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This thesis offers a comparative examination of the works of Keats and 
Shelley, two important second-generation Romantic poets. It draws upon the 
philosophy of Friedrich Nietzsche to illuminate their treatment of the self. 
Despite the significant cultural, historical and generic differences, the 
works of Keats and Shelley share Nietzsche's conviction that art and the 
aesthetic are life-affirming. Nietzsche's understanding of the self as 
fictional is viewed, first, as being anticipated by the writings of Keats and 
Shelley and, secondly, as an integral part of modern constructions of 
Romanticism. Chapter One surveys a variety of Romantic literary criticism. 
Both aesthetic and theoretical readings of Keats and Shelley are shown either 
to have drawn parallels between their works and Nietzsche's philosophy or 
(particularly in the case of de Ilan and deconstructionists after him> to have 
employed certain Nietzschean critical practices and concepts. Nietzsche's 
philosophy is shown to have become an integral part of Romantic literary 
criticism. This chapter also summarises Nietzsche's critique of metaphysics, 
his viewsw on art, his understanding of the lyric poet, his concept of the 
Overman [Nbermensch), and his account of the self as a fiction. 
In Chapter Two the prose writings of Keats and Shelley are regarded as 
precursors of a Nietzschean emphasis on self-invention. Shelley's definition 
of poetry in A Defence of Poetry is read as encouraging a continual process of 
metaphorical self-revision. Shelley's aesthetics of self-revision are 
paralleled with Keats's concept of "Negative Capability" and the "Vale of 
Soul-making". The prose writings of Keats and Shelley are considered as 
foreshadowing Nietzsche's ideas about fiction as a mode of knowing. 
Chapter Three offers a comparative reading of Keats's Endymion and Shelley's 
Alastor, exploring how their narratives probe the darker depths of the romance 
world. The tension between tragic reality and blissful illusion is considered 
in the light of Nietzsche's Apollonian and Dionysian dynamic in The Birth of 
Tragedy. Keats and Shelley have recourse to a series of negative fictions in 
order to confront the tragedy underlying romance's illusions. 
Chapter Four understands the major lyrical poetry of Keats and Shelley as 
confronting the limitations of language, art and existence. The need for the 
lyric poet to joyously affirm life, even in the face of tragedy and loss, is 
discussed in terms of Nietzsche's later view of the Dionysian category in 
Twilight of the Idols. These confrontations are viewed as testifying to the 
poetic power of Keatsian and Shelleyan fiction-making. 
Chapter Five examines how Shelley's Adonais remoulds Keats's poetic 
character and the circumstances surrounding his death to ensure that Keats and 
Adonais attain a posthumous existence. Shelley is viewed as redeeming Keats 
and Adonais, yet as orientated by the poetic logic of Adonais towards a 
confrontation with his own death. 
The final chapter offers a comparative reading of Keats's "Hyperion" 
fragments and Shelley's incomplete The Triumph of Life. The processes of self- 
invention at work in these fragments are viewed both as exemplifying 
Nietzsche's concept of becoming and as offering a critique of Enlightenment 
ideas about history and the self. The abrupt endings of these Romantic 
fragments place a responsibility on the reader to countersign the poetic 
identities of Keats and Shelley. To countersign these fragments is to 
participate in an affirmative Nietzschean "yes" saying, which will ensure the 
posthumous reputations of Keats and Shelley as writers. 
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The writings of John Keats and P. B. Shelley have attracted an 
overwhelming variety of criticism. Studies of either one of these poets, 
or of the British Romantic movement as a whole, have naturally drawn 
comparisons and contrasts between their works. Few studies confine 
themselves to a comparative examination of Keats and Shelley, writing 
instead about the works of one or the other and tacitly reinforcing 
Leavis's segregation of an earthy Keats from an airy Shelley. The only 
notable exception is R. H. Fogle's painstaking study of The Images of 
Keats and Shelley (1949) which, nonetheless, finds Keatsian imagery full 
of richness and Shelley's poetry somewhat abstract. 
This thesis offers a comparative examination of these two important 
second-generation Romantic poets and draws upon post-Romantic writings, 
particularly the works of Friedrich Nietzsche, to discuss their 
treatment of the self. Many significant cultural, historical, and 
generic differences exist between Nietzschean philosophy and the works 
of Keats and Shelley. Such differences are even more pronounced in light 
of Nietzsche's self-professed anti-romantic stance, which criticises 
Romanticism for impoverishing life by offering art as a redemptive 
shelter from a troubled world. Nietzsche's criticism of Romanticism 
gestures towards how his own emphasis on the aesthetic as life-affirming 
is shared by, and anticipated in, the works of Keats and Shelley. The 
overall intention of my thesis is to offer original readings of the 
xiii 
poetry and prose of Keats and Shelley, which are usefully illuminated by 
Nietzsche's views on the aesthetic and life. My own thinking about 
Nietzsche' s understanding of self, art and life owes much to Alexander 
Nehemas's Nietzsche: Life as Literature (1985) and Julian Young's 
Nietzsche's Philosophy of Art (1992). Both of these philosophical 
studies explore Nietzsche's ideas concerning aesthetics in the broader 
context of his writings about metaphysics, eternal return, and the 
60 
concept of the Overman [Übermensch). With varying degrees of emphasis, 
Nehemas and Young consider a merging of life and literature central to 
Nietzsche's views of aesthetics and as an integral part of his 
interpretation of metaphysics and self as another mode of fiction. 
Daniel V. Conway's recent study of Nietzsche and the Political (1997) 
has acknowledged the significance of aesthetics for a process of self- 
creation, although his book is concerned mainly with Nietzsche's notions 
of moral perfectionism and the ascetic ideal. By contrast, the present 
thesis gives Nietzsche's ideas on aesthetics prominence over his 
writings on morality and ascetic ideals. 
Nietzsche's understanding of the self as fictional is viewed, first, 
as being pre-empted by the writings of Keats and Shelley and, second, as 
central to modern constructions of Romanticism. My emphasis on the 
significance of Nietzschean philosophy points to an affinity this thesis 
shares with Tilottama Rajan's Dark Interpreter (1980). Rajan's book 
focuses on romantic discourse and uses Nietzsche's The Birth of Tragedy 
to provide a vocabulary for her deconstructive readings of major 
Romantic poems. For my part, I have drawn upon a variety of Nietzsche's 
xiv 
texts in order to incorporate the Apollonian-Dionysian dynamic discussed 
by Rajan with his critique of Enlightenment metaphysics and concept of 
the Overman CUbermensch). Where possible, I have discussed the work of 
other commentators on Keats and Shelley, who have made comparisons and 
contrasts with Nietzsche's writings, or else employed his ideas for 
theoretical agendas, to emphasise how enmeshed his philosophy has become 
with Romantic criticism. I am sympathetic to Rajan's style of 
deconstruction which, like Ronald Tetreault's approach to Shelley in T. h, 
Poetry of Life (1987), is insightful without ascribing to the text in 
question a blindness to its own effects, or making a de Manian claim to 
know a text better than itself. 
Ny comparative readings of Keats and Shelley are arranged into 
chapters according to genre: their prose writings about self and 
aesthetics; their early poetic use of romance; their transgressive and 
tragic lyrics; Shelley' s elegy for Keats; and, finally, their Romantic 
fragment poems. These genres were selected because they contained 
widely known works by Keats and Shelley. By re-examining these familiar 
works in the light of Nietzschean philosophy, fresh critical insights 
are gained and the affinities between Keats and Shelley foregrounded. 
My thesis excludes the dramatic works of Keats and Shelley. Such an 
exclusion is made, partly, because i believe that a consideration of 
Keats's theatrical endeavours and Shelley's extensive dramatic works 
would be better served by inclusion in a larger critical project than 
the present one. More importantly, the dramas of Keats and Shelley have 
xv 
received excellent critical attention in recent years. Keats's 
experimentation with the dramatic mode recieves its most sympathetic 
defence in Charles J. Rzepka's The Self as Mind (1986). Rzepka uses Otho 
the Great as a basis for suggesting that Keats's poetical and prose 
works are preoccupied with the staging and dramatic framing of the 
events they portray. Keats is viewed as a credible dramatist, because 
all of his writings are imbued with a sense of the dramatic. Shelley's 
critics have successfully connected his dramatic undertakings with the 
concerns of Nietzschean philosophy. Jerrold E. Hogle's study of 
Shelley's Process (1988) reads Prometheus Unbound in terms of 
Nietzsche's concept of the will and Ross Woodman explores Shelley's 
lyrical drama as a Rietzschean conflict between the metaphysical and 
metaphorical modes (Studies in Romanticism, 1990). In a recent work on 
Revenge Tragedy (1996), John Kerrigan has suggested that Shelley's Ib& 
Gggc-i foreshadows Nietzsche's announcement of an ethical revolution in 
Beyond Good and Evil and On the Genealogy of Morals. 
Chapter One of my thesis surveys a spectrum of Romantic literary 
criticism. Both aesthetic and theoretical readings of Keats and Shelley 
are shown either to have drawn parallels between their works and 
Nietzsche's philosophy or (particularly in the case of de Man and 
deconstructionists after him) to have employed certain Nietzschean 
critical practices and concepts. Even Jerome J. McGann's New 
Historical method draws upon Nietzschean philosophy and shares certain 
affinities with the critical practices of deconstruction. Nietzsche's 
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philosophy is shown to have become an integral part of Romantic literary 
criticism. In the course of establishing Nietzsche's significance for 
literary criticism, this chapter outlines his critique of metaphysics, 
his views on art, his understanding of the lyric poet, his concept of 
the Overman [Ubermenschl, and his account of the self as fictional. 
These key concepts are returned to in subsequent chapters and used to 
enrich comparative readings of the poetry and prose of Keats and 
Shelley. 
A reading of Shelley's A Defence of Poetry and Keats's Letters is 
offered in Chapter Two. The prose writings of Keats and Shelley are 
regarded as anticipating Nietzsche's own emphasis on self-invention, the 
metaphorical nature of language, and distrust of metaphysics. I suggest 
that Shelley's A Defence of Poetry regards poetry as a discourse which 
subordinates all systems of signs under the banner of poetic language, 
thus liberating the self from dogmatic certainty and reductive 
rationalism, permitting a continual process of metaphorical self- 
revision. These key ideas in A Defence of Poetry are paralleled with 
Keats's view of the self as fictional and his own distrust of 
metaphysical reasoning. Keats's concepts of "Negative Capability" and 
the "Vale of Soul-making" are shown to invest in a similar process of 
self-revision. The prose writings of Keats and Shelley anticipate 
Nietzsche's ideas about fiction as a mode of knowing. 
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Chapter Three considers romance as a genre which was attractive to 
the young Keats and Shelley, who were sceptical about Wordsworth's 
consolatory fictions and wanted to experiment with fictions of self- 
invention. A comparative reading of Keats's Endvymion and Shelley's 
Alastor shows how Keats and Shelley probe the darker depths of the 
romance world, with its apparent surface of light and harmony. This 
oscillation between tragic suffering and bliss in Alastor and Endymion 
is considered in terms of Nietzsche's understanding of the Apollonian 
and Dionysian dynamic in The Birth of Tragedy. Keats and Shelley are 
regarded as inventing a strategy of negative, yet affirming, fictions to 
confront the tragic suffering and absence that they unearth beneath 
romance's illusions. 
In Chapter Four, the lyric is presented as a transgressive genre, 
which is suited to further explorations of the tragic awareness that 
Keats and Shelley realised in their romances. The major lyrical poetry 
of Keats and Shelley is understood as confronting the limitations of 
language, art and existence. I contend that the scepticism of Keats's 
"Ode to Psyche" and Shelley's "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty" is developed 
into a joyous affirmation of tragedy, celebrated in To Autumn" and "Ode 
to West Wind" respectively. The role of the lyric poet to affirm life 
even in the face of tragedy and loss is discussed in terms of 
Nietzsche's later view of the Dionysian category in Twilight of the 
mss. These confrontations with the limitations of language, art and 
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existence are viewed as testifying to the poetic power of Keatsian and 
Shelleyan fiction-making. 
Focusing on Adonais, Chapter Five examines how Shelley comes to 
terms with Keats's death and the possibility of his own future 
extinction. Adonais, I suggest, takes up a relationship with history and 
biography through Shelley's initiation of a process of forgetting which, 
ultimately, leads to a remembering of what is repressed. Shelley's 
treatment of history, biography, and forgetting is compared with 
Nietzsche's meditation On the Uses and Disadvantages of History for 
Life. Shelley remoulds Keats's poetic character and the circumstances 
surrounding his death to ensure that Keats and Adonais attain a 
posthumous existence. Their immortality, I argue, is only possible 
because of Adonais's poetic logic which incorporates the temporal into 
the eternal. Shelley redeems Keats and Adonais only at his own expense; 
he is orientated by the poetic logic of Adonais towards a confrontation 
with his own death. 
The final chapter offers a comparative reading of Keats's "Hyperion" 
fragments and Shelley's incomplete The Triumph of Life. These Romantic 
fragment poems with their abrupt endings implicate the reader in the 
process of self-invention, explored by Keats and Shelley in their other 
works. The processes of self-invention at work in these fragment poems 
are viewed both as exemplifying Nietzsche's concept of becoming and as 
offering a critique of Enlightenment ideas about history and the self. 
These fragment poems promote the necessity of grasping a double truth, 
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which affirms Joy and suffering; they signpost the way towards attaining 
the perspective of Nietzsche's Overman Ijbermenschl. The fragmented 
state of Keats' s "Hyperion" poems and Shel l ey' s The Triumph of Life, I 
contend, place a responsibility on the reader to countersign the poetic 
identities of Keats and Shelley. To countersign these fragments is to 
participate in a process of becoming and an affirmative Nietzschean 
"yes" saying, which will ensure the posthumous reputations of Keats and 
Shelley as writers. 
A 
1 
Chapter 1 
Üsia and Abusing Nietzschean Concepts in the Criticism 
.. [T]here seems to be no better way to 
interpret the movement than by understanding 
the misunderstandings it created among its 
interpreters. ' 
(Paul de Man) 
Many important historical, cultural, and generic differences separate the 
writings of Keats, Shelley and Nietzsche, but these have not deterred 
scholars from establishing parallels between them. Even critics without 
explicit theoretical agendas have traced significant similarities between 
the texts of Keats, Shelley and Nietzsche. Theoretical accounts have gone 
beyond charting parallels to draw upon Nietzschean philosophy as a source 
for critical practices and appropriate vocabulary. The critical reception 
of Keats and Shelley has been equally varied although, since F. R. Leavis's 
heyday, marked differences have existed between the nature of literary 
criticism that their individual bodies of work have received. Leavis 
persistently complains, after Matthew Arnolde, about the failure of 
Shelleyan imagery "to grasp something real"O, and in contrast, praises 
Keatsian language for its "strong grasp upon actualities" and its "sense of 
the solid world" (BY2261). More importantly, Leavis's praise established 
the long-standing critical perception of Keats as an aesthete--preoccupied 
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with the contemplation of Greek artefacts, literature, and paintings (3L, 
257)--and rendered Shelley "'almost unreadable'" ($y, 231). 
Leavis's ghost still haunts criticism of the works of Keats and 
Shelley. The majority of critical approaches to Keats have tended to 
support Leavis's myth of Keats as an aesthete by focusing on the self- 
transcendent implications of the beauty-truth identification, as in Earl R. 
Wasserman's The Finer Tone, or John Jones's study"- of the Keatsian struggle 
to come to terms with the co-existence of suffering and beauty, through a 
working out of this problematic relation in the poetry of "snail-horn 
perception" (, 105-27). One of the more recent Harvard Keatsians, Helen 
Vendler--in the wake of the criticism of Lionel Trilling, John Bayley, and 
Christopher Ricks--has reinforced Keats's image as an aesthete, adopting a 
critical methodology of inter-textuality, which discovers endless internal 
connections between the odes. Vendler's approach offers, as Wasserman's 
account so often readily does, a totalising retelling of how "each ode is 
generated out of previous odes"l- and she identifies in the sequence of 
Keats's odes "his own predicament as an artist" (QJK, 13). Such aesthetic 
readings of Keats are highly sophisticated, subtle and illuminating, but, 
as Morris Dickstein has observed, they do tend to separate Keats from the 
general Romantic Movement, including Shelley his contemporary who was, like 
Byron, a major literary figure of second-generation British Romanticism. 
This separation--if not alienation--of Keats and Shelley from one another 
has been further exacerbated by the different kinds of critical practice 
their literary works have attracted. Keatsian criticism often encompasses 
philosophic, linguistic, and political issues by persistently framing them 
in, or even out of, artistic and poetical frameworks, so that they are 
rendered subordinate to a series of aesthetic inter-relations for their 
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significance. Conversely, Shelley's work has produced a more esoteric body 
of criticism still haunted by Leavis's utterances about abstract 
"unreadability". These theoretical approaches include deconstructive 
readings by Paul de Man, Harold Bloom's version of Shelley as a 
"mythopoeic" poet' and Ross Woodman's study of the apocalyptic in Shelley's 
poetrys. Psychological investigations into Shelley's work have been 
conducted by Jerrold E. Hogle's emphasis on "transference". Peter Sacks's 
study of grief in Adonais'° and Thomas Weiskel's Lacanian account of 
Al ast or ,'1 
Shelleys work has never been confined to the aesthetic, because the 
aesthetics of Shelley's poetry have been read through a complex critical 
and philosophical lens. Ironically, theoretical Shelleyan criticism often 
reveals traces of Leavis's influence. Latent in Weiskel's Lacanian readings 
are traces of a morally repugnant egotistical narcissism; in Rogle's 
Shelley's Process the criticism borders on the didactic by moralising about 
Shelley's "self-regarding" (3L, 220) heroic role in his poetry. ' Even de 
ltanian deconstruction echoes a Leavisian notion of "unreadability", 
formulating Shelley's The Triumph of Life as an extension of a Bloomian 
misprision, disclosing "reading as disfiguration". 13 
Certainly, the recurrence of process as an issue in these critical 
studies is partly explained by the Romantic obsession with the incomplete, 
on-going nature of writing and reading. It is also explained by similar 
concerns, inherent in Nietzschean philosophy, which underlie many methods 
of criticism of Romantic poetry. Critics have established links between 
Nietzschean philosophy and Romantic writings in one of two ways; either the 
preoccupation with self-invention in Romantic texts is viewed as a 
precursor to the concerns of Nietzschean philosophy, or Nietzsche's 
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fictionalising of the self and world is used to measure Romantic concerns 
with the nature of self, world and aesthetics. Few Romantic scholars who 
employ either of these approaches will readily concede a Nietzschean 
influence on their critical perspectives, or consider Romantic and 
Nietzschean texts alongside one another. This comparative exploration of 
self-invention in the works of Keats and Shelley admits to a Nietzschean 
influence on its critical practices and makes explicit connections between 
the writings of Keats, Shelley and Nietzsche. 
Exploiting the inconsistencies of rational metaphysics, Nietzsche 
establishes the principles of a de Manian approach to literature, 
Nietzsche's analysis of an Enlightenment "will to truth", Reason, and a 
progressive improvement of humanity extends beyond a logical attack on the 
movement's essential premisses to a deconstructive examination of what has 
been excluded, denied, and repressed by rationalism, This critique of 
Enlightenment values persistently focuses on what has been repressed by 
Kantian metaphysics and highlights the internal weaknesses of this 
rationalist system: 
What really is it in us that wants 'the truth'? We did indeed 
pause for a long time before the question of the origin of 
this will--until finally we came to a complete halt before an 
even more fundamental question. We asked after the value of this 
will. Granted we want truth: why not rather untruth? And uncer- 
tainty? Even ignorance? ($_U, 33) 
The Enlightenment "will to truth" <BSr., 33) represses the notion of 
"untruth as a condition of life" (am, 36), failing to account for the 
5 
possibility that its belief in the rational may in itself be the product of 
an error. Reason wrongly locates the origin of the Good and Beautiful in a 
divine and transcendental realm. Kant's a priori categories of the mind and 
their correspondence with the Ideals of the Good, Beauty, and Reason 
secured an individual's ability to gain "true" knowledge of the phenomenal 
world, without considering a "truth" or "fact" to be only one possible 
interpretation of the universe out of many. Metaphysicians, according to 
Nietzsche, asserted their fictional perspective as actual and universal, 
confusing their fabrication of the world with the world's real state of 
affairs: 
Because we have to be stable in our beliefs if we are 
to prosper, we have made the 'real' world a world not 
of change and becoming, but one of being. (WP, 3,3,50? ) 
A world of being is rooted in the mistaken metaphysical assumption that 
to possess the ability to name the elements of the phenomenal world, 
through language, is identical to having knowledge of what is observed. 
ietaphysical language is not permitted to produce a multiplicity of 
meanings, but forced to bear testament to a world of being, underpinned by 
a fixed meaning, absolute ideals, and certain knowledge of the observed 
object; 
The sculptor of language was not so modest as to believe 
that he was only giving things designations, he conceived 
rather that with words he was expressing supreme knowledge 
of things... W, 16) 
Language or logic "depends upon presuppositions with which nothing in 
the real world corresponds" (mal, 16). For Nietzsche, the act of naming a 
thing is not to attain knowledge of its essence, but to give birth to the 
notion of that particular thing as a concept. For Nietzsche, words and 
symbols are no more an integral part of the essence of the phenomenal world 
than the concepts they create; freed from the constraints of a metaphysical 
system, they serve as partial signposts to new understandings and 
interpretations of reality: 
We set up a word at the point at which our ignorance begins, 
at which we can see no further, eg., the word 'I, ' the word 
'do, ' the word 'suffer': --these are perhaps the horizon of 
our knowledge, but not the 'truths'. (WT-, 3,3,482) 
To deconstruct the metaphysical is not for Nietzsche to reject it. Even 
his critique of metaphysics and its totalising explanations of the universe 
is preoccupied with viewing metaphysical absolutes as one way of 
interpreting life. Metaphysics is no more or less valid than any other 
interpretation of the universe, since all explanations--even those of logic 
and science--are only necessary interpretative fictions of reality: 
... [TJhat physics too is only an interpretation and arrangement 
of the world... and not an explanation of the world... 
.,. [T]hat without granting as true the fictions of logic, with- 
out measuring reality against the purely invented world of the 
unconditional and self-identical, without a continual falsific- 
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ation of the world by means of numbers, mankind could not live... 
(Ba, 44; 35) 
Reality is no longer founded upon an absolute metaphysical cornerstone, 
but partly uncovered and partly invented by a series of competing fictions, 
which attempt to interpret reality and negotiate humanity's position in the 
universe. Consequently, a totalising view of reality is impossible since 
these competing interpretations are only capable of portraying a fragmented 
reality, glimpsed through their particular conceptual windows. Metaphysics 
is displaced by the fragmented fictions of the metaphorical: 
'You shall learn to grasp the sense of perspective in every 
value judgement--the distortion and merely apparent teleology 
of horizons and whatever else pertains to perspectivism... ' 
(HE, Preface, 9) 
Effectively, Nietzsche has deconstructed the metaphysical "will to 
truth" and unity to reveal that underlying its claims to absolute truth and 
certainty of knowledge is a repression of the necessary "condition of 
untruth". Through the loss of these metaphysical certainties an 
individual's own self-knowledge is subject to the processes of excavation 
and invention, as is the nature of reality. A Nietzschean critique of the 
transcendental realm of metaphysical systems permits an exploration of self 
so that individuals can become the "adventurers and circumnavigators of 
that inner world called 'man"' (am., Preface, 10) : 
The subject: this is the term for our belief in a unity 
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underlying all the different impulses of the highest 
feeling of reality: we understand this belief as the 
effect of one cause--we believe so firmly in our belief 
that for its sake we imagine 'truth', 'reality', 'sub- 
stantiality' in general. --The subject is the fiction 
that many similar states in us are the effect of one 
substratum: but it is we who first created the 'simil- 
arity' of these states. (a, 3,3,485) 
By doubting a subject's autonomy and unity, Nietzsche is able to free 
an individual's sense of self from the shackles of a transcendental 
reality. Enlightenment's apparent impulse to unity produces a dualistic 
understanding of the self, in which the rational mind aspires to a 
metaphysical and supersensible realm of Reason, yet is constantly hindered 
by the base and sensuous desires of the body. Ni etzsche' s aligning of the 
pursuit of Reason with the "will to truth" ends the division of the 
intellect from other bodily desires, as it acknowledges the thirst for 
knowledge as one of many of the appetites of the body--the Nietzschean 
"will to power" combines action and thought, intellect and desire, mind and 
body--as in "every act of will there is a commanding thought-- and do not 
imagine that this thought can be separated from the 'willing"' (B-QE, 48). 
Nietzsche's emphasis on the inextricability of an author from his or her 
work, sharply distinguishes his own thinking from those deconstructionists 
who celebrate Nietzsche as a proto-deconstructionist and claim that his 
critique of onto-theology initiated the end of authorial intention. 14 A 
Nietzschean critique of metaphysics unearths a repressed "will to power" 
present in its formulation of the "will to truth" and its subsequent 
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evaluation of morality, The "will to truth" appears to advocate a divine 
transcendental realm of Reason and the Good, when in fact, it desires the 
subjection of reality to its rationalist system, along with the 
subscription of its disciples to a rationalist account of the universe: 
Will to the conceivability of all being: that is what L call 
your will! 
.,. But it must bend and accommodate itself to you! Thus will 
your will have it. It must become smooth and subject to the mind 
as the mind's mirror and reflection. 
This is your entire will... it is a will to power; and that is 
so even when you talk of good and evil and of the assessment of 
values. (Z., 136) 
Nietzsche's acute awareness of the creative and metaphorical nature of 
language--even that employed by metaphysics--liberates the self's 
perception of reality and the self's understanding of itself through an 
extreme awareness of the fictionality of any particular linguistic 
construction of a self and its perspective on and relation to reality. The 
self is no longer a fixed and divided part of the metaphysical world of 
being, but one of many processes that are a part of an eternal universe 
involved in the act of "becoming". The universe and the self's relation to 
it are not to be constructed through a single fiction; rather, they are 
constructed and invented by numerous competing fictions, which must 
continually invent and re-invent both the universe and the self. The nature 
of reality and the self must partly be unburied and partly invented, as the 
process of "becoming" is centred on the paradoxical task of "how one 
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becomes what olle is" (Ea" 64). An act of "becoming" necessitates the 
perpetual invention of these fictions to avoid a hardening of a fictive 
construction of the self and reality into metaphysical dogma. Consequently, 
"what one is" will be inextricable from the process of "becoming"; it will 
not be a fixed state at which the individual self must arrive, as if driven 
by a metaphysical telas: 
[14Jan is a bridge and not a goal; counting himself happy 
for his noontides and evenings, as a way to new dawns... 
A dangerous going-across, a dangerous wayfaring, a danger- 
ous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering and staying-still. 
(Z, 215; 43) 
Crucial to the Nietzschean process of "how one becomes what one is", 
involving the act of self-construction and self-definition in and through 
fiction, is the self's struggle to fashion a social, political, and 
literary identity that might cast light upon its true nature and relation 
to reality. The centrality of the self as a constantly revisable script to 
Nietzsche's philosophy is of equal importance to the treatment of aesthetic 
self-construction in the works of Keats and Shelley; the critical lenses 
these poets have been viewed through are often indebted to Nietzsche (as in 
particular the work of de Man, Rajan, and Woodman); and more in spite of 
generic and historical differences, the poetical concerns of Keats and 
Shelley anticipate Nietzsche's philosophical treatment of the self. 
Throughout Nietzsche's philosophical works there is a persistent 
awareness of Nietzsche the author which extends beyond his engagement in 
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penning his manuscripts to an active involvement in the writing and re- 
writing of his own self-identity. Nietzsche exploits the autobiographical 
genre in Ecce Homo through a blending of literary fiction and historical 
fact, so that he can fashion a literary identity approximating the Overman 
06 [Ubermensch7, shaping himself as a Dionysian individual who knows and 
embraces his fate, whose coming was foretold by Zarathustra the prophet of 
the noontide, Nietzsche's own literary re-invention of a historical figure 
(ui, 126-7). Mirroring this blurring of fiction and fact, Nietzsche's 
autobiographical account is at once retrospective and forward-looking: Ekg 
Homo is a recollected account of an individual who prophesied an end to the 
Enlightenment project throughout his life and work. 
Consequently, Nietzsche's life and work are deliberately collapsed 
into one another by the collection of the later stages of his career under 
the chronological sequence of the titles of his publications; the process 
of self-revision occurring both from within, in the form of a reappraisal 
of his past works and fictional identities, and from without, as these 
revisionary accounts of past events and works produce a re-writing of the 
self and a new literary work in the form of Ecce Homo, The close of Ecce 
Homo stresses a return to Nietzsche as an author who, simultaneously, pens 
a literal manuscript that revises other manuscripts and a metaphorical 
writing and re-writing of the self. Both kinds of manuscripts, whether by 
Nietzsche or other readers, will inevitably be subject to re-invention and 
re-interpretation, so it is fitting that the final line asserts Nietzsche's 
fictionalisation of the self in hand with the endless potential for 
numerous constructions, readings, and writings of the "I": 
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--Have I been understood? --Dionysos against the Crucii d,,, 
(EH, 134) 
Nietzsche's philosophical and literary treatment of the self, through a 
constant interpenetration of life and literature, exploits and underlines 
the fictive nature of an individual's concept of self to such an extreme 
degree that everyone becomes an artist engaged in the weaving of complex 
fictions to forge a new self, "Ih)e is no longer an artist, he has become a 
work of art" (EI, 37). Certainly, this is the case in Nietzsche's literary 
practice of signing his initials at the beginning of Ecce Homo only to re- 
cast, displace and defer whatever fictional construction of self is 
implicated in this act throughout the text, or his creation of Zarathustra 
as his mouth-piece, or even Nietzsche's explicit "attempt at a self- 
criticism" in the 1886 edition of The Birth of Tragedy, a critique of his 
first major work and his earlier constructed self. The conflict between the 
signature and the signatory in the process of self-construction (or the 
steady fiction of an adopted mask and the evolving fictions of a "becoming" 
self) and the gap created by Nietzsche's protest that The Birth of Trage 
"should be treated with some consideration and taciturnity" (BI, 19). 
Nietzsche is, in fact, actively writing a critique of his own work to 
disclose such a fictive space. This space will permit the continued 
fashioning of a self, so that an individual is at once master artist and an 
incompleted artistic project. In many respects Nietzsche's profound self- 
awareness of a self as a fictional construct in his literary work and life, 
in spite of his anti-romanticism, identifies him with the magical being he 
understands the lyric poet to be: 
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.,. [L]ike the weird image of the fairy tale which can turn 
its eyes at will and behold itself; he is at once subject 
and object, at once poet, actor, and spectator. Q a, 52) 
Nietzschean philosophy turns out to have a double fascination for the 
literary critic of Romanticism. On one hand, it offers a useful 
deconstructive approach with which to analyse apparently closed systems or 
texts--without the premature death of the author or reader--and, on the 
other, it offers a much-needed vocabulary to discuss Romanticism's own 
extreme self-awareness of the "I" as a fictional construct and the 
movement's subsequent obsession with the processes involved in the 
construction of a literary work and identity. Critical perceptions of 
Romanticism, whether conscious of it or not, are indebted to the terms and 
concepts of Nietzschean philosophy, to an extent which is often 
underestimated. 
Even M. H. Abrams's study of Romanticism's reappropriation of religious 
redemptive patterns to a secularised arena finds, in Nietzsche's The Birth 
of Tragedy, a model for his own pattern of "a fall from primal unity into 
self-division, self-contradiction, and seif-conflict as... ta]-.. first step 
along the way toward a higher unity... ". 's The Apollonian-Dionysian duality 
is adopted by Abrams to describe the psychic conflict between the 
harmonious and the chaotic, so that individual redemption is only possible 
by the unification of these contradictory states, which brings an end to 
humanity's alienation from nature and produces "the consummation of all 
things" (K, 318). Tilottama Rajan's more sophisticated theoretical 
account of Romanticism (although primarily concerned with the movement's 
deconstruction of its own idealist aesthetics) shares a similar interest 
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with Abrams in the dialectical "process of constant self-negation to 
generate a momentum toward synthesis"', and imports Nietzschearl 
terminology to inform her critical discussion: 
... Nietzsche... can provide us with a vocabulary with which 
to interpret a wide variety of Romantic poems, considered as 
allegories of the aesthetic act and the operations it performs 
(uk, 20) 
Rajan's first deconstructive study of Romanticism is mostly dependent 
upon The Birth of Tragedy for its Nietzschean vocabulary; borrowing its 
dual understanding of art as a "bright image of clouds and sky mirrored in 
a black lake of sadness" (In, 70), she excavates the duality of Romantic 
consciousness to disclose that "Ctlhe darker elements in Romantic works are 
not a part of their organic unity" (]I, 19). 
Consequently, Rajan is able to depict Keats as a poet who during the 
course of his career moves away from Apollonian idealism towards a more 
tragic and Dionysian concept of art, occupying a "space of... discontinuity 
between the real and the ideal, between the empty verbal sign and the thing 
it evokes... " (LI, 107). Keats, for Rajan, finally arrives "Coln the 
L t] hreshold of [t]ragedy" (J1L, 97) in his late romances without taking 
account of the tragic sensibility present in Keats's earlier romance, 
Endymion. Rajan's reading confines Keats to the aesthetic sphere, in which 
he is only capable of the incestuous act of representing "the nature of 
aesthetic representation" (Dl, 111), and forever unable to realise his own 
fiction, because "to make this fiction real might be to destroy altogether 
the fragile foundation of illusion on which it rests" Q j, 115). 
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Shelley's poetry is for Rajan similarly constructed in terms of an 
Apollonian-Dionysian dynamic, as she finds that "Shelley's poetic theory is 
not self-conscious enough to provide us with an explicit terminology in 
which to discuss his poetry" (L, 73). What emerges is a Shelley capable of 
a complex sceptical idealism, expressed through the image of the 
transforming mirror in A Defence of Poetry, and read by Rajan as "yet 
another attempt to submerge Dionysus in Apollo, and to silence an 
inevitable dialogue between the veil of language and the knowledge of life" 
(pl, 74). Shelley' s mature works, like Keats' s later poetry, are confined 
to an exploration of art as "the reconstruction of appearances as well 
as the disclosure of the Dionysiac knowledge that lies behind them" Cpl, 
70). The works of Shelley, in Rajan's critical investigation, are at least 
comparable to those of Keats, though the price for the comparison is a 
less political Shelley and a highly aestheticised Keats, who truly belongs 
amongst the exhibits of Marjorie Levinson's "museum space". 
The roots of this aestheticised construction of Keats and Shelley--and 
wider Romantic discourse--are, of course, in Nietzsche's The Birth of 
Tragedy, or what Raj an refers to as "Nietzsche' s aesthetic theory" <Dl, 
29), a label that is both restrictive and inaccurate. After all, Nietzsche 
never proclaimed a comprehensive aesthetic theory and was subsequently at 
pains to criticise his own study of Greek culture and its use of tragedy. 
Niether does Rajan's focus on The Birth of Tragedy allow her account to 
emphasise fully how inextricable the Apollonian and Dionysian categories 
were for Nietzsche nor how by 1888, in The Twilight of the Idols, the 
Dionysian category had been expanded to incorporate the Apollonian. 
Certainly, a curious irony occurs when a deconstructionist critic wishes to 
totaiise Nietzsche's views of aesthetics under a single banner. More 
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importantly, Nietzsche's philosophy extends beyond a simple theory of 
aesthetics to a radical aestheticisation of self and reality, which permits 
their writing and re-writing through the invention and disclosure of 
fictions. 
The myth of a single Nietzschean aesthetic theory has been perpetuated 
by critical efforts, often dependent upon the Apollonian-Dionysian dynamic, 
to chart the duality of Romantic consciousness and experience. By 
subscribing to this myth Rajan was most obviously following in the 
footsteps of Ross Woodman's apocalyptic study of Shelley's poetry and 
Abrams's Natural Supernaturalism. Equally, de Manian readings of 
Romanticism contributed to the rise of this myth by the infiltration of 
Nietzschean concepts into literary and aesthetic discussions of other 
Romantic commentators. Paul Privateer has observed that these "two forms of 
romantic literary criticism" employ Nietzsche differently; on one hand, 
"Abrams accepts the notion of a textually representative romantic self" 
and, on the other, de Man questions the possibility of "self-reference and 
authority". 13 
The process of de Manian effacement--in which the act of affirming the 
self through a figural "I" produces its immediate erasure--is indebted to a 
conflict between Apollo and Dionysus. In Nietzschean terms, the attempted 
affirmation of the "I" draws on the Apollonian "delimiting (of) the 
boundaries of the individual" and a desire for "self-knowledge" (BI, 46); 
its erasure draws on the Dionysian state in which "everything subjective 
vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness" (IM, 36). 
Those critics who have followed in the wake of de Man have contributed 
to this conspiracy and unwittingly smuggled Nietzschean concepts into 
Romantic criticism. Andrew Bennett's study of the "anxiety of audience"' 
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in Keats's poetry is rooted in two de Manian concepts; explicitly that 
the "allegory of reading narrates the impossibility of reading" (ALE, 77) 
and, more implicitly, that "CdJeath is a displaced name for a linguistic 
predicament, and the restoration of mortality by autobiography (the 
prosopopoeia of the voice and the name)" ($$, 81). Bennett's account has 
shifted emphasis away from the author to the figure of the reader, but his 
study is unmistakably de Manian in origin. A desire to be a poem's 
audience only heightens a reader's sense of being a non-audience; 
consequently, reading can only ever result in its own impossibility. This 
collapse of the reader's attempted affirmation as textual audience into 
non-audience can be traced back to a de Manian erasure of the "I", which 
itself echoes Nietzsche's Apollonian-Dionysian dynamic.: °'O 
Equally, Jiogle's study of process in Shelley's poetry assents to this 
critical conspiracy. Although Hogle's critical account focuses on Shelley's 
preoccupation with figuring and recovering a lost or repressed origin, the 
study is more concerned with the fabrication of the self through a social 
context (, 15; 16). This criticism, overtly, brings into play a Marxist 
understanding of "transformation" and a Freudian sense of "transference" to 
discuss the decentred centre in Shelley's work: 
Perhaps the newer readings closest to my view are the ones 
that have announced themselves as more truly "deconstructive" 
than any Bloomian would want to be [... 7 Even so, and despite 
my debts to them, I do not find the American deconstructionists 
to be much more accurate in their sense of Shelley than the more 
traditional and "centred" interpreters of his work. (EE, 22; 23) 
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Nonetheless, Hogle's reading of a Shelleyan impulse toward the poetic 
act of writing draws explicitly on de Man and Nietzsche. He understands 
Shelley's work, at moments, as exhibiting a "Nietzschean foresight" in how 
it "generates a guiding or 'ruling thought' that sets the direction for the 
self-overcoming always attempted by a complex feeling and desire" <SE, 
105). Such a notion relies upon Nietzsche's understanding of truth as a 
"mobile army of metaphors", an idea which was also taken up by de Man ($$, 
239), and views Shelley's poetry as reasserting "the continual and self- 
overcoming interaction between ever-changeable language and its self- 
transforming speakers" C, 109>. Consequently, Shelley's weaving of 
metaphors and figures is read as an act of supplementation through which 
"the movement that underlies all figuration... becomes visible only in 
figures" (EE, 19). Shelley can be construed in these epistemological terms, 
since his poetry has recourse to a fictive metaphysical supplement of 
reality. Similarly, Levinson sees the allegorical life of Keats's poetry as 
a supplement to the social, financial, and sexual frustrations which he 
encountered in actual life; conversely, Rajan gives a recent account of 
reading as a supplementary act, which supplements Romantic writing and 
exposes its textual lack. =' Critical perception and understanding of the 
supplement have principally been fashioned by de Man and Jacques Derrida2-, 
but the seeds of this critical tool are sown in Nietzsche's understanding 
of art's function: 
[A7rt is not merely an imitation of the reality of nature 
but rather a metaphysical supplement of the reality of 
nature, placed beside it for its overcoming. (In, 140) 
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Unsurprisingly, Shelleyan criticism--which has a longer standing 
tradition of theoretical approaches than studies of Keats--most obviously 
reveals a dissemination of Nietzschean concepts, from Nietzsche's own work 
and through de Man's, into deconstructive accounts of Romanticism. Yore 
significantly, the Shelley-Nietzsche connection is still current in recent 
critical debate. Rajan, in The Supplement of Reading, returns to the 
subject of A Defence of- Poetry and Nietzsche; constructing the text as a 
potential "precursor of a Nietzschean and phenomenological deconstruction" 
(a$, 289), using other Nietzschean works besides The Birth of Tragedy, 
including The Wanderer and His Shadow, and "On Truth and Falsity in Their 
Ultra-Moral Sense, " Both Shelley and Nietzsche share the understanding that 
"language is vitally metaphorical" (61E, 482) equally capable of concealing 
and revealing the nature of reality. 
Kathleen M. Wheeler, in her discussion of "Shelley and Nietzsche: 
'Reality' as Rhetoric", takes her critical point of departure from Rajan's 
observations about Shelley's A Defence of Poetry and Nietzsche's views of 
language, truth, and reality, Wheeler places A Defence of Poetry in a much 
wider philosophic context, encompassing Dewey, Nietzsche, Heidegger, and 
Derrida, viewing the work as "a thoroughgoing rejection of dualistic 
thinking as exemplified by much Western philosophy (or at least 
interpretations of Western philosophy)". °=ý Shelley and Nietzsche are alike 
in their rejection of the substance of a thing-in-itseif and recognition 
that reality is dependent upon rhetoric, rooted in the conviction that 
"both mind and world are figures of speech, neither having priority over 
the other" ýR , 13). Wheeler offers the most fully Nietzschean account of 
Shelley; she stresses the importance of actively constructing the figures 
of "mind" and "body" from the "radically metaphorical fabric of experience" 
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i$Ep, 14), and she acknowledges Nietzsche's important relevance for 
critical and literary approaches, especially of The Will to Power; 
These notebooks are some of the most relevant of Nietzsche's 
works for readers today, as they address themselves to issues 
which have become dominant in late-twentieth-century literary 
theory, and for some philosophers as well. (ED 15) 
Wheeler is certainly right to assert Nietzsche's significance, although 
Nietzsche's relevance for the dominant strands of current literary theory 
is a direct consequence of his latent influence upon theoretical criticism 
in the past. In spite of this tangled 
and Romantic criticism, Wheeler warily 
discussing both their place in Westei 
similarities in separate sections. In 
Rajan's caution, which served as her 
Shelley's Defence is only a 
link between Nietzschean philosophy 
segregates Shelley from Nietzsche, 
"n Philosophy and their philosophic 
this respect Wheeler subscribes to 
critical point of departure, that 
potential "precursor of a 
Jietzschean... deconstruction", and is careful to avoid imposing a 
retrospective teleological framework on the history of ideas. 
Wheeler's approach is critically prudent. Yet a close textual 
examination of A Defence of Poetry, explicitly aware of the Nietzschean 
influences at work in its own methodology, might have produced a reading 
sensitive to the intellectual relation between Shelley and Nietzsche, as 
well as to Nietzsche's influence upon Romantic criticism. Nietzschean 
philosophy has played a significant part in shaping deconstruction and 
Romantic Literature--often characterised by social, political, and 
aesthetic non-conformity--has been especially susceptible to the 
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experimentations of this critical movement. Accounts of Romanticism by Paul 
de Nan, Geoffrey Hartman, and Harold Bloom have dominated the Yale 
deconstructive school, " 
This debt to Nietzschean philosophy has not gone entirely unnoticed by 
those currently engaged in Romantic criticism, particularly with the 
appearance, in Spring 1990, of a Studies in Romana cism dedicated to the 
subject of "Nietzsche and Romanticism" and introduced by Tilottama Rajan. 
By taking as read Nietzsche's implicit place amongst Romantic studies, 
Rajan's introduction highlights a general rift between more theoretical 
American and Canadian representations of Romanticism and British aesthetic 
and social readings. Harvey Birenbaum's recent study of Blake testifies to 
American acceptance of Nietzsche's place in Romantic scholarship. 
Birenbaum's Between Blake and Nietzsche explores how myth extends beyond 
being a figure and is, in fact, a way of being which presents a version of 
reality. 26 Blake and Nietzsche are regarded as both involved in "'the 
revaluation of all values"' (, 4) and a "war on language within and 
through language" (am, 6). Birenbaum compares Blakean and Nietzschean 
texts in light of their use of prosopopeia and shared views about self- 
overcoming (Bal, 8; 6). Theoretical studies--like those by Bennett and 
Wheeler--go some way towards redressing the balance on this side of the 
Atlantic, but they do not derive from a British view of Nietzsche as a 
"canonical" figure in the mechanics of critical representations of 
Romanticism: 
But now that the revision of romanticism through Nietzsche 
has become almost canonical, it is appropriate to ask 
whether Nietzsche should not be revisioned through 'romant- 
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icism' 
. 
e: 
Rajan is prepared to revise Nietzsche, in the light of' Romanticism, 
before British Romantic studies have wholly established the relevant 
relations between Nietzschean philosophy and Romantic poetry. In trying to 
establish a fruitful dialogue between Nietzsche and Romanticism American 
and Canadian Romantic studies have their own problems; they often tend to 
subsume Idietzschean philosophy into their deconstructive practices, without 
considering Romantic writings and Nietzsche's works alongside one another, 
In this respect, American and Canadian Romantic critics might take their 
lead from Wheeler's inter-textual account of Shelley and Nietzsche. Many of 
the essays in Rajan's forum on Nietzsche and Romanticism bear witness to 
the absorption of Nietzsche into deconstructive practices and the 
di#ziculty of separating Nietzsche from de Manian deconstruction. Henry 
Staten's reconstruction of The of Tragedy inevitably involves a 
dismantling of de Man's reading of Nietzsche through "a series of bipolar 
oppositions", which allowed him to submit the text "to a canonical process 
of deconstruction" <, L2). William Walker's exploration of Ivietzsche's 
affinities with Enlightenment empiricists produces a diagnosis of the 
inter-relation between de Man and Nietzsche: "Nietzsche's writing on trope 
and concept, particularly as it is explicated by de Man, is a strong text 
within contemporary studies in romanticism" (RE, 65). Such verdicts are 
supported by Woodman's account of the "metaphorical body" in the works of 
Blake, Keats, and Shelley, which betrays explicit Nietzschean and de Iranian 
traces in its handling of "the difficulty faced by the poet's own effaced 
body in finding a metaphorical shape" (, 7). Consequently, Nietzsche, 
whether by theoretical design or later, accidental, critical absorption has 
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come to occupy a central place amongst much Romantic criticism and will 
prove no less difficult to exorcise than Leavis's spectre. 
Deconstructionist approaches did not passively inherit Nietzschean 
terms and concepts from de Manian criticism. Instead they actively sought a 
less conservative and more radical interpretation of literature and 
Nietzsche, Deconstruction's emphasis on the processes of writing and 
reading within Romantic literature has produced destabilising accounts of 
texts and ensured a decisive break with structuralist or formalist 
criticism. Paradoxically, de Man's critical accounts of' endless tropes and 
effacement are underpinned by some sense of a metaphysical value system, a 
personal belief which prevents him from giving truth up to an extreme 
Nietzschean fictionality and credibility: 
Nietzsche is not simply saying, as de Man suggests, that 
truth is mere figure. Under the guise of reducing truth 
to illusion/metaphor, he also argues for the truth of 
metaphor as a relational, diacritical mode of understand- 
ing that constantly displaces itself... "' 
De Man's portrayal of Nietzsche as a post-structuralist limits the 
meaning and full implications of Nietzsche's work by a conservative 
reduction of truth as radical fiction to a mere "figure". In the final 
analysis, de Manian deconstruction, unwittingly, preserved its owil 
logocentric beliefs. Ironically, it is Nietzsche's preservation of 
'°romantic categories such as metaphor, myth, symbol..., figure" Q la, 46i) 
and authorial subject which points to de Man's critical abuse of 
Nietzsche's writings to invent his own brand of deconstruction. 
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These deconstructive approaches to Romantic literature have not gone 
unchallenged, encountering their most sophisticated critical adversary in 
New Historicism. Jerome McGann, for one, sharply defines himself against 
deconstructionist and phenomenological approaches to Romanticism. On the 
grounds that characterising its literature "as a 'poetry of 
process'... cannot serve to distinguish the literary phenomena of 
Romanticism". ý'-I' To define the "Romantic Period as one marked by an 
'epistemological crisis"' is only for McGann to follow Romanticism's own 
"definition of its historical problems" (RI, 71>. In McGann's view, 
criticism's foregrounding of the processes of writing and reading, along 
with the attention given to the self in these processes, has obscured the 
socio-historical circumstances surrounding the creation and circulation of 
Romantic literature. Romantic commentators' inability to "pass through 
those Romantic forms of thought" (Ri, 71) have trapped then in a circular 
critical procedure, in which the romantic nature of their own criticism 
inevitably leads them to focus on issues of process and epistemological 
crisis, rather than on vital issues of personal, social, and political 
circumstance. McGann's essay, "Keats and the Historical Method in Literary 
Criticism", formulates this precise problem in more general terms: 
To hold a literary analysis within a purely poetic space 
is to ensure the conclusion--rampant in such criticism-- 
that the subject of literature--is literature. 2"3 
Reading and writing exist outside of an aesthetic space and free from 
the de Manian "prison-house of language" ($L, 18), as according to McGann, 
"poetry is itself one form of social activity" and so occupies "social 
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space". Once poetry is rendered a social act, taking account of the 
audience addressed, the circumstances surrounding its composition, and 
authorial decisions about where, if at all, it should be published, 
criticism is permitted to include extrinsic socio-historical material, as 
the poetic act is one "involved with extra-poetic operations" <Bi, 21), 
AcGann's identification of a poetic act as a social one permits the critic 
to elucidate the,.. (presumed) network of social relations" within a poem 
(B, 18), regardless of his own chastisement of critics concerned with 
"poetic space", who focus on literature as its own subject. In spite of 
the contradictory methodology, McGann does highlight the lack of critical 
attention given to the social and political aspects of the aesthetic in 
initial deconstructive approaches to Romantic literature. 
The historical critic must unearth the public and private social and 
political situation surrounding a poem's point of origin and its 
circulation by excavating a text's bibliographical history to reveal the 
"first explicit appearance of the poem's meaning" (BI, 32). Such a process 
is vital, because when the poem is no longer under authorial influence, its 
"critical history"--consisting of responses by reviewers and critics-- 
begins; and "all subsequent responses [will] derive in some way from [this] 
initial event" ($.., 51). Historical criticism is concerned with the 
recovery of the socio-historical origin of a text, mediated through its 
reception by future readers, who "remain part of the processive life of the 
poem" and bear witness to it as a "social event" (EL, 24-5). Unlike 
deconstructionist accounts of failed attempts to find a centre, this social 
origin is--if not entirely recoverable--semi-retrievable through a 
historical reading of the text: 
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... art works are forever placed historicity, that is, 
in the vertical and horizontal circumstances which def- 
ine human events. (jj., 64) 
Poetical acts are perpetually implicated in the criss-crossing currents 
of past, present and future socio-political history which ensure a 
literary text cannot be isolated from its social and historical context. A 
poem's meaning is always partially recoverable rather than forever lost 
amongst the endless figures and tropes of deconstruction. Consequently, 
McGann is able to produce the aesthete Keats, as a poet all too well aware 
of the "'world-wind'" of a social unrest and political discontent 
exacerbated by poor harvests, the suspension of Habeas Corpus, and the 
Peterloo massacre (la, 39; 58). These events inform McGann' s account of "To 
Autumn"'s apparent transcendence of history, through its idealising 
portrayal of a perfect autumn, when Keats is acutely aware of that 
particular autumn's social and political imperfections. Keats calls upon 
the reader's suspension of disbelief precisely because he knows the autumn 
of the poem is far removed from the socio-political reality, and only 
resembles the autumns painted by Poussin and Claude (, 57-8; 55). "To 
Autumn"'s meaning rests with the extrinsic historical material deliberately 
excluded from its finished literary text. What, according to McGann, is 
created out of Keats's autumnal stay in Winchester is a "'world elsewhere"' 
($-L, 57): 
... a charmed world far removed from 
the quotidian press of 
his money affairs and the dangerous political tensions of 
his society. <, 58) 
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Romantic attempts at escapism reveal the impossibility of escaping 
historical circumstances; acts of aesthetic transcendence are already 
social acts and will, inevitably, bear the marks of their soclo-historical 
contexts. Conversely, McGann's Historical Method strips away the layers of 
Romantic fictions about the self (or mind), desire, and even the 
imagination to reveal how a text charts the social, political, and 
historical situations which determined its formation: 
Romantic poems repeatedly discover: that there is no 
place of refuge, not in desire, not in the mind, not 
in imagination. (RI, 145) 
Unfortunately, the decision about what extrinsic material is considered 
relevant to a particular text must always remain arbitary; relying upon a 
subjective critical judgement to determine what social and political 
factors are salient to extract the "historical meaning" of a Romantic poem. 
If this is the case the "historical meaning" of a text, like the historical 
moment of its composition, must remain in a state of arbitration, 
persistently re-interpreted, re-invented, and reconstructed, by present and 
future audiences in light of their own socio-political circumstances. The 
historical origin and meaning of a text is no more certain than 
deconstructionist accounts of Romantic failure to recover a point of 
origin. 
Despite McGann's anti-deconstructionist position, his New Historical 
reading of "To Autumn" is peculiarly deconstructive in practice; although 
the text's apparent meaning is not contested by its own inherent 
inconsistencies, the poem is set at odds with its contemporary political 
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and social reality. Critical attention focuses on "To Autumn"'s framing- 
out of poor harvests, social deprivation, and political dissatisfaction to 
deconstruct the poem's idealised picture of the season, revealing it as a 
self-conscious and persuasive lie, which is deliberately contrived to 
signpost the reality of its historical circumstance. New Historicism risks 
favouring textual meanings rooted in the ever-absent and arbitrary over 
those that the more immediate presence of the text might yield, a critical 
risk inherent in the practices of New Historicism and deconstruction. Both 
these critical approaches turn out to share a common source of influence 
from Nietzsche's philosophy although, according to their specific agendas, 
they constructed two distinct versions of his thought. In contrast to those 
deconstructionists, who drew upon Nietzsche's dismantling of metaphysics in 
"On Truth and Falsity in the Ultra-moral Sense", McGann constructs a New 
Historical approach based on Nietzsche's treatment of history in On the 
Uses and Disadvantages of History, for Life (EL, 10-12). Central to 
Nietzsche's untimely meditation is the way in which a single moment is 
forgotten, or repressed, only to be unwillingly remembered at some future 
historical point. Such a desire to forget eventually produces a capacity to 
remember. This is enacted, for McGann, by Keats's "To Autumn" and 
expressed by Nietzsche as that moment when: 
A leaf flutters from the scroll of time, floats away--and 
suddenly floats back again and falls into the man's lap. 
Then the man says 'I remember' and envies the animal, who 
at once forgets and for whom every moment really dies, 
sinks back into night and fog and is extinguished for ever. 
(VAS 61) 
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Uncertainty about the meaning of a "text" is directly at odds with 
McGann's original intention to "encounter the human experience of the poem 
as finished" not only in terms of its "specified history", but "in terms of 
all human history" (aj., 21). More importantly, McGann displaces the idea of 
Romantic poems as primarily concerned with aesthetic process into his 
account of the socio-political conception and reception of a literary work, 
so that "the finished past is constantly being reformulated into new forms 
of f inisheduess" (j, 12). McGann' s assertion is founded in identifying 
the "text" as the "linguistic state of the 'poem's' existence" and a "sign 
of the poem's completion", so that it is the embodiment of the poem, even 
if the poem is more than the sum of its "text" (1,22). If the poem is not 
equal to its text--or linguistic state-it is freed from the "prison-house 
of language", but only because it is reduced to an uncertain quantity, to 
be guessed at by the critic. A New Historical critic, McGann would claim, 
is best equipped to determine the poem's nature by revealing the nexus of 
social and political relations that surrounded its composition and 
reception. 
Curiously, the "text" contains no mention of these socio-political 
factors and yet "To Autumn"'s undetermined nature directly signposts these 
exact circumstances. The poem will inevitably provide this historical 
evidence--a poetic act is after all a social one--as McGann's investigation 
is committed to describing Romantic poems in terms of their social and 
political contexts. Regrettably, such a critical decision reduces a "poem" 
to either a label for a specific period of social history, or a vague 
notion to which an inexhaustible amount of extrinsic material can be 
appended. Poetry is reduced to an unnecessary stepping stone to a political 
and social past. 
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Deconstruction and New Historicism are not so alien to one another as 
may first appear. Similarities between these two apparently opposed 
critical movements are demonstrated in Bennett's recent deconstructionist 
account of Keats' s "To Autumn". Confronted with the perfection of the poem 
Bennett abandons the focus on narrative and audience, so that he can 
instead analyse--arom within and without--the poetic fiction, how 
`Efligures of reading become, literally, economic figures and the silencing 
of politics and history in 'To Autumn'. -repeated in the silence of 
critical response to the implicit political 'subtext' of the poem' ( ., 
160). Echoing McGann, Bennett is intent on exploring the poem's "figures of 
reading" as indicators of the socio-political pressures of the wider 
historical context that surrounded its composition. What is constructed, 
with this context in mind, is a radically transgressive "To Autumn"; a 
revolutionary poem that rejects social, political, financial, and 
topographical boundaries--all of which are implicated for Bennett in the 
agricultural legal struggle over private land ownership and the authorial 
wrestle to possess a proper name (, 164): 
The peculiar resistance to the political which has been read into 
'To Autunm' can be disfigured by the transgressions which constit- 
ute the politics of intertextuality in the poem: in order to read 
the politics of 'To Autumn' we must transgress the boundaries of 
authorial property, we must refuse to be figured within, or by, 
the bounds of the text, <, 171) 
Intertextuality becomes the means through which a transgressive act of 
reading is possible. "To Autumn" is precisely not about what is contained 
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within the boundaries of its own text but, according to Bennett, derives 
its significance from a complex networking with a vast matrix of past 
literature, including the poem's own original draft. Consequently, "Ceres 
is the pervasive unstated presence in `'To Autumn'" ( ,, 
164), Keats's 
personified Autumn alludes to Pope's Mammon in the 4ist1e to Bathurst 
(&U., 165), and his exchange of "a gold cloud gilds" for "barred clouds 
bloom" (25) is a sign of the poem's repression of monetary issues Cam, 
1(57); a further reference to agricultural enclosures is implied by Keats's 
final choice of "barred", taken to allude to Clare's "Helpstone" (, 
168). 
Bennett's reading is distinct from McGann's New historical 
interpretation, involving a framing-in, rather than a framing-out, of the 
socio-political circumstances relevant to the poem. Bennett prefers--in 
spite of his rejection of boundaries--to gain access to the salient nexus 
of public and private socio-political circumstances through the literary 
allusions framed within the poem, and their intersections with a whole 
matrix of socially aware literature. By contrast, McGann circumvents the 
matrix of literary allusion and directly accesses the nexus of socio- 
political history surrounding the poem's composition, asserting its 
significance because of the "text"'s framing-out of these events. Both 
critics are determined to unearth what is repressed in "To Autumn" and 
point toward the poignant presence of an eternal absence in the poem. What 
remains for the New Historicist and deconstructionist is an arbitary 
critical decision about what extrinsic literary and historical material 
should be supplemented to a particular text. 
Unfortunately, Bennett's intertextual reading of "To autumn" highlights 
precisely this crucial critical question and difficulty. By justifying his 
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literary practice with appeals to Barthes, and less explicitly Derrida, 
Bennett is able to claim that "textuality is intertextuality" and so reduce 
Keats's specific poem of "To Autumn" to a text indistinguishable from any 
other; after all "the Keatsian text is, like all texts, a tie-sue of 
gleanings" (MA, 170). This reduction of "To Autumn" enables Bennett to 
evoke an array of the poem's literary interconnections with past works and 
those contemporary with Keats's own times. Yet surely, if all texts are 
intertexts how can Bennett determine which texts are the intertexts 
pertinent to Keats's "To Autumn"? Bennett takes no account of the tact that 
individual readers will bring their own particular matrix of literature to 
the text of "To Autumn", which will not only differ from his own, but 
produce readings of Keats's poem that involve texts of a later period; if 
Pope's Epistle to Bathurst, Andrew Tooke's Pantheon and Clare's "Helpstone" 
are salient to an intertextual account of "To Autumn", then should Wallace 
Stevens's "Sunday Morning" be excluded from this critical discussion? 
Indeed, the only grounds for exclusion would be if a particular text was 
unknown to an individual reader and so did not form part of his or her own 
personal literary matrix of intertexts. Such a matrix of intertexts risks 
permitting a study of subsequent influences on a deceased author's works. 
New Historical criticism has given rise to a more general theoretical 
historical discourse, which to some degree has disseminated into more 
recent deconstructionist representations of Romanticism : 3`='; reflected in the 
work of Andrew Bennett, Ronald Tetreault, and Marjorie Levinson. 
Tetreault's study of Shelley combines, more successfully than Bennett's 
work on Keats, deconstructive practices with a sensitivity to the poet's 
iesire to acquire an audience: 
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Bound by tradition, authority, and convention, the poet strains 
at the limits of rhetoric to create a poetic discourse that 
reaches out to its audience but does not bind them in turn in 
the iron grip of manipulative machinery. " 
Tetreault's account of Shelley's poetry does not adhere to a dogmatic 
form of deconstruction, but instead understands that "[t]he task of the 
poet is to create a text sufficiently open and uncertain to engage the 
reader in the play of interpretation, to invite the reader to participate 
in the endless pursuit of meaning" (ELL, 16), Broadly speaking, Tetreault` s 
approach is "deconstructionist", although he remains alert to social, 
political, psychological and historical pressures which exert themselves on 
a literary text. Tetreault understands his own criticism as one of many 
possible approaches and regards the task of literary criticism as being 
"like turning a diamond in the light, the aim always being to show the 
gem's beauties to the greatest advantage" (giL, 17). 
With increased historical awareness, critics with theoretical agendas 
have made some progress in redressing the balance against the more 
traditional apolitical representations of Romanticism, produced by de Man's 
deconstructive approach and advocated by Rajan's earlier work, Dark 
Interpreter. This partial convergence of these once distinctive critical 
movements highlights important questions about the literary theory behind 
their critical practices, which insist on a return to the fundamental issue 
of what should be included in and excluded from a particular reading of a 
text. Appropriately, Romantic criticism is forced to engage with the 
difficulties of the ever-absent present, as similar problems were 
encountered by Romantic attempts to fashion a figural "I"; a process that 
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produced both a fictive disclosure about the self' in the present and the 
loss--or absence--of a vital previous self-construction, Critics of 
Romanticism, as readers and writers, not only provide a commentary on the 
Romantic processes of aesthetic self-construction, but are radically 
implicated in the processes of shaping their own literary and fictional 
self-identities. 
The poetical works of Keats and Shelley share this interest in forging 
new aesthetic and social identities against past historical and literary 
tradition, Romantic excavations into the process of self-construction were 
haunted by the spectral figure of a poet's literary forefather or their own 
death, producing a deferral of responsibility to a future reader. Bloom's 
literary criticism is sensitive to these anxieties and yet maintains that a 
meaning of a poem "is excessively impoverished by a Nietzsche-inspired 
deconstruction" (Mi, 85). What motivates Bloom's claim is a belief that to 
adhere to Nietzschean philosophy would require "deconstructing the thinking 
subject itself" and evaluating consciousness as a mere "mask" (XI, 86). 
These views are attributed to Nietzsche's writings when, in fact, they are 
only one version of his philosophy, constructed by those critics who prized 
Nietzsche as a proto-deconstructionist. Bloom's distrust of Nietzschean 
concepts is not born of a direct reading of Nietzsche, but from an 
uncritical acceptance of de Man's version of Nietzsche. A Romantic crisis 
over self-identity often turns out to be mirrored in contemporary 
criticism's explorations of the Romantic legacy, which discover that their 
own literary practices are suffering from an anxiety of influence in the 
wake of Leavis, de Man, and Nietzsche. 
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Chapter 2 
"Being within our Being": Aesthetics of Self-Revision in Shelley 's A 
Defence of Poetry and Keats's Letters. 
Poetry redeems from decay the visitations of the divinity in man. ' 
(P. B. Shelley) 
[A] World of Pains and troubles is to school an Intelligence and 
make it a soul..., 
(John Keats) 
.,. [ there were gods, how could I endure not to be a godt3 
(Friedrich Nietzsche) 
Recent readings of A Defence of Poetry view Shelley's response to Thomas 
Love Peacock's The Four Ages of Poetry within a broader intellectual 
context, extending beyond Hobbes, Hume and Locke to the philosophical 
enquiry of Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida and even Adorno. Rajan and 
Wheeler, with varying degrees of caution, describe A Defence of Poetry as a 
possible "precursor of a Nietzschean and phenomenological deconstruction" 
(z$,, 289) and a "thoroughgoing rejection of dualistic thinking" ($LU, 12- 
13). Shelley and Nietzsche share a Kantian conviction that the observing 
mind and the world which it observes are constituted from a series of 
fictions. Such a conviction directly opposes Enlightenment faith in fixed 
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metaphysical certainties and encourages critical thinking without seeking 
to erect any new system of absolute values. Kant's assertion of quantity, 
quality, reason and modality as priori categories of the mind promoted 
the importance of an observer's mental self-reflexivity to experiencing the 
phenomenal world, According to Kant's mental schema, sense data is actively 
arranged by an observer's mind to create a concept or symbol that has no 
relation to the observed empirical object, but permits its universal 
communicability. ' Kant's emphasis on how experiencing phenomena effects the 
observer's mental life is even more pronounced in his Critique of 
Judgement , which argues that an observer presupposes that what he or she 
experiences as beautiful will cause the same pleasure in another. For Kant, 
aesthetic judgements are disinterested and only communicable through a 
"subjective universality". - Kant's belief in a universal subjectivism 
influenced eighteenth-century thinking about the aesthetic as an 
independent category and contributed to Romantic interest in self-reflexive 
speculation. ' 
Although Keats and Shelley express a Kantian commitment to ending a 
division between the experienced world and the experiencing mind, they are 
more sceptical than Kant about transcendental reason and understand the 
aesthetic as a mode of knowledge. Shelley's Defence recognises how Santian 
reason has prescribed a system of mental categories through which reality 
is perceived and is a reminder that, in Robert Kaufmann's view, "it is not 
so much the world that is being legislated, as it is the implements for 
understanding the world". ' A Defence of Poetry points to "the limits of 
objective knowledge" and defends poetry as one of those "forms of knowledge 
that are neither true nor false but open". ' Like Nietzsche, Shelley 
understands truth and untruth, object and subject, scientific and literary 
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knowledge, world and mind as fictional. These concerns also occupy central 
passages of Keats's correspondence, which distrust the Enlightenment's 
project of classifying all phenomena in a "dull catalogue of common things" 
(La-mia, 2,233) and discover that "[ w] bat shocks the virtuous philoso[p]her 
delights the camelion poet" (ILL., 1,387). For Keats, in common with Shelley 
and Nietzsche, metaphysics is only a fictional interpretation of reality 
that has come to prescribe the nature of self and world. Keats's own 
formulation of "Negative Capability" promotes the self as a sequence of 
invasive fictions without metaphysical grounding and pre-empts Nietzsche's 
assertion "tt]hat one becomes what one is presupposes that one does not 
have the remotest idea what one is" (L 64). Keats' s epistles offer more 
than a diagnosis of the self's precarious fictional existence with their 
self-conscious representations of a "complex and shifting character" in 
style and tone. '" Anticipating Nietzsche, Shelley and Keats advocate an 
aesthetic without didacticism which encompasses rather than excludes 
different modes of knowing to liberate the self from metaphysical 
constraints. 
In Shelley's Defence, self remains as vital and elusive as the 
footsteps on the sand, "which the coming calm erases and whose traces 
remain only" (OIL, 504). '0 The difficulties of satisfactorily defining what 
is meant by the self are exacerbated by the philosophical complexities 
involved in arriving at such a definition and Shelley's varying usage of 
the term throughout the Defence. In spite of Shelley's anti-rationalism, he 
appears to mix a Platonic understanding of an immutable self with, on 
occasions, a formulation closer to eighteenth-century empirical psychology 
and a more transcendental Kantian model. Whatever is understood by 
Shelley's use of self it is always linked in the Defence to the central 
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subject of poetry and so implicated in an intrinsic relationship with the 
fine arts, or more widely, the aesthetic. To establish the nature not only 
of the self and the aesthetic, but the relation between the two, is crucial 
for Shelley's claim that "poets are the unacknowledged legislators of the 
World" (EM, 508). 
"[P]oetry is connate with the origin of man" <aU, 480>, one of 
Shelley's earliest claims in the Defence, is essential for illuminating the 
text's complex handling of the self. This assertion extends beyond an 
anthropocentric view of the universe, in which "men dance and sing and 
imitate natural objects" (691h, 481), towards a more radical description of 
the Cartesian moment when consciousness becomes aware of itself " --and the 
possibility of the concept of "man" is born. After all, "language itself is 
poetry" ( L, 481; 482) and, in the widest sense, acts as "the 
hieroglyphics of... [our]... thoughts" (; B, 483) by providing the means by 
which self-reflexivity can be mediated. Integral to this formation of 
language, a communicative system of verbal and non-verbal signs in 
Shelley's analysis, is the development of self-identity through an 
increasing awareness of its difference from anything other: 
.., [L]anguage and gesture, together with plastic or pictorial 
imitation, become the image of the combined effect of those 
objects, and of his apprehension of them. (, 481) 
Self and poetry are inextricably bound together by an organising--if 
not organic--"principle within the human being", which desires "not melody 
alone, but harmony" (EEL 480) and gives rise to the creation of language. 
Simultaneously, language conveys delight in what is beautiful, good, 
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harmonious, and can express self-awareness. This capacity for seif- 
reflection and ability to respond to the beautiful are necessitated through 
and by language--or poetry--which, in its broadest sense, is a system of 
meaningful signs. Pre-empting Nietzsche's Apollonian mode of "pleasurable 
illusions (Scheinel" (EI, 43), Shelley contends that the invention of 
language reveals a human impulse to reproduce the rhythmic and ordered, so 
that harmony and unity are delighted in wherever they are found and 
incorporated, instinctively, into creative activities: 
And, although all men observe a similar, they observe not the 
same order, in the motions of a dance, in the melody of a song, 
in the combinations of language, in the series of their imitat- 
ions of natural objects-Every man in the infancy of art, obs- 
erves an order which approximates more or less closely to that 
from which highest delight results... <E, 481) 
This "faculty of approximation" enables the observer to experience the 
beautiful, by establishing a "relation between the highest pleasure and 
its cause" (am, 482). Those possessing this faculty "in excess are poets" 
and their task is to communicate the "pleasure" of their experiences to the 
community (, 482). Shelley is not claiming language is poetry on the 
grounds that language is the medium of poetry; rather he recognises in the 
creation of language an adherence to the poetic precepts of order, harmony, 
unity, and a desire to express delight in the beautiful. Consequently 
poetry, in the Defence, is a term which encompasses all human creative and 
artistic efforts either to approximate the beautiful, or imitate its 
rhythmic order. 
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Almost from the outset of the Defence Shelley is eager to place his 
explorations of the origin of man and poetry in a social context, asserting 
a concept of human conduct governed by the "will of a social being" (EEL 
481) and focusing on the communal activities of dance, song, and 
communication. These aesthetic acts are all considered as poetry--a term 
synonymous with language--and as such invested with the task of 
communicating their experiences of the beautiful to engender "a sort of 
reduplication from that community" (, 482). Aesthetic admiration of "the 
true and the beautiful" (012L, 482) is provided with an important social 
aspect which extends beyond communication to initiating a process of seit- 
awareness. This enables Shelley to assert later in his argument the utility 
of poetry in the face of Utilitarian philosophy. Poetry and the various 
modes of the aesthetic it incorporates are directly implicated in, rather 
than alienated from, the social dimension of life (a vital relationship to 
establish if poets are to be "unacknowledged legislators of the world"). 
Language and poetry, in Shelley's view, are enmeshed in all spheres of 
human activity. Firstly, on a fundamental level, through mediating a 
process of self-awareness, secondly, by revealing the true and the 
beautiful, through the relation between the cognitive faculty of perception 
and what is perceived, and lastly, through its instinctive adherence to the 
principle of order--the establishment of governing institutions in 
civilised society: 
... [T]o be a poet is to apprehend the true and the beautiful, in 
a word, the good which exists in the relation, subsisting, first 
between existence and perception, and secondly between perception 
and expression... 
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But poets... are not only the authors of language and of music, 
of the dance, and architecture, and statuary, and painting; they 
are the institutors of laws, and the founders of civil society,,. 
(SEE, 482) 
Aesthetic, social, and linguistic order are not the sole products of 
the rational faculty, which recognises only "differences" and consists of 
the "the enumeration of quantities already known" (&E, 480). In this 
respect reason is subordinate to the imaginative faculty that promotes 
unity and is capable only of respecting "the similitudes of things" ( BL 
480). Language is "arbitrarily produced by the imagination" Cam, 483) and 
reveals "the before unapprehended relations of things and perpetuates their 
apprehension" (DB, 482), which pertain to a higher beauty and truth. 
Unsurprisingly, Shelley does not subscribe to a fixed logocentric system of 
language, as he warns against words becoming fixed "signs for portions or 
classes of thoughts instead of pictures of integral thoughts" and 
maintains, as does Nietzsche, that "language is vitally metaphorical" <;, 
482). 
Keats, in a letter of November 1817, invests imagination's ingenuity 
with a similar capacity to discover its own created truths, so that "CwJhat 
the imagination seizes as Beauty must be truth" is in opposition to 
"consequitive reasoning" (EL,, 1,184; 185), which seeks to define, label 
and catalogue human existence. 12 Keats's "Speculation" about the conflict 
between sensation and thought, poet and philosopher, leads to an assertion 
that imagination's "own silent [w]orking" can create and re-create 
existence in a "finer tone" through "its empyreal reflection [which] is the 
same as human life and its spiritual repetition" (i, 1,185). This "finer 
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tone" is only possible when imagination coalesces self and world, subject 
and object, to create a "Shadow of reality to come" (LLM 1,185). 
o Preferring "a Life of Sensations rather than Thoughts" (am,,.., 1,185), Keats 
advocates dissolving his identity in the moment of a "setting sun" or 
taking part in a sparrow's "exist[ eJ nce and pick about the Gravel" (U, 1, 
186). Fully aware that not "even the greatest Philosopher ever,.. arrived at 
his goal without putting aside numerous objections" (EL, 1,185) and that 
philosophy's dictums are only another kind of fiction, Keats favours 
imagination and sensation over inteliect and reason, Imagination can invent 
and re-invent the self and world in an endless series of fictions free from 
the dogma of reason. 
If poets do not continually act, according to Shelley, as the "authors 
of language" and "create afresh the associations" of words, which risk 
becoming fixed signs, then "language will be dead to all the nobler 
purposes of human intercourse" (am, 482). What is anticipated, and feared, 
in Shelley's early analysis of language in the Defence, is a linguistic 
system dominated by reason, which denies its own fictionality and asserts 
its authority over the productions of the imaginative faculty. A continued 
investment in transcendental reason led Enlightenment and Post- 
Enlightenment philosophy to decline into a rational and, as Nietzsche 
diagnosed, metaphysical language system rooted in the fixity of signs, 
established through habit and custom. This failure of metaphysics to 
acknowledge its poetic and imaginative origins produces an active 
suppression of poetry: 
.,, EVIe have more scientific and 
[ ... ]economical knowledge than can 
be accommodated to the just distribution of the produce which 
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it multiplies. The poetry in these systems of thought is con- 
cealed by the accumulation of facts and calculating processes. 
c ". 502) 
If "language is vitally metaphorical", then the fixed signs of rational 
and metaphysical systems are only metaphors for the experiential world-- 
regardless of how well established they seem--as any given sign is only a 
representation of a thing and never a thing in itself. In spite of its 
appeals to the actual facts of experience, metaphysics is only another 
fiction in contest with many other possible interpretations of the 
universe. Unavoidably these attempts to interpret the experiential world 
involve an explication of how through the medium of language, the self 
constructs its own self-perception and determines the nature of its 
relationship with the universe. Self cannot only invent and re-invent the 
universe. Owing to language's ability to produce a "before unapprehended 
relations of things", it can equally invent and re-invent its own self- 
perception and identity. 
This continual process of self-discovery and self-revision is central 
to Keats's formulation of "Negative Capability", which emphasises how 
important undergoing a loss of a former sense of self is to re-inventing or 
rediscovering a new one: 
[TJhe poetical Character... has no self--it is everything and 
nothing--it enjoys light and shade; it lives in gusto, be it 
foul or fair, high or low... It has as much delight in concei- 
ving an Iago as an Irrogen. (KL, 1,386-7) 
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Keats's concept of poetic identity pre-empts Nietzsche's claim that " 
does not have the remotest idea what one is" (j, 64) and frees the self to 
occupy the extremities of "everything and nothing", "light and shade", 
"foul or fair". Like Nietzsche's critique of Enlightenment's notion of the 
subject's unity, Keats perceives a direct connection between the creative 
processes of writing and the creation of a self unable to assert itself as 
a metaphysical category because of its awareness of its fictional status: 
If then he (the poet] has no self, and if I am a Poet, where 
is the Wonder that I should say I would... write no more.,. It 
is a wretched thing to confess; but is a very fact that not 
one word I ever utter can be taken for granted as an opinion 
growing out of my identical nature--how can it, when I have 
no nature? (U, 1,387) 
Written in October 1818 to Richard Woodhouse, Keats's letter is 
pervaded by uncertainty about the validity of personal opinions. The 
Keatsian self is forever in potentia, wavering between "everything and 
nothing", verging on self-discovery and self-invention through writing its 
own irretrievable loss. According to Keats and Nietzsche, it is exactly 
this loss of identity which liberates the self from a fixed metaphysical 
system, leading to a recognition of the self's awareness of its own myriad 
natures. Both Keats and Nietzsche favour a multiple and flexible self 
conceived as an endlessly revisable script. 
Shelley's insistence that language is "vitally metaphorical" also 
discloses an extreme fictionality of the self and its interpretations of 
the universe. Paradoxically, A Defence of Poetry frames its own claims for 
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fictionality and self-revision in metaphysical formulations, An 
individual's impulse for harmony is revealed by a Platonic desire for the 
"good", the "beautiful", and the "truth", and the poet's activity is 
underpinned by a participation in the "one" (E, 482; 483). Equally, 
Shelley's analysis of language appears coloured with a Kantian belief in 
the universal communicability of knowledge. All of these formulations, 
seemingly at odds with Shelley's critique of reason, might indicate some 
kind of metaphysical cornerstone upon which he wished to build his 
ontological account. 
In spite of a recurrence of these quasi-metaphysical claims in the 
Defence, Shelley's appeal to what is transcendentally true and "beautiful" 
appears, on closer examination, not an attempt to establish a secure 
philosophic anchor-point for the self and language, but an indicator of the 
shifting intellectual sands underlying his own ideas. The true and 
"beautiful" are not attributed an unassailable absolutism ascribed to them 
by Plato and Kant. Shelley's handling of these terms is more sceptical 
about the ideal status they are attributed in the Platonic and Kantian 
systems: 
Poetry ever communicates all the pleasure which men are capable 
of receiving: it is ever still the light of life; the source of 
whatever of beautiful or generous or true can have place in an 
evil time. (32k, 493) 
Truth and beauty are subordinate to the illuminating source of poetry 
which, simultaneously, identifies the harmonious in phenomena and expresses 
the "pleasure" this recognition can cause. Whatever can be regarded as true 
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or "beautiful" is relative to its particular historical context--a claim 
which risks reducing the truth and beauty of a thing to either being the 
best product of "an evil time" or the worst of a happier one. A 
subjectivism is implicated in the Defence, for all its Platonic and Kantian 
transcendental apparel, which defers the status of the true and the 
"beautiful" to a historical, as well as an individual, process of 
perception and response. In Shelley's sceptical view, "beauty" and truth 
are inextricably bound up with this process, rather than unequivocally 
postulated as transcendent and objective Ideal Forms. Instead, determined 
by historical, cultural, and social circumstance, the true and the 
"beautiful" are only interpretations of what Shelley refers to as the 
Of one "., a 
The relative concepts of the "true", the "beautiful", and the "good" 
are securely tethered to the "one", which is both "eternal" and "infinite" 
and transcends "time and place and number" (&_L, 483). The aesthetic, in 
the Defence, is at once a product of a particular historical and cultural 
milieu and a part of the transcendent "one" beyond the circumstantial and 
temporal. Poets are central to this formulation of the aesthetic, as 
although they live in a mutable and experiential world they have the 
capacity to "imagine and express... [an]... indestructible order" (EU, 482) 
that lies beyond interpretations of the "beautiful" and metaphysical 
systems of reason: 
For he not only beholds intensely the present as it is, and 
discovers those laws according to which present things ought 
to be ordered, but he beholds the future in the present, and 
his thoughts are the germs of the flower and the fruit of 
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latest time. (SP P, 482-3) 
Crucially, the poet is the sole creator and origin of this 
"indestructible order", instead of these inventions having a source in a 
metaphysical divine being or Ideal Form. Effectively, a poetic creation is 
self-validating and self-sustaining, adhering only to the fundamental 
precepts of unity and the disclosure of "before unapprehended relations". 
Self-validating poetic fictions must be constantly invented, re-invented, 
and revised. Consequently, a perception of self and universe are 
persistently undergoing a revelation about the, otherwise, "dull vapours of 
the little world of the self" (32ß., 497>. The "one" is not established as 
an underlying metaphysical cornerstone from which all poetry is 
constructed; it is, rather, a necessary and revealing fiction woven into 
Shelley's own poetics, 
These fictions, although self-validating, are not totalising 
explanations of the universe, because Shelley's theorising about language 
does not assert that it is all-inclusive of the experiential world. The 
limits of language, as in Wittgenstein, are the limits of an individual's 
world, but this is not to deny that there are elements of a particular 
individual's world which exist outside and beyond their linguistic 
interpretations of the experiential. '4 In aesthetic terms a human impulse 
for harmony and beauty, or the "spirit of events" behind the creativity of 
the poet-prophet (aa, 483), are the primordial and pre-linguistic 
Dionysian origins of poetry. Counterbalancing the Defence's tendencies 
towards a subjective perspectivism is a desire to discover, either within 
or without, a sublime whole. Such idealism co-exists with Shelley's 
scepticism, manifesting itself in Milton's conception of Paradise Lost as a 
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"whole before he executed it in portions" (, 483) and the poet's 
participation in the "infinite and the one". 
Present in this understanding of a particular literary work as a part 
of a preconceived whole, the contribution of an intellectual epoch to a 
universal poetic scheme, and the rewriting (or linguistic reinvention) of 
established traditions, are the aesthetic dynamics of Shelieyan self- 
construction. The co-existence of scepticism and idealism, part and whole, 
subjective and objective, within the Defence's poetic fabric, forces the 
possibility of uniting these oppositions and opens up an enormous 
potentiality for the self. Uncovering and inventing the true nature of 
self and its identity now rests with the interior as much as the exterior; 
or the subjective "centre" (, 503) of a self is no less valid than 
attempts to locate a true self in its objective transcendental 
"circumference" (, 508). 
What emerges is the presence of too many uncertainties in the Defence 
to construct a comprehensive explanation of its argument. Such a reading 
would assume the text had been written as a water-tight philosophical 
treatise, instead of as a complex composition, struggling to weave a 
poetical prose from artistic and philosophic fictions of the past and 
present to highlight contemporary theoretical difficulties, Loyal to the 
nature of poetry it seeks to defend, the Defence avoids subscribing to a 
particular system of metaphysics, or asserting itself as the only valid 
interpretation of self, language, and the universe. It asserts equally the 
origin of poetry as exterior and interior to the self; implying that self- 
identity rests both with a participation in the transcendent external "one" 
and an unearthing of the internal "being within our being" (i SU, 505); and 
analysing language as a means of critiquing reason, whilst upholding the 
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Enlightenment notion of its "relation to thoughts alone" (EU,, 483), 11 
Self-validating poetic fictions do not resolve conflicts between these 
opposed factions, permitting instead their multiple co-existences, so that 
poetry Is at once the centre and circumference of knowledge" (J, 503). 
The poetic spirit not only allows a self to participate in the 
"eternal" and the "one", but "redeems from decay the visitations of the 
divinity in man" (, 505), Self is both in and of the universe, existing 
as "an atom" (, 505), which is peculiarly particular and finite, and yet 
inextricable from the infinite whole of cosmic processes. Like poetry, the 
self is a product of historical and cultural circumstance: simultaneously, 
its vital essence is a-historical and a-temporal. Poetry has the capacity 
to unmask--a process involving creation and invention--the self's real 
nature by stripping the metaphysical "veil of familiarity from the world" 
(M-1,505). Detached from the foundation of a metaphysical cornerstone, the 
self is capable, through metaphorical language, of re-inventing its own 
perception of the universe and itself. Keats's own account of "spirit 
creation" blends a metaphysical vocabulary of "Intelligence", "hind" and 
"World" with a constant flux of "provings and alterations and 
perfectionings" to an "identity" (EL, 2,103). Unlike the Defence, Keats' s 
description of self-creation foregrounds the importance of suffering "in a 
world of Circumstances" where a "heart must feel and suffer in a thousand 
diverse ways" (Kk, 2,102). Similar to Shelley's Defence, Keats's notion of 
"spirit creation" unites the temporal and finite with the eternal and 
infinite, but does so by specifically addressing the necessity of 
experiencing a "World of Pains" to create an identity, or soul: 
II]ntelligences are atoms of perception--they know and they see 
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and they are pure, in short they are God--how then are souls to 
be made?,.. How, but by a medium of a world like this? (om, 2,102) 
Keats's "Vale oY Soul-making" recognised the "highest terms for man" 
(EL, 2,102), investing individuals with the immortal potentiality to 
attain their true identity, prefiguring Nietzsche's advocacy of a return to 
bodily sensations and his belief that "[y]ou should follow your senses to 
the end" (Z, 110) in order that humanity overcome itself through an act of 
self-creation so as to transform "everything... into the humanly- 
conceivable, the humanly-evident, the humanly-palpable" (Z, 110). Like 
Nietzsche's union of intellect and desire in the "Will", Keats maintained 
the inextricable nature of thought and sensation, asserting "[n]othing ever 
becomes real till it is experienced" Cj, 2,81): 
... [F]or axioms in philosophy are not axioms until they are 
proved upon our pulses: We read fine--things until.. we have 
gone the same steps as the Author, (1W, 2,279) 
For Keats and Shelley, self and world are infinitely revisable once the 
potential for collapsing a transcendent objective into the subjective and 
perspective is realised. Self ceases to be just a participant in the 
abstract: to borrow from Coleridge, the "I AM" actively exercises its own 
god-like powers of creation and invention to disclose its own divinity: 16 
(Poetry]... whether it spreads its own figured curtain, or withdraws 
life's dark veil from before the scene of things, it equally creates 
for us a being within our being. It makes us the inhabitants of a 
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world to which the familiar world is a chaos. It reproduces the com- 
mon universe of which we are portions and percipients, and it purges 
from our inward sight the film of familiarity which obscures from us 
the wonder of our being. It compels us to feel what we perceive, and 
to imagine that which we know. (, Up., 505) 
Discovering, inventing and revising the "being within our being" is 
about a continual process of aesthetic self-construction--the revelation 
and invention of an "eternal truth" about the self and its relation to the 
universe--premissed upon the essential understanding that "to imagine that 
which we know" is to actually have grasped an insight. Keats's belief in 
the validity of imagination's creations is perfectly expressed when he 
writes that "C t] he imagination may be compared with Adam's dream--he awoke 
and found it truth" (K L, 1,185). Poetic fictions must be constantly re- 
invented, persistently worked up into complex poetical fabrics that are a 
part of the revealing and concealing "figured curtain". The poetic fabric 
of this "figured curtain" must always be evolving, or else it risks itself 
becoming an obscuring "veil of familiarity"--poetic fictions can mask the 
"eternal truth" as easily as they disclose it. Such difficulties are 
inherent in language as the medium of poetry, because language excludes and 
contains to be meaningful, like the "cloud which enfeebles" (, 485), 
because signs are forever at odds with the poetic spirit which like "a 
sword of lightning, ever unsheathed... consumes, the scabbard that would 
contain it" (; , 491). 
Poetry is at once concealing and revealing, altering the perception of 
"our inward sight" by peeling back "life's dark veil"--synonymous with the 
"film of familiarity" which conceals the "wonder of our being"--by, 
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paradoxically, casting its own fictive "figured curtain" of metaphorical 
and hieroglyphic patterns over the cosmos, Shelley's "dark veil" 
foreshadows Nietzsche's description of the veil or maya, which summons "us 
to tear the veil and to uncover the mysterious background" and is as likely 
"to reveal something as to conceal something" (, 139-40). The 
metaphorical language of poetry permits the birth of previously 
unrecognised relations of meaning and perception. A creative chaos 
displaces the notion of divine logos and the "common universe" of 
rationality can be re-discovered and re-invented in hand with the "being 
within our being". Shelley's ontological account of the self exacerbates a 
collapse of the subject and object into one another by closing the 
distinction between sensation and perception, and allowing the mental 
faculties to imagine--or invent--knowledge as opposed to simply amassing it 
from sense data. In this respect Shelley's account resembles a Heideggerian 
formulation of being as presence'', in which being in and knowing of the 
world are one and the same. Self, on one hand, is finite and inextricable 
from "a definite period of time, and a certain combination of events which 
can never again recur", and, on the other, is infinite and a-temporal as it 
contains all "possible varieties of human nature" and "is itself the image 
of all other minds" (, 485). 
Philosophers and poets are curiously yoked together in the Defence's 
poetical prose, their uneasy alliance dependent upon Shelley's invocation 
of them for literary and philosophic authority, so that these separate 
traditions can be deliberately misread. Plato's task is interpreted by 
Shelley as an essentially poetical one, owing to his comprehension of "the 
past, present, and the future condition of man" (&Z 496). Nor is Plato 
alone in being counted as one of the "poetical philosophers", as he finds 
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himself amongst the philosophic "exertions of Locke, Hume, Gibbon, 
Voltaire.,. [ and].. Rousseau" (EE, 502). Conversely, a poetical undertaking 
of Paradise Lost is viewed as a "philosophical refutation" and 
deconstruction of its own theological system; or the poetic delvings of 
Shakespeare, Spenser, or Petrarch into the Platonic subject of love affirm 
Plato as a "worthy poet" and these poets as an earnest part of 
philosophical enquiry (, 497). 
Shelley's representation of philosophic and literary tradition is vital 
to his archaeological--and retrospective--account of the development of 
literature, ideas and the self, which is able to identify the significant 
"epochs of the world" (, 482), and their specific contributions to the 
great "cyclic poem" Cam, 482). Consequently, the Defence claims membership 
of, and authority from, these co-existing traditions whilst subverting them 
for its own ends. Ultimately, in the Defence, it is philosophy which is 
subsumed into poetry and not poetry into philosophy; as its metaphysical 
systems are rendered fictions of a larger poetic fiction since poetry "is 
that which comprehends all science, and that to which all science must be 
referred" (691E, 503). The world's legislators are to be poets (no longer a 
task to be shared with philosophers, as Shelley excluded them from the 
Defence's text, in contrast to their earlier inclusion in A Philosophical 
View of Reform). 
Shelley's Defence. urges a new understanding of the self and the 
aesthetic not by resolving the conflict between subject and object, but by 
mediating a co-existence between them which defers ultimate reconciliation 
to a future reader who must, in Keats's words, take "the same steps as the 
Author" (EL., 279). This future mediation is ensured by the Janus-faced 
nature of the self and poetry in Shelley's Defence; poetry and self are 
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capable of liberating individuals from social conventions, established 
institutions, and financial interests of Enlightenment thought: they are 
able to enforce social and intellectual conventions; they can also imprison 
an individual in a self-interested metaphysical prison-house of language 
(the fixed and definite state of the "6jelf" implied by Shelley's use of the 
capital). For Shelley, this metaphysical mode of "Self" is directly at odds 
with the metaphorical mode of poetry: 
Poetry, and the principle of Self', of which money is the 
visible incarnation, are the God and Mammon of the world. (, 503) 
Ultimately, Shelley places his trust in an on-going self-affirming and 
self-validating process through a perpetual invention of poetic fictions: 
Poetry enlarges the circumference of the imagination by replenish- 
ing it with thoughts of ever new delight, which have the power of 
attracting and assimilating to their own nature all other thoughts, 
and which form new intervals and interstices whose void forever cr- 
ayes fresh food. (&P-, , 488) 
An individual self is similar to a manuscript of a poem, as it must be 
written, revised, and re-written, through a weaving of a self-sustaining 
fiction--represented by the "figured curtain"--which no sooner sheds light 
upon the nature of the self than it is engulfed by darkness: 
... [F]or the mind 
in creation is as a fading coal which some 
invisible influence, like an inconstant wind, awakens to tran- 
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sitory brightness, like the colour of a flower which fades and 
changes as it is developed... (; , 503-4) 
Process is vital to the Defence's treatment of the self and the 
aesthetic; the work is concerned with the writing process and with 
processes of perception and expression. Indeed, it is within these creative 
processes that true self-identity is to be located, not as a final, 
realisable, state, but as an on-going aesthetic construction. Shelley's 
Defence, by freeing the self from a metaphysical system, opens up the 
possibility of uniting subject with object; effectively, it is the genesis 
of an ontological account of the self's relation to the universe over an 
epistemological one. In this respect the Defence permits an intellectual 
confluence by revising previous literary and philosophic traditions, 
claiming the advantages of hindsight for its archaelogical explorations, 
but deferring a resolution of the difficulties encountered to a future 
reader. 
From our own vantage point in intellectual history, Shelleyan and 
Keatsian formulations of the self as a perpetual process of revision can be 
identified with the Nietzschean concept of self as a "going-between" (Z, 
43). To draw these parallels does not signify an end to the processes 
initiated in Shelley's A Defence of o. rv and Keats's letters, but instead 
re-asserts these issues of self and aesthetic as a continuing intellectual 
project. 
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Chapter 3 
"Faery Lands For1 orn" ; Tragic Romance in Endymion and Al or, 
"The journey homeward to habitual seif... "' 
(John Keats) 
"And what an I that I should linger here... "2 
(P. B. Shelley) 
"It is returning, at last it is coming home to me--my own 
Self and those parts of it that have long been abroad [in der 
Fremde] and scattered among all things... "' 
(Friedrich Nietzsche) 
Romantic revisionist practices bore testimony to the movement's revival of 
the romance world, populated with brave chivalric heroes, youthful 
paramours, cruel tyrants, wizards and fairies, living out their existences 
amongst the leafy vales of Arcady, elfin grottoes, and Spenserian "bowers 
of bliss". Romanticism's return to the romance genre recognised it as a 
literary mode already accustomed to political, social and aesthetic 
controversy since its adoption by Bunyan, Milton and Spenser. Although the 
Romantic movement reworked the aesthetic, social, and political allegories 
of romance, in response to both the outcome of the French Revolution and 
domestic political affairs, the essential quest motif and the dual 
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conception at reality were retained by Romanticism. Romantic poets 
unearthed in, and affirmed through the romance mode, their own belief in 
the pivotal dualities of innocence and experience, life and death, surface 
and depth, and the ideal and the real. 
Both Keats and Shelley were drawn towards romance as a benevolent arena 
which would allow them to produce their first polished poetical works. Both 
poets had previously experimented with the conventions and concerns of 
Romance; Shelley's lengthy visionary poem Queen Nab anticipated the writing 
of Alastor and Keats produced his "Calidore" fragment prior to the 
composition of Endymion. The choice of the romance genre for their major 
poetical debuts reflected anxieties over their literary aspirations to 
attain the lofty poetic heights of the daunting Milton, or those of the 
more accessible, but equally respected, Spenser. " Keats's and Shelley's 
preference for Romance also underlines their concern to ensure that their 
newly emerging poetical characters were aligned with a truly English 
lineage of literary ancestors. These revisionist patterns are more complex 
than may first appear: Sheliey's Alastor corrects Wordsworth's Ie 
Excursion, while Keats's End, ymion was composed as a redress to, and 
revision of, the underlying message of Alastor. '» At the same time Romantic 
revisionism involved inter-textual dialogues with past literary ancestors 
(Chaucer, Shakespeare, Spenser, and Milton, for instance). 
Both Endym,, ion and Alastor depict a quest for an alluring absent lady, 
often characterised as an auto-erotic journey that points towards the 
inherent dangers of confusing fiction and fact, although in many other 
respects these two poems appear at odds with one another. `; This 
oppositional stance between the two romances is to some degree 
unsurprising, given Keats's sad reflection on Endvy jon that "this youngster 
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should die away" (Preface, 102) and his later advice to Shelley to "curb 
your magnanimity and be more of an artist, and 'load every rift' of your 
subject with ore" (EL. 2,323), Shelley fiercely defended an opposite view 
of Alastor's poet-figure whose "self-centred seclusion was avenged by the 
furies of an irresistible passion pursuing him to speedy ruin" (Preface, 
15). Nonetheless, Keats recognised that his more mature and assured self- 
concentrated poetical character--which he wished to impress on Shelley--had 
not prevailed during the composition of E dvmion: 
And is this not extraordina[r]y talk for the writer of Endymion? 
whose mind was like a pack of scattered cards--I am picked up and 
sorted to a pip. (jL, 2,323) 
This is not to suggest that at some early stage the poetical characters 
of Keats and Shelley were ever identical, but to emphasise the formative 
and experimental stage the writing of Glastor and Endymion represented in 
Shelley's and Keats's poetic careers. Neither poet had yet developed a 
hard-and-fast aesthetic theory and consequently, in spite of the apparent 
antagonism between the two romances, both poems are shot through with 
shared ambiguities and anxieties. Unfortunately, recognition of these 
shared affinities has been coloured by critical determination, after 
Leavis, to render Shelley as the airy, abstract metaphysician, opposed to 
Keats the sensuous, earthy, aesthete. 
Endymion has, consequently, been characterised as a meandering maze of 
disconnected potential narratives and poetic pictures, through which Keats 
struggles to find the right narrative path and perfect his own distinctive 
poetic language of "Snailhorn perception". Stuart M. Sperry, John Jones and 
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Norris Dickstein--interested in Keats's poetic development--concentrate on 
Endymion as a transitional poem, marking Keats's departure from the idyllic 
realms of his early 1817 verse to the more weighty and tragic concerns of 
the mature "Hyperion" fragments and odes (K, 84-9; Kam!, 129). In general 
Sperry, Jones and Dickstein believe Keats's romance to be his first 
significant attempt, no matter how flawed, to work out the place of 
suffering in the poet's emerging aesthetics of beauty and truth. Such 
aesthetical readings have always been reluctant to pin down Endvmion's 
allegory. Not only are they aware, as Keats was, that the poem's 
"foundations are too sandy" (Preface, 102), but they also take note of 
Sperry's own description of the poem as "a little wilderness amid whose 
tangle one can wander happily but at the risk of becoming lost", ' 
These accounts of Endymion, as a poem concerned with its own origins, 
through the processes of literary "invention" and storytelling, are riddled 
with anxiety about the choice of subject, style and form. Such readings 
have come to fruition in the theoretical work of Marjorie Levinson, who 
argues that "mast of the 1817 poems are 'about' their own coming into 
being" (j A, 243), Although Levinson's study maintains a critical silence 
about Endyinion her formulation of the 1817 poems' preoccupation with their 
own creative processes and origins chimes with the handful of other 
theoretical readings of the poem. Martin Aske's account of Endue ion, in 
his study of Keats's fascination with Greek antiquity, argues that Endymion 
resists being constructed, either by the poet or reader, as a unified 
literary work. The tendency of the "text" to "erase that which it had 
desired to represent" is viewed as an impulse towards fragmentation in 
reaction against a totalising whole. 9 This instability of End v mion's 
narrative framework has been noted most recently by Andrew Bennett, who 
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perceives the poem as a series of narrative impulses and digressions, 
littered with numerous false starts of "surrogate tales" (om, 81; 76), 
which ultimately reveal their own inventive origins, as Keats's effort to 
"make 4,000 lines of one bare circumstance and fill them with poetry" <, 
1,170). Alternatively, Daniel P. Watkins has offered a materialist 
historical account of Endymion, which situates the poem in the socio- 
political context of post-Waterloo Britain, reading Keats's narrative, in 
spite of its lack of clarity, as rooted in the "fear of the world coming 
apart at the seams, and an attempt to prevent this by projecting a world 
subject to the control of individual desire". 9 
Theoretical critical accounts of Keats' s EEndymi on focus on the poem's 
awareness of its own fictionaiity: evident in the narrative's disclosures 
about the poem's origins of "invention", the arbitary nature of its own 
particular poetic language, and the inability of poetic vision to console. 
The consensus of these critics is that Endyion is a poem about itself; 
concerned with, and revealing of, the very imaginative and poetic processes 
which permits the existence of its own fantastic romance. Endymion's 
revelations about its own precarious fictional status are often, 
mistakenly, asserted by this kind of criticism as ends in themselves 
without any further critical explanation. The poem's awareness of itself as 
a poem might be further illuminated, if it were considered in relation to 
Keats's preoccupation with self-construction and self-consciousness. In 
this respect commentators on End__Pmion_ might usefully borrow a leaf from 
recent critical readings of Alastor, which focus on Shelley's poem as an 
"introspective crisis... of self-knowledge and self-consciousness". "' 
The Romantic quest for an insight into a sublime truth or meaning, the 
task undertaken by Endymion and Shelley's poet-figure, inevitably involves 
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the process of constructing a self and its relation to the universe. 
Romantic re-workings of the Kantian understanding of the sublime experience 
initiated a shift away from an exclusive concern with the "subject" to the 
broader consideration of a self's relation to mundane and sublime 
experience. Consequently, Romantic explorations of the sublime persistently 
require aesthetic understandings of the self, whether in the form of 
Wordsworth's theory of the egotistical sublime, Keats's self-concentration 
through Negative Capability, or Shelley's complex and elusive understanding 
of a connection between "Poetry and the principle of Self" (&-E, 503). 
Keats and Shelley revise Romance, omitting the moral certainties 
present in Spenser, choosing to concentrate on the spiritual or 
psychological dimensions of the genre. What emerged in the form of Endymion 
and Alastor were "psychodramas" " which portrayed the turbulent struggle of 
the self to re-orientate its relations with the world, once moral certainty 
was no longer an absolute and a Wordsworthian idealising of nature became 
inadequate to its desires. Keats and Shelley deliberately adopted an 
antagonistic stance to the Wordsworthian notion of communion with nature, 
troubled that such a scheme invested too greatly in solitary contemplation 
of, rather than in an ability to establish relations with other 
individuals. For Wordsworth, at least, the solitary contemplation of nature 
was the means to connect with the universal "life of things" 12 and to be 
aware of the "sad music of humanity" ("Tintern Abbey", 91). Neither Keats 
nor Shelley shared Wordsworth's "cheerful faith" in nature ("Tintern 
Abbey", 134), as they were increasingly aware of the potential self- 
deception involved in Wordsworth's retrospective myth-making, because of 
their own alertness to how the human mind fashions symbols--to depict its 
its own moods and desires--out of the perceived natural world, The problem 
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oI self-deception, which was latent in Wordsworth, became one of greater 
concern to Keats and Shelley who were more sceptical about the moral and 
metaphysical certainties that seemed to secure Wordsworth's fiction: 
.,, 101f all the mighty world 
Of eye and ear, --both what they half create, 
And what perceive; well pleased to recognise 
In nature and the language of the sense, 
The anchor of my purest thoughts, the nurse, 
The guide, the guardian of my heart, and soul 
Of all my moral being. (' Tintern Abbey", 105-il) 
At first glance Keats's opening to ndymion might seem to endorse 
Wordsworth's understanding of nature. Keats's emphasis may rest directly 
with "beauty" (1,1) rather than nature, but indirectly it is connected 
with the natural world of the "sun, the moon, Trees old" (1,13-14), 
"daffodils" (1,14), "clear rills" (1,16) and "musk-rose blooms" (1,19). 
Apparently, beauty rather like Wordsworth's nature will ensure a natural 
haven--the "bower quiet for us" (1,4)--into which retreat is possible from 
"all the unhealthy and o'er-darkened ways / Made for our searching" (1.10- 
11); in precisely the same way as the "simple sheep" shelter under the 
"shady boon" of a young tree (1, A-15). Keats's "bower" of beauty does not 
fit so neatly into the Wordsworthian pattern as, simultaneously, it offers 
a balm to the dark turbulence of the world and transfigures humanity by 
moving "away the pall / From our dark spirits" (1,12-13). Keats"s "beauty" 
leads to a process of retreat and disclosure, not to a solitary 
Wordsworthian communion with humanity mediated by nature. 
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From the outset of En,, mion Keats establishes an ambivalent attitude 
towards Wordsworth's fiction of nature, troubled both by the necessity of 
inventing these kinds of fictions (as a poet) and his awareness of their 
limitations. '- Keats, even at this early poetical stage, is sensitive to 
the double-edged sword which imaginative fictions can be. He is haunted by 
the idea that a fiction has the potential to reveal as much as it deceives: 
.., [E]ven as the trees 
That whisper round a temple become soon 
Dear as the temple's self, so does the moon, 
The passion poesy, glories infinite, 
Haunt us till they become a cheering light 
Unto our souls, and bound to us so fast, 
That, whether there be shine, or gloom o'ercast. 
They alway must be with us, or we die. (1,26-33) 
Natural beauty--whether in the form of the whispering "trees" or the 
glowing moon--attracts the attention of those who possess the "passion 
poesy", ensuring that nature's "glories infinite" become as important a 
focus for divine worship as the "temple"; the leafy location of the temple, 
consequently, becomes "dear as the temple's self". Implicitly, Keats 
turns 
the reader to the subject matter of his romance through a suggestion of a 
"temple" (perhaps Grecian in style? ) and a foregrounding of the human 
propensity to invent mythical fictions about the natural world. 
The natural 
beauty of the trees suggests the origins of mythical tales of satyrs and 
sileni and the alluring shine of the moon a story of a mortal youth's 
love 
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for the goddess, Cynthia--the "one bare circumstance" that inspired Keats's 
poetic exploration of the tale of Endymion. 
This kind of myth-making is vital to the human condition, because 
these fictions "must be with us, or we die", and yet at the same time they 
do not guarantee to improve anyone's particular lot, offering only a 
momentary respite from the "shine, or gloom o'ercast". The fictive "bower 
quiet for us" can only promise a return to the world of reality, which by 
contrast with the realm of "sweet dreams, and health, and quiet breathing" 
(1,5), may seem more bleak and troubled than ever before, Such fictions, 
in Keats's view, are a blessing and a burden, as they "haunt us" with their 
potential to "become a cheering light" amongst the "gloom o'ercast". Like 
Wordsworth, Keats is drawn to the world of nature for a source of poetic 
inspiration--at some primitive stage, observations of the natural world 
gave rise to the creative act of myth-making"4--and yet his early and acute 
awareness of the ambivalent nature of the fictive "bower" presses Keats to 
attempt to surpass his literary ancestor. Less than a month after writing 
the Preface to Endion Keats, in a letter to John Reynolds, re-formulates 
his poetic relation to Wordsworth and the ambivalence of the idyllic "quiet 
breathing" bowers of Endue on--or what he now terms the "Chamber of Maiden- 
Thought"--in which: 
... [Wle become 
intoxicated with the light and the atmosphere, we see 
nothing but pleasant wonders, and think of delaying there for ever 
in delight: However among the effects this breathing is father 
... [o]f convincing one['s] nerves 
that the World is full of Misery 
and Heartbreak, Pain, Sickness and oppression--whereby this Chamber 
of Maiden Thought becomes gradually darken'd and at the same time on 
1I as 
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all sides of it many doors are set open--but all dark--all leading 
to dark passages... LTIo this point was Wordsworth come as far as I 
can conceive when he wrote 'Tintern Abbey' and it seems to me that 
his Genius is explorative of those dark [p]assages, <K, 1,281) 
There is little doubt about the young poet's admiration for Wordsworth 
and the formnative influence Wordsworth's poetry had on his choice of poetic 
subject--particularly Keats's recurring interest in mythology--and 
philosophical reflections on the "heart and nature of Man" (K, 1,281). 
Wordsworth ushers Keats into "dark passages"' when his poetic explorations 
"into the life of things" ("Tintern Abbey", 49) trigger a return to an 
awareness of the "still, sad music of humanity" ("Tintern Abbey", 91). 
Ironically, it is precisely Keats's desire to explore the "dark passages" 
of human existence and nature which force him, in spite of his admiration, 
to gradually distance himself from Wordsworthian influence. Even before the 
Chamber of Maiden Thought letter Keats was sure "that we ought to read our 
Contemporaries... that Wordsworth &c should have their dues from us" but 
still troubled about readers being "bullied into a certain kind of 
philosophy engendered in the whims of an Egotist" (EL, 1,223). Ultimately, 
it was differences over the kind of poetic process necessary to an 
investigation of the "heart and nature of Man" that set Keats and 
Wordsworth apart from one another, as by the end of October 1818 Keats had 
rejected the idea of a "wordsworthian or egotistical sublime" (EL, 2,387). 
By then, the rapidly evolving Keats was a very different poet from the one 
who had penned Endy on, and yet Keats's constant testing of fictions-- 
especially those that construct a possible self and relation to the world-- 
was a poetic interest from the outset of Endymion, which is strongly aware 
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that the "bowers" or romance fiction all too readily surrender their idyll 
back to the "o'er darkened ways" of the reality of human existence. 
Critical controversy over the relationship between the Preface of 
Shelley's Alastor, its narrator's dedication to the "Great Parent" of 
nature (45)1ß,, and the tragic retelling of a young poet-figure's doomed 
quest, bears witness to the ambivalent stance the poem takes towards 
Wordsworthian aesthetics and psychology, Like Keats's opening sequence in 
Fndymion, Shelley's Alastor is immediately aware of itself as a fiction, 
Both poems establish themselves as tales that are to be recollected by 
their respective narrators. Alastor's main narrative commences, "[tihere 
was a Poet.., " (50), and Keats's narrator starts his tale with, "I / Will 
trace the story of Endymion" (1,34-5). Equally, the dedication of 
Alastor's narrator hints at the poetic need to go beyond the retrospective 
myth-making of Wordsworth. Shelley's narrator actively embraces the "o'er 
darkened ways" that the narrator of Endymion unsuccessfully attempts to 
resist: 
... I have watched 
Thy shadow, and the darkness of thy steps, 
And my heart ever gazes on the depth 
Of thy deep mysteries, (Alastor, 20-3) 
Shelley's narrator knows all too readily the dark tragedy of 
investigating the "deep heart of man" (49> and pursuing nature's "shadow 
and the darkness of... [her] ... steps" (21), so that he might 
force her "to 
render up the tale of what we are" (28-9). For Alastor's narrator, at 
least, the meaning of human existence is locked within nature's vast 
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framework, because what sustains his explorations into the "deep heart of 
man" is the "dark hope" that nature one day will reveal to him her "inmost 
sanctuary" X32; 38). Although Shelley's narrator gives more direct emphasis 
to the darker aspects of nature's "deep mysteries" (23), they are included 
only after what appears to be a rehearsal of a Wordsworthian fiction of 
universal harmony and "beloved brotherhood" (1), Alastor opens with the 
narrator's apparent account of his mutual upbringing with the changing 
skies, seasons, and wildlife (which he is proud to call "my kindred" and 
"beloved brethren" (15; 16)) under the watchful eye of nature, his "Great 
Parent": 
If our great Mother has imbued my soul 
With aught of natural piety to feel 
Your love, and recompense the boon with mine.,. (2-4) 
This fiction of communion with nature gains credence from its echoes of 
the "Ode: Intimations of Immortality" and its portrayal of the narrator as 
a Wordsworthian student of the natural world, whose "heart ever gazes on 
the depth / Of thy deep mysteries" (22-3). Although the narrator does 
invoke nature as his "Great Parent", there is little evidence to suggest 
that he is either particularly favoured by the "great Mother", or that he 
is privileged to any of nature's deepest secrets. It is questionable from 
the start, because of the conditional "if", whether the narrator has ever 
had his soul "imbued... [ w) ith aught of natural piety", What on the surface 
appears to be a Wordsworthian myth of communion (which unites opposites 
through the narrator's union with nature, so that he is at one "Lw)ith 
sunset and its gorgeous ministers / And solemn midnight's tingling 
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silentness" (6-? )> turns out to disclose the limitations of this kind of 
fiction. The narrator's initial invocation of the "Earth, ocean, air... " 
(1) underlines Shelley's intentional echoing of Wordsworth's poetic 
diction: 
Not for this 
Faint I, nor mourn nor murmur; other gifts 
Have followed; for such loss, I would believe, 
Abundant reco" ense. (85-8) 
And I have felt 
A presence that disturbs me with the joy 
Of elevated thoughts; a sense sublime 
Of something far more deeply interfused, 
Whose dwelling is the light of setting suns, 
And the round ocean and the living air, 
And the blue sky, and in the mind of man: 
A motion and a spirit ... (93-100, my i talics) 
In "Tintern Abbey" the absence of youthful vitality, 
"time... Ethat ]... is past" (83), and the more immediate five-year absence of 
Wordsworth from the Wye valley are all compensated for and consoled by the 
poet's awareness of the Spirit of nature. Shelley's narrator (like the 
narrator's proem to Keats's Endymion) deliberately weaves his elegy for the 
poet-figure from the existing poetic fabric of Wordsworthian language. 
Neither Keats nor Shelley endorses Wordsworth`s retrospective myth-making; 
instead they invoke it through their narrators in order to foreground the 
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ambiguities present in Wordsworth's fiction, and develop their own 
ambivalent attitudes towards this type of myth-making. Both Keats and 
Shelley wanted to move beyond Wordsworth's underlying metaphysical premiss 
that nature was the "soul of all. -[our] ... moral being" (110-11), but at 
this earlier stage of their poetic careers were unsure about what kind of 
poetry they would write to displace that of their literary forefather, 
Certainly, their narrators suggest the possibility of a transition to a 
poetry of "dark passages" rather than a consolatory fiction more concerned 
with the processes of its own creation and the fashioning of a self- 
identity than the finished poetic creation that asserts hopefully, "that 
all which we behold / Is full of blessings" (134-5). Keats's narrator 
asserts a romantic bower of "quiet breathing" only to have it troubled by 
the stifling confusion and darkness of reality and, similarly, Shelley's 
re-enactment of Wordsworthian union does not produce a fiction of 
consolation, but a state of isolation, The "deserted" (44) narrator is left 
stranded in the "solitary dome" (43), forever awaiting nature's "breath" to 
inspire and fill him with the universal rhythms of life, p stor's narrator 
clings to the "dark hope" that nature, in Wordsworth' s words, will permit 
him to "see into the life of things", a hope which is desperate precisely 
because the "tale of what we are" remains an "incommunicable dream" while 
the world remains "unfathomable"(39; 18). " 
I wait thy breath, Great Parent, that my strain 
May modulate with murmurs of the air, 
And motions of the forests and the sea, 
And voice of living beings, and woven hymns 
Of night and day, and the deep heart of man. (Glastor, 45-9) 
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Ironically, the narrator's continued belief in Wordsworthian 
consolation and coimnunion is not rewarded. Instead, it leads to the 
realisation that adherence to the Wordsworthian myth has both tethered the 
narrator to the mutable world and isolated him from nature's "inmost 
sanctuary". What becomes of paramount importance are the kind of fictions 
which different individuals choose to create, as the invention of a 
particular fiction affects their own self-perception and relation to the 
universe. Shelley's narrator, "LlJike an inspired and desperate alchymist" 
(31), seeks to concoct a fiction which will illuminate the "voice of living 
beings" (48) as well as his own. The narrator's chosen fiction at some 
point may have enabled him to catch fleeting glimpses of the sublime 
"truths" concealed by nature amongst her "twilight phantasms" and "deep 
noonday thought" (40), but at present, like a "deserted fane" (44), he is 
untouched by these mysterious insights. 
This kind of myth-making discloses its own precarious existence. Its 
fragile illusions might collapse at any moment; worse still, their woven 
metaphors might become established as binding metaphysical "truths". 
Fictions, poetic or otherwise, have the potentiality to cast light onto the 
human condition as much as they mystify and shroud existence in darkness. 
What is always clear is the importance of these fictions to an individual's 
understanding of self and its relation to the universe. Conversely, it is 
an individual's desire for self'-knowledge which originates the impulse to 
invent these different fictions, as a means to explain and interpret the 
phenomenal world, so that they can establish within it what their 
particular place, purpose, or function might be. The narrators of Endvmmion 
and lastor highlight, in particular, the limitations of Wordsworthian 
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myth-making and, more generally, the ambivalent tensions present in the 
process of generating fictions. 
Altýtor's poet-figure spends his "early youth" in a manner strikingly 
similar to that of the poem's narrator (75), as nature's "vast earth and 
ambient air / Sent to his heart its choicest impulses'", which leads to his 
active pursuit of her "most secret steps" 69-70; 81). 11 Shelley's poet- 
figure is driven by an insatiable desire for knowledge, thirsting after 
both nature's sublime secrets and the "truths" to be found amongst the past 
fictions and myths of humanity: 
The fountains of divine philosophy 
Fled not his thirsting lips, and all of great 
Or good, or lovely, which the sacred past 
In truth or fable consecrates, he felt 
And knew. (71-5) 
At the outset of the narrative the poet-figure is already distanced 
from the rest of humanity by his otherworldly abiiity to participate in the 
realm of "solemn vision... and bright silver dream" (67) and the 
companionship he seeks with the animal kingdom which allows him to make the 
"wild his home" (98-106; 99); an isolation firmly underlined through the 
narrator's earlier reminder that "CnJo human hands with pious reverence 
reared" the poet's "untimely tomb" (50-1) and his succinct lament, "[hie 
lived, he died, he sung, in solitude" (60). The poet-figure's desire for 
self-knowledge stems from his heightened awareness of himself as an 
individuated consciousness, acutely aware of his difference from his fellow 
beings and the phenomenal world. 
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Neither "divine philosophy" nor the lessons of past "table[s]" quench 
the poet-figure's desire for self-knowledge, they serve only to heighten 
his profound sense of alienation and prompt his "fearless steps" (79) into 
"undiscovered lands" (77). Their fictions fail to measure up to the 
expectations of his "solemn vision... and bright silver dream". The poet- 
figure's emergence from the idyllic trance-like state of his "infancy" (69) 
represents a change from passive reception of nature's "choicest impulses" 
(71) to an active search for meaning amongst the ruins of ancient 
civilisation, spurred on by his yearning to satisfy "high thoughts" (108). 
This vast geographical exploration becomes an archaeological excavation of 
early human history and its beliefs, as the journey undertaken is as much 
temporal as topographical, as much historical fact as mythical. On the 
poet-figure's itinary are Athens (109), Jerusalem (110), Memphis (110), 
Ethiopia (115), and even "the fallen towers of / Babylon" (110), all of 
which he plunders in search of the "strange truths" (77) he believes will 
measure up to the expectations of his ideal nurturing and unlock the 
secrets of the universe. Reality must satisfy his thirst for knowledge in 
the absence of the "bright silver dream" of childhood, or alternatively it 
must be subjected to the idealising fiction of this dream and shown to be 
inadequate: 
... [B]ut ever gazed 
And gazed, till meaning on his vacant mind 
Flashed like strong inspiration, and he saw 
The thrilling secrets of the birth of time. (125-8) 
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A1. äatoL-' s poet-figure gains an insight into the "secrets of the birth 
of time" by ransacking human history for former understandings of the self 
and its relation to the universe, particularly through his solitary 
contemplation of the Egyptian "eternal pyramids" or the "mutilated sphynx" 
(111; 114), the "wild images / Of more than man" (117-8), and the 
"[zlodiac's brazen mystery" X119). This contemplative study of ruins 
requires the poet-figure to reconstruct--from the "mute thoughts on the 
mute walls around" and "speechless shapes" (120; 123)--former astrological 
and religious fictions to test whether or not they will satisfy his "vacant 
mind" that has lost and yet is continually haunted by the ideal visions of 
his childhood nurturing. 
Locating the origin of time may set the poet-figure apart from 
Alastor's narrator" (to whom the hieroglyphs "strange / Sculptured on 
alabaster obelisk, or jasper tomb... " (112-4) remain unintelligible and the 
"thrilling secrets" of time hidden), but ultimately it underlines his own 
personal sense of loss and intellectual dissatisfaction with the reality 
encountered during his quest. The poet-figure's isolated enquiry enables 
him to complete the fragmentary ancient signs--giving a "voice", as it 
were, to the "speechless shapes"--by restoring their meaning. Although the 
poet-figure can ascribe meaning to the hieroglyphs, reality can never 
realise his ideal visions and so fulfil his idealised expectations. The 
poet-figure's ability to renew meaning to these hieroglyphics reinforces 
his increasing awareness of reality's inability to affirm any validity for 
the ideals he holds sacred. 
Shelley's visionary poet-figure discovers himself to be at odds with 
reality. Keats's Endymion is another youth troubled by dreams and visions, 
which cause him to strain beyond the phenomenal world in search of a higher 
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transcendental plane of existence. Increasingly "L aJ lone and sad" (1,477), 
Endymion's contemplation of the otherworldly causes him to withdraw from 
communal activities and is reminiscent of the poet-figure's alienation in 
Alastor: 
But in the self-same fixed trance he kept, 
Like one who on the earth had ever steilt-- 
Aye, even as dead-still as a marble man, 
Frozen in that old tale Arabian. (Endymion, 1,403-6) 
in accordance with Keats's revisionism towards Shelley's Alas or, 
Endymion's distracted state is the product of an "airy trance" (1,585) in 
which he encounters--after a magical chariot ride--the beautiful goddess, 
Cynthia. Endymion's romance quest takes its point of departure from the 
tragic death scene of Shelley's poet-figure, as the vision of Cynthia's 
"naked comeliness" (1,615) is pre-empted by Endymion's glimpse of the 
"loveliest moon, that ever silver'd o'er /A shell for Neptune's goblet" 
(1,592-3). Keats's scene inverts that of Alastor's isolated and weary 
poet-figure who exhales his last feeble breaths beneath a "great moon, 
which o'er the western line / Of the wide world her mighty horn suspended" 
(646-7), so that even at his moment of death he is still haunted by the 
possibility that her "two lessening points of light" (654) might be the 
"beamy bending eyes" (179> of the dream maiden he sought, Despite the 
juvenile sexual overtones of Keats's portrayal of Endymion's transcendental 
encounter with Cynthia it is both life affirming--pointing towards a 
potential higher "second self" (1,659)--and a reminder to Endymion of his 
own "desperate mortal" state (1,661). 
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A conflict between mortality and immortality highlights the tension 
present in Alastor and Endmy ion between their protagonists' yearning for an 
immutable, absolute, and idealised existence and their encounters with the 
"o'er-darkened ways" of the tragic and mutable human condition. Shelley's 
"graceful" (106) poet-figure emerges from an illusory chrysalis of the 
"bright silver dream" initially unaware that this "silver vision" (316) is 
ultimately inextricable from "solemn vision". Shelley's poet-figure needs 
to learn what Keats's Endymion knows all too well, that a "'dream within a 
dream"' (1,633) gives way to "nothing" and "stupid sleep" (1,678). The 
"Journey homeward to habitual self" (2,276) is made at the expense of 
realising his immutable "second self" (1,559). Self-exploration and the 
uncovering of self-knowledge are dependent upon the invention of these 
idealising and redemptive fictions which both make the "disappointment" and 
"anxiety" of "human life" bearable (2,153-9) and risk disclosing their own 
fictive natures and revealing the dark reality of human existence: 
There, when new wonders ceas'd to float before, 
And thoughts of self come on, how crude and sore 
The journey homeward to habitual self! 
A mad-pursuing of the fog-born elf, 
Whose flitting lantern, through rude nettle-briar, 
Cheats us into a swamp, into a fire, 
Into the bosom of a hated thing. (Enddymion, 2,274-80) 
These elusive fictions appear as hopeful spots of light which, like a 
will-o'-the-wisp, flit through the murky air to be madly pursued as a 
guiding "lantern" that will light the way to a safe haven. Ironically, if 
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the "flitting lantern" of one of these idealising fictions is successfully 
pursued it turns out not only to be illusory, but to have betrayed the self 
to the "hated thing" it sought to escape. This is certainly true of 
Endymion's dream of immortal union with Cynthia, because his waking from 
the "sweet dream" (1,677) is a betrayal to a phenomenal world from which 
he is totally alienated. He is unable to weave a Wordsworthian fiction of 
solace to ease his loss: 
Away I wander`d---all the pleasant hues 
Of heaven and earth had faded: deepest shades 
Were deepest dungeons; heaths and sunny glades 
Were full of pestilent light... (1,691-4) 
Alastor's poet-figure awakes from his hopeful dream of the "veiled 
maiden" (151) to experience a feeling of isolation, emptiness and lack of 
consolation for the loss of his own self-projected fiction in response to 
the failure of the phenomenal world to affirm his ideals. When the poet- 
figure wakes to the "cold white light of morning" (193) '[h]is wan eyes / 
Gaze vacantly on the empty scene' (200-1) and "vacant woods" (195). The 
poet-figure, having found the phenomenal world inadequate to his initial 
"bright silver dream"24, and incapable of filling the painful vacancy of 
the human condition that troubles him, imposes onto the world his own 
idealised fiction of a primal "beautiful shape" (211), only to be cheated 
by his own illusion and returned to a world more barren and bleak than it 
was before. Reality is always at adds with ideal expectations: 
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Whither have fled 
The hues of heaven that canopied his bower 
Of yesternight? The sounds that soothed his sleep, 
The mystery and the majesty of Earth, 
The joy, the exultation? (196-200) 
When the poet-figure and Endymion awake from their dreams of beautiful 
maidens--ultimate projections of their idealised fictions of truth--it is 
not that the empirical universe has altered f or the worse. In their state 
of dejection they represent the ordinary world through negative poetic 
language to emphasise the loss of their unfulfilled visions. The absence of 
the evaporating visionary maidens is translated into a negative poetic 
fiction in which nature is no longer construed as a mediator of the 
transcendental and eternal, but as a constant reminder of human mutability 
and the inevitability of death, what Coleridge's "Dejection: An Ode" terms 
"[ rl eal ity' s dark dream". 2' Endyinion creates his own fictional prison-house 
of " [d]eepest dungeons", where once he had idealised the joys of nature; 
Aast is poet-figure can only image the brilliant iridescence of a rainbow 
as its own negation, portraying it as a symbol of despair and death: 
Does the bright arch of rainbow clouds, 
And pendent mountain seen in the calm lake, 
Lead only back to a black and watery depth... (214-5) 
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Shelley's poet-figure and Keats's Endymion are alienated from their 
respective communities--the poet-figure leaves an "alienated home" (?? ) and 
Endymion is so distant "from the whole multitude" (1,308) they fear "young 
Endymion.. Lmight].., pine away" (1,184). The sense of difference from 
others and the world around them leads them to the contemplation of a 
transcendental "truth", glimpsed during moments of intense vision. 
Both Alastor and Fvmion depict a conflict between fictions of the 
ideal and the harsh circumstances of the ordinary and real, between the 
heightened sense of self-knowledge attained through visionary modes of 
consciousness and the self-deception of the illusory, and between desire 
for a distinct identity and the impulse to recapture a primal oneness. 
Endymion's awareness of his individuality threatens to extinguish forever 
the light of "golden-tongued Romance" ("On Sitting Down to Read King Lear 
Once Again", 1) and to destroy outmoded pagan myths of "old piety" (1,130) 
taught him as a child. Ironically, given the fact that Endymion has been 
raised amongst the romance world of pagan ritual, at one with "nature's 
lives and wonders" (1,105), it is he who threatens its "quiet bowers" of 
romance by adhering to the Apollonian dictum of seeking self-knowledge: 
Apoll[onian72 culture-must first overthrow an empire of Titans and 
slay monsters, and... have triumphed over an abysmal and terrifying 
view of the world and the keenest susceptibility to suffering 
through a recourse to the most forceful and pleasurable illusions 
[Scheine]. (EI, 43) 
Nietzsche's diagnosis of the relationship between the Apollonian and 
Dionysian myth-making dynamic points towards a definition of the 
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oscillating patterns of light and darkness in Endymion and lastor, 
Endylnion's desire to fashion a distinct sense of self--rooted in his sense 
of difference from others of his community--produces a supplementary 
fiction of a higher transcendental self, in which "true" identity is 
realised by a melting away from the horrors of dark "human serpentry" (1, 
821): 
... an orbed drop 
Of light, and that is love: its influence, 
Thrown in our eyes, genders a novel sense, 
At which we start and fret; till in the end, 
Melting into its radiance, we blend, 
Mingle, and so become a part of it... (1,807-11) 
This fiction separates Endymion from the selfish ways of his fellow 
beings by asserting a belief in the greater nobility of humanity. The light 
of "love" redeems man from "human sepentry" by opening "our eyes" to a 
higher purpose and goal. Dark reality is no longer a threat, because once 
touched by love's "novel sense" mankind is absorbed into the "radiance" of 
its transcendental realm. Such fictions are necessary to the continuation 
of human life in a dark and mutable universe, as the Apollonian world of 
"powerful and pleasurable illusions" suppresses and supplements the 
Dionysian awareness of incurable human tragedy: 
... [Slo that now reversing the wisdom of Silenus we might say 
of the Greeks "to die soon is worst of all for them, the next 
worst--to die at all, "... At the Apolltonian) stage of develop- 
went, the "will" longs so vehemently for this existence... Q II, 43) 
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The appearance of the Indian Maid to Alastor's poet-figure and 
Endymion's encounter with Cynthia, resepctively, discloses the fictive 
nature of these idealised women, Shelley's poet-figure ominously pursues 
the "bright shadow of that lovely dream" (233), hinting to the narrator's 
audience that the Apollonian world of light, order, and harmony must itself 
be overreached. Idealised fictions, like all other interpretative fictions 
of the universe, as Nietzsche argued, conceal as much as they reveal: 21 
The brightest clarity of the image [des Bildes] did not suffice 
us, for this seemed to wish just as much to reveal something as 
to conceal something. Its revelation, being like a parable, seemed 
to summon us to tear the veil and to uncover the mysterious 
background; but at the same time this all-illuminated total visib- 
ility cast a spell over the eyes and prevented them from penetrat- 
ing deeper. (EI, 113) 
A single swan "Isicaling the upward sky" (278) provides an ambiguous 
counterpart for the poet-figure's pursuit of his visionary "strange light" 
(265). The "(bleautifui bird" (281) is able to ascend to airy heights that 
represent for him the transcendental realm to which he aspires and yet it 
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also serves as a reminder of his alienated state and human limitations. The 
poet-figure's idealising fiction of the "Spirit more vast... " (287) gives 
way only to the darker fiction of an unresponsive earth and a "desperate 
hope" (291) : 
"'And what am I that I should linger here, 
With voice far sweeter than thy dying tones, 
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Spirit more vast than thine, frame more attuned 
To beauty, wasting these surpassing powers 
In the deaf air, to the blind earth, and heaven 
That echoes not my thoughts? '" (285-90> 
Once again the ordinary and visionary merge with one another, as the 
patterns of light and darkness coalesce in the quest for the "bright 
shadow". In Nietzschean terms, "Dionysus speaks the language of Apollo; and 
Apollo finally speaks the language of Dionysus" (a, 130). Shelley's poet- 
figure is pained by the difference between his own solitary state and the 
shared existence of the swan with its "sweet irate" (282) for life, and 
isolated by the indifference that nature displays towards him. The bird 
navigates its "bright course / High over the immeasurable main" (278-9) 
without any regard for the poet-figure's plight. This treacherous 
experience of rejection and dejection leads to the poet-figure's attempted 
suicide, motivated by an attempt to re-create the Apollonian dream state-- 
in order to recapture his self-projected ideal--by embracing an eternal 
state of sleep in the form of death, The "desperate hope" of Alastor's 
poet-figure is that an encounter with Dionysian "lone Death on the drear 
ocean's waste" (305) will end his sense of difference from a vacant 
universe by recapturing a state of primal oneness, essential to the 
Apollonian ideal he has sought and failed to discover in the empirical 
world. 
Equally, Keats's Endr v mion depicts a quest through a procession of 
shifting fictive bowers, in which Endyrnion experiences both the illusory 
bright vision of the Apollonian and the dark tragedy of the suppressed 
Dionysian, For instance, Endymion's glimpse of the moon as a "tiny point of 
68 
iaery scymetar" ý4,499) gives rise to a vision of Cynthia, who "bow'd into 
the heavens her timid head" (4, X502), and, finally, to the despair of "her 
body jading gaunt and spare / In the cold moonshine" (4,507-8). What at 
first appears to be an ultimate vision of primal oneness--the ending of 
difference--ior Endymion, collapses into the tragic realisation that his 
Apollonian impulse for self-knowledge has finished in the most extreme 
illusory state, self-delusion: 
Straight he seiz'd her wrist: 
It melted from his grasp: her hand he kiss'd, 
And, horror', kiss'd his own--he was alone. (4,508-10) 
Endymion`s visionary sighting of Cynthia's "bright signal" (4,500) 
reveals the self-deception present in the Apollonian illusory state, 
returning the youth to his own solitary state amongst "[d]ark regions" 
where the soul "can trace / Its own existence, of remotest Blooms" (4,516; 
514-5), Apollonian illusion belies its own fictive nature and reveals to 
Endymion the Dionysian tragedy of human life, which he, like Alastor's 
poet-figure, constructs in the Cave of Quietude a negative fiction of 
absence and vacancy: 
Dark paradise! where pale becomes the bloom 
Of health by due; where silence dreariest 
Is most articulate; where hopes infest; 
Where those eyes are the brightest far that keep 
Their lids shut longest in a dreamless sleep. (4,538-42) 
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Keats' s depiction of Endymion' s sighting of the moon's "diamond peak" 
(4,497) and subsequent dejection echoes the poet-figure's haphazard 
midnight and moonlit arrival, in Alastor, at the cavern's entrance (352-4; 
363-4), where his encounter with the Spirit is pre-empted by his renewed 
persistence to attain "'Vision and Love! '" (366), Shelley's poet-figure, in 
spite of the darkness and despair of failure that plague him, never stops 
asserting and re-asserting during his life an idealised fiction of 
transcendence in the face of "[rleality's dark dream". This is the poet- 
figure's destiny, to reformulate the Apollonian illusion against the 
Dionysian, because for better or for worse "He images to himself the Being 
whom he loves" (Preface, 14). The tragedy in Alastor stems from the 
apparent ignorance of the poet-figure, who pursues the hopeful visions of 
love and harmony not as life-preserving fictions of his own invention, but 
as emissaries of an attainable otherworldliness. Narcissus-like the poet- 
figure gazes at his fading reflection "in the dark depth / Of that still 
fountain" (471-2) at the very moment that his Apollonian fiction breaks 
down into a similar self-delusory state experienced by Keats's Endymion: 
A Spirit seemed 
To stand beside him--clothed in no bright robes 
Of shadowy silver or enshrining light, 
Borrowed from aught the visible world affords 
Of grace, or majesty, or mystery... (479-83> 
Shelley's poet-figure conceives his vision of the Spirit in yet another 
negative fiction, which is devoid of the brightness and lustre of the other 
emanations of the "silver vision". There is a direct correlation between 
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the physical deterioration of the poet-figure, whose eyes are filled with a 
"wan light" and whose body has become a "shadowy frame" (470; 416), and the 
fading of the "enshrining light" which accompanies his vision. The 
Apollonian illusory light is almost entirely enveloped in Dionysian 
darkness, save for two pinpoints of light which are preserved only at the 
expense of the poet-figure's great mental exertion: 
... and evening gloom 
Now deepening the dark shades, for speech assuming.,. 
Were all that was, --only... when his regard 
Was raised by intense pensiveness... two eyes, 
Two starry eyes, hung in the gloom of thought... (485-90) 
Alastor's poet-figure is caught in the endless task of supplanting one 
vision with another, as each illusory fiction points toward its fictive 
origins and the chaos of the dark, confused, tragic Dionysian mode it 
struggles to erase, or forget. The poet-figure's moments of most intense 
vision occur in Spenserian bowers--the "natural bower" in the "vale of 
Cashmire" (147; 145) and the "cavern" with its enclosed dell of "Silence 
and Twilight" (455) --suggesting his attempt to elide reality in his quest 
for transcendental "truth" and the impossibility of the poet-figure 
establishing--and discerning--through a "single image" (Preface, 14), or 
fiction, the immutable "truth" of the universe. After all, a poet-figure 
who "images to himself the Being whom he loves" inevitably perceives the 
cosmos as a continual stream of self-projected and changing fictions. This 
risks a collapse into an existential crisis and a state of solipsism in 
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which, to borrow from Nietzsche's understanding of the Dionysian, 
"everything subjective vanishes into complete self-forgetfulness" (L 36). 
What Endymion terms the "goal of consciousness" (2,283) is the product of 
the Apollonian impulse to individuation and can be satisfied by its exact 
opposite mode, the Dionysian, which has the capacity to end the sense of 
vacancy and difference present in the apparent harmonic order of the 
Apollonian. No matter how intensely a dream reality is felt there always 
remains an awareness of it as illusion; or as Nietzsche writes: 
... [E]ven when this dream reality [Traumwirklichkeit) is 
most intense, we still have, glimmering through it, the 
sensation that it is mere appearance [Schein]. (, 34) 
Shelley's visionary bowers are tainted with the reality from which 
they try to shield the poet-figure, as Keats's "quiet bowers" are never far 
away from the "o'er darkened ways" in End on. Unlike Keats' s Endymion, 
Shelley's poet-figure becomes increasingly like a Dionysian priest who, 
according to Joseph Raben, "re-enacts the sufferings and death of the god 
he serves" and is punished for witnessing the epiphany of his god, ='" 
Although Raben's mythological framework demands a didacticism that fits 
uneasily with much of Alastor, it does help to highlight a n important 
difference between the plight of the poet-figure and Keats's En dymion. The 
stifling darkness, despair, and mutability which oppress Alas tor's poet- 
figure until the grave contrast with Endymion's enchanted exit with 
Cynthia, as "[t]hey vanish' d far away! " (4,1002). 
In spite of the difficulties of constructing a clear narrative 
sequence from Endymion' s journey of littered allusions, Keats is eager to 
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ensure that this youth does not pine away through a self-destructive 
pursuit of a transcendental idea. Consequently, when Endymion encounters 
the lonely and distressed Indian Maiden, he displays an unselfish love and 
relinquishes his search for the divine Cynthia in order to become her "sad 
servant evermore" (4,301). Unfortunately, Endymion' s displays of selfless 
love turn out to be rather arbitrary, as his encounter with Glaucus is 
purely accidental and, even after he has sworn service to the Indian 
Maiden, he continues to pine after the transcendental Cynthia; in fact, 
during in his service to the Indian Maiden Endymion verges on solipsism and 
suffers his greatest depression, wasting the day away in a "soft poppy 
dream" and carving the design of a crescent moon and stars on tree bark (4, 
786-9). Regardless of these narrative inconsistencies, Keats ensures his 
poem's close witnesses the revealed Cynthia united with Endymion, her 
lover, and his sister, Peona: 
Next Cynthia bright 
Peona kiss'd, and bless'd with fair good night: 
Her brother kiss'd her too, and knelt adown 
Before his goddess, in a blissful swoon. (4,996-9) 
If Endymion was supposed to have learnt greater empathy with his 
fellow beings, it would seem that he did not make a very good student, 
Having achieved communion with the transcendental, he once again abandons 
the web of human relations and the "gloomy wood" to which Peona returns (4, 
1003). The illusory dream reality of the Apollonian is literalised by 
Endymion's effective apotheosis "by some unlook'd for change" and "decrees 
of fate", so that he can "[ bl e spiritualiz' d" (4,992; 990; 993) and escape 
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the mutable world of his "mortal state" t4,991), Yet the world he abandons 
by Keats's poetic sleight of hand is left much darker by his absence. Even 
at the moment End- {on makes its greatest bid to assert a magical fiction 
of transcendence, it points back towards the vacant, dreary, mutable world 
of human existence. 
Shelley's poet-figure has not "vanish'd" from reality like Endymion, 
but is engulfed by its darkness, extinguished like a brilliant flame. The 
physically weak poet-figure dies a solitary and tragic death, literally 
affirming the misery of reality by becoming an "image, silent, cold, and 
motionless" (661): 
Even as a vapour fed with golden beams 
That ministered on sunlight, ere the west 
Eclipses it, it was now that wondrous frame-- 
No sense, no motion, no divinity-- 
A fragile lute, on whose harmonious strings 
The breath of heaven did wander--a bright stream 
Once fed with many voiced waves--a dream 
Of youth, which night and time have quenched for ever, ., 
(663-70) 
The death of Alastor's poet-figure not only affirms the tragedy of 
human mutability, but contributes to reality's darkness, as the world grows 
much darker when his "wondrous frame" is stifled from existence by "night 
and time". This affirmation of the "utterly black" (660) Dionysian mode 
evokes the presence of the illuminating and transcendental Apollonian mode 
through a negative fiction of its absence. Neither the Apollonian images of 
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the westering "sunlight" nor the "bright stream", in spite of their 
apparently dazzling brilliance, are actually present because they have 
already been eclipsed. Shelley's "ere the west / Eclipses it" is only a 
momentary stay of execution for the poet-figure as the "ere" struggles 
against all hope and time's relentless passage, to defer the inevitable 
victory of death and darkness over the poet-figure. 
Although Keats's poetic tone in E ion wavers between play and 
seriousness, it does point to a "gloomy" world changed for the worse by 
Endymion's vanishing, leaving Peona abandoned--in spite of Cynthia's 
unconvincing promise that they will "meet... many a time" (4,996)--and 
Latmos without its rightful heir and leader. Endymion's union with his 
transcendental Cynthia becomes Keats's optimistic attempt to ensure this 
youth does not "pine away" as Shelley's poet-figure does, A astor's more 
sceptical narrator understands the strange tragedy of the poet-figure's 
death in the poem's final lines, but he offers no consolation; instead he 
indicates that the universe is irrevocably altered by the poet-figure's 
absence: 
leaves 
Those who remain behind, not sobs or groans, 
The passionate tumult of a clinging hope; 
But pale despair and cold tranquillity, 
Nature's vast frame, the web of human things, 
Birth and the grave, that are not as they were. (715-20) 
Alastor's narrator is at his most sympathetic when he speaks these 
elegiac lines. At this moment narrator and poet-figure seem at their 
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closest to one another, as is indicated by the imagery of harps awaiting 
divine breath to bring their music to life, The narrator is equated at the 
poem's start with a "moveless... land] ... long-forgotten lyre" (42), offering 
a parallel with the poet-figure's final state as a "fragile lute" abandoned 
by the "breath of heaven". Through the lyre imagery narrator and poet- 
figure are, ironically, united by their acceptance of a meaningless 
existence which ends only in death. 21- In response to the poet-figure's 
death Shelley's narrator weaves his own negative fiction, forbidding tears 
through their evocation and condemning the writing of elegiac "high verse" 
(707) in the act of writing his own elegy for the "Poet". Effectively, the 
narrator's elegy re-enacts the strategy of negative fiction-making resorted 
to by the poet-figure in answer to his persistently failed transcendental 
expectations: 
Art and eloquence, 
And all the shows o' the world are frail and vain 
To weep a loss that turns their light to shade. (710-12) 
This recognition of a "woe too 'deep for tears"' produces a negative 
fiction, exquisitely expressive of a grief "too 'deep... "'--or beyond--the 
power of language. "Art and eloquence" fail to offer a consolation to those 
who remain in a world made darker by the poet-figure's loss, because they 
are only capable, for all their beauty and majesty, of reminding those left 
how much darker reality has become. Shelley's narrator strains beyond a 
retrospective Wordsworthian fiction of consolation, favouring a tragic 
affirmation of human tragedy and loss, in which language is poignant 
precisely because of its floundering in the face of negative fictions. The 
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narrator's elegy is a complex negation of itself; firstly, the grief caused 
by his absence from the universe finds expression in the negative trope of 
absent tears and, secondly, its series of negative tropes constitutes the 
kind of "high verse" that it dismisses as irrere "Art and eloquence". This, 
as Keats became increasingly aware, was the dark otherside to the brilliant 
illusion par excellence asserted by Ent dymion's storyteller and Alastor's 
poet-figure. 
No matter how much the solitary visionary in these poems advocates the 
transcendence of the mutable world and quests for what lies beyond the 
phenomenal world--stretching language's elasticity almost to breaking 
point--he does so at the peril of becoming like the alchemist "Cl]one as 
incarnate death" (681), who asserts his vision regardless of his experience 
in the physical universe. Shelley's image of the alchemist becomes an 
ironic negative inversion of the earlier visionary bowers encountered by 
the poet-figure: 
0, that the dream 
Of dark magician in his visioned cave, 
Raking the cinders of a crucible 
For life and power, even when his feeble hand 
Shakes in its last decay, were the true law 
Of this so lovely world! (682-6) 
Even when death's "last decay" robs the final breath of life from the 
"dark magician"--like the poet-figure--ever hopeful of attaining the 
immutable and transcendental, he struggles to assert his Apollonian dream, 
as if it "were the true law" of the universe, in spite of all his contrary 
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experience in the empirical world. The alchemist's experimental attempts to 
concoct the eternal elixir of "life and power" result not in immortality, 
but the physical wrecking of his body. Unlike the beauteous form of the 
poet-figure, which gradually decays and fades during his quest, the 
alchemist is already "dark" and "feeble". These negative fictions ensure 
that language remains meaningful in the face of a double absence and 
negation. 
Shelley's poet-figure and "dark magician" alike adhere to their 
idealised dreams as though they provided a "true law"; they seem unaware 
that their visions do not transform the phenomenal world and lead only to 
the quickening of their own deaths, Alastor's imagery suggests there is a 
dark tragic Dionysian mode beyond the visonaries' illusory Apollonian dream 
by interpenetrating patterns of light and dark. Yet the poet-figure and 
alchemist remain until death oblivious of the inter-connection between the 
Apollonian and Dionysian modes. Although Keats's Endymion prefers to tread 
amongst innocent pastoral bowers, he is conscious that the Apollonian dream 
can surrender the visionary to the "bosom of a hated thing". In contrast, 
Shelley's poet-figure continues to project his dream vision, as "two 
lessening points of light", still ignorant of the fact that it is this 
"silver vision" which hastens him towards death and the reality he seeks to 
transcend. 
Self-transformation is sought by Alastor's poet-figure through 
projection of an idealising fiction onto the surrounding universe, whereas 
Keats's Endymion advocates dissolution into a state of "no self-passion or 
identity" (4,476). Despite the indeterminacy of glastor and Endymion's 
strategy of narrative confusion, what emerges from comparison between these 
two poems is the beginning of differences between Keats's and Shelley's 
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treatment of the sell and the poetical character. 
l 
TYteir treatment of the 
interplay between an idealised dream mode with the tragedy of waking 
reality. 
Keats's "La Belle Dame Sans Merci" adopts the technique described 
above as "negative fiction" in its complex exploration of the relation 
between dreaming and waking, transcendental sublimity and the mutable world 
of ordinary experience. Enchanted by a "fairy's child" whose '°eyes were 
wild", the "knight at arias" (1) is apparently united with the otherworldly 
and yet this union is not the joyous one eventually experienced by 
Endymion. Having been enthralled by the wiles of the "fairy's child", 
Keats's knight is left hovering in an indistinct mode of existence--caught 
between dreaming and waking--as a "woe-begone" figure (2; 6) in a landscape 
characterised by negativity and absence: 
And this why I sojourn here, 
Alone and palely loitering, 
Though the sedge is wither'd from the lake, 
And no birds sing. (45-8) 
legation and absence pervade even the knight's description of the 
"fairy's child" as her magical and fleeting beauty--a composite of memory 
and imagination--is only glimpsed in his retrospective account of her 
fading memory: 
I me± a lady in the meads, 
Full beautiful, a fairy's child; 
Her hair was long, her foot was light, 
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And her eyes were wild. (13-16, my italics) 
Enticed by her gentle "fairy's song" and "language strange" (24; 27) 
the knight is led to the familiar Romance motif of the visionary bower, in 
this case, a fairy creature's "elfin grot" (29). Similar to the many bowers 
encountered by Endymion and Shelley's poet-figure, the "elfin grot" is a 
location where the protagonist experiences a dream-vision, although the 
knight's vision is strikingly different from those of Keats's earlier 
romance: 
And there she lulled me asleep, 
And there I dream'd--Ah! woe betide! 
The latest dream I ever dream'd 
On the cold hill's side. (33-6) 
Keats's knight finds no solace or consolation in his dream-visionary 
experience. Rather than providing hope for a belief in the transcendental 
and otherworldly (represented here by the "fairy's child"), the dream 
ensures the reverse transition from the enchanted "elfin Brot" to reality's 
"cold hill[... ] side". This dream-vision reinforces the horror of ordinary 
reality, stressing its absences and shortcomings, and so fails to elevate 
the dreamer to a higher plane or mode of consciousness. Like the beautiful 
lady who both entices and enthrals the knight, the dream has all the 
promise of great pleasures--the knight is "lulled... asleep" by a lovely 
fairy creature--and yet abandons the dreamer to a desolate reality in which 
the recapturing--or re-invention--of the "fairy's child" is impossible. No 
consolation is discovered by the dreaming knight, because the emptiness of 
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his story's climactic dream episode underlines the vacancy at the heart of 
his retrospective narrative account, which in turn points toward his own 
vacant and abandoned existence: 
I saw pale kings, and princes too, 
Pale warriors, death pale were they all; 
They cried--"La Belle dame sans merci 
Hath thee in thrall! " (37-40) 
Death and absence characterise all the other noble men, who have 
fallen victim to the wiles of the fairy creature. Deceived by what they, 
too, thought would lead to fulfilment and union with a higher reality, they 
instead have become impoverished as the synecdoche of "starv'd lips in the 
gloam" indicates (41). Despite the knight's claim that "I awoke and found 
me here" (43), Keats's poem never satisfactorily defines clear distinctions 
between waking and dreaming, recollection and invention, or even in the 
knight's case, life and death. The anguish of Keats's knight leaves him 
"Alone and palely loitering" in an apparently wakeful state, which is 
similar to the condition of the "death pale" noble men in his dream. The 
fairy creature encountered by the knight is, in part, a product of mental 
recollection and, partly, the result of imaginative creation ---or what 
otherwise might be termed Apollonian fiction-making. Keats's "La Belle Dame 
Sans Merci" occupies a transitional stage between waking and dreaming, life 
and death, the idealised illusory and more sceptical interpretations of 
reality, the Apollonian and Dionysian. 7 
This blurring of these distinct modes of consciousness and existence 
rehearses a problem to which Keats persistently returns in his poetic 
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career, centred on the question of "Cwias it a vision, or a waking 
dream?... Do I wake or sleep? " ("Ode to a Nightingale", 79-80). Keats's 
fiction-making produces enchanted "faery lands" not in order to transform 
the self and the world into an idealised dream, but to examine the self's 
fiction-making processes. "La Belle Dane Sans Merci" explores the nature of 
its own modes of consciousness and the fictive frameworks it employs to 
interpret the phenomenal universe. Writing about Keats's more sophisticated 
and ironical use of Romance in "Isabella", Rajan formulates a precise 
diagnosis of Keats's use of the dream-vision: 
Keats acknowledges that dreams are not foreshadowings of the 
"material sublime" which liberates us into the country of the 
rainbow, but are a mental repetition of anxieties present in 
the real world, a disclosure rather than a transformation of 
the self... (nj, 110-11) 
Keats's fascination with alluring fairy creatures (ranging from the 
divine Cynthia, to the mysterious belle dame and later, the seductive 
"Lamia") reveals that his aspiration toward these imaginatively created 
symbols of the otherworldly--a reality in which the self realises its 
immutable potentiality--were more often than not inter-woven with an 
awareness of reality's darkness; in Endymion's terms these imaginative 
encounters are prone to triggering a bewildering "journey homeward 
to 
habitual self". Even in Endymion, Keats strives to stress a return to the 
ordinary sphere of tragic human life after an imaginative flight; 
there he 
was troubled that the wonderous fairy creature of imagination could easily 
conceal the mischievious nature of a "fog-born" or "deceiving elf" 
("Ode to 
17 i x; 
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a Nightingale", 74), Endymion's renunciation of the illusory prefigures 
Keats's ambiguous attitude to the belle dame, capturing both the amazement 
and desolation experienced by the abandoned knight: 
Ky life from too thin breathing: gone and past 
Are cloudy phantasms. Caverns lone, farewell! 
And air of visions, and the monstrous swell 
Of visionary seas! No, never more 
Shall airy voices cheat me on the shore 
Of tangled wonder, breathless and aghast. (4,650-5) 
These imaginative voyages sail brilliant "visionary seas", hoping to 
discover a "shore / Of tangled wonder" but risk being shipwrecked by siren- 
like "airy voices", or smashed by a darker reality's "monstrous swell". 
When he wrote the odes, Keats had learned that illusion's "cloudy 
phantasms" were inextricable from the tragedy of human existence. To open 
romance's "[ cl harm' d magic casements" is to gaze, for the poet of the odes, 
upon a beautiful illusion which, ultimately, is a reminder of human 
anguish. For Keats, awareness of human tragedy is heightened by sailing the 
"perilous seas, in faery lands forlorn" ("Ode to a Nightingale", 69-70). So 
the imaginative "country of the rainbow" is tinged by melancholy, and human 
sorrow must "glut" itself upon a "rainbow of the salt sand-wave" ("Ode on 
Melancholy", 15-16). 
Keats`s imaginative voyages involve a continual return to the mutable 
and ordinary self which, altered by its imaginative experience, affirms the 
tragedy of its own existence. Human existence becomes apprehended as a 
bitter-sweet experience that, in Keatsian terms, has a habit of "[t]urning 
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to poison while the bee-mouth sips" ("Ode on Melancholy", 24). This more 
developed dualistic view is latent in moon's negotiations between light 
and dark, illusion and reality and the Apollonian and Dionysian modes, 
where the universe is never transformed, or transfigured, but the tragic 
beauty of human existence affirmed, This interplay between Apollonian and 
Dionysian modes is represented by Peona, who is abandoned in reality's 
"gloomy wood", filled with the light of "wonderment" (4,1003). 2' Keats's 
knight, like Peona, is unable to create a Wordsworthian fiction of 
consolation to soothe his abandonment. Instead he produces a negative 
fiction that can only disclose the ambiguous nature of his tragic 
predicament, but never transform his existing state. Keats's poetic subject 
emerges as the nature of his own subject so, according to Nietzsche, he is 
like "the weird image of the fairy tale which can turn its eyes at will and 
behold itself" W 52). 
What is central to Keats's handling of the romance genre is his 
treatment of self-invented fictions and their attempts to define new 
relations with the universe. Individuals struggle to come to terms with a 
cosmos in which myths of consolation, like those of Wordsworth, have lost 
their resonance. Romance, for Keats, is a literary mode of countless 
possibilities unable, as Harold Bloom remarked, like love itself, to define 
precisely what it is; able only to signpost what it yet might become. 
Keats discovers in romance this rich potentiality and a literary terrain 
that--after a rejection of Wordsworthian consolation--might permit a re- 
orientation to an aesthetic which embraces tragic reality. 
Alastor's poet-figure expires torn to pieces on reality's "Jagged 
hills" for the sake of his illusory "silver vision", as if with his final 
breath he makes one last desperate gesture to transfigure the universe into 
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the otherworldly reality he has sought all of his mortal life. The poet- 
figure's idealised fiction seems to have been intended as a programme of 
transformation for the phenomenal universe, but fails to understand that 
the weaving of his own self-invented fictions would constitute a "figured 
curtain" of his own, capable of rending the veil to reveal--or invent--a 
possibly illusory "being within our being" (, 505), 
Consequently, Alastor's poet-figure remains unaware that his negative 
fictions have an effect on the physical world, hastening his physical 
decline and inevitable demise. This is symptomatic of his failure to 
understand that "He images himself the Being whom he loves" (Preface, 14). 
Shelley' s poet-figure is incapable of transfiguring the self and the world, 
because he is unable to express his idealised fiction in a "single image" 
(Preface, 14), which would otherwise give body to his conception and 
transform the way the self and universe is apprehended. If Shelley's poet- 
figure's failure to find an adequate metaphorical vehicle for his idealised 
conception perfectly exhibits the Defence's definition of poetry as "a 
sword of lightning, ever unsheathed, which consumes the scabbard that would 
contain it" (, 491), he never understands that the "being within our 
being" is partly discovered and, more importantly, partly created through a 
self's fiction-making process. This lack of comprehension causes the poet- 
figure to be dissatisfied with the illusory mode of the Apollonian, forcing 
him to seek some greater primal force or truth beyond his dream-vision. 
Regrettably the poet-figure's actions only surrender him to the tragic 
mutability of the Dionysian mode, whilst he clings to the torn tatters of 
the illusory. It is the poet-figure's desperate struggle to rend "life's 
dark veil" by embodying his Apollonian dream--which he believes to be an 
essential universal truth--in a "single image" that exquisitely 
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demonstrates Nietzsche's understanding of the conflicting emotions an 
Apollonian mode causes in the observer; on the one hand, the "all- 
illuminated" Apollonian symbol "castIs3 a spell over the eyes" and, on the 
other, it "summons us to tear the veil" (BI, 140). 
If "life's dark veil" can be withdrawn--or even rent--then the self 
and the cosmos can be transformed, but this is only possible by finding a 
"single image" which partially expresses and partly creates a new 
apprehension of the relations between the self and the universe, In Alastor 
the poet-figure's childhood is "nurtured" by a "bright silver dream" which 
feeds, or instigates, his desire to pursue the sublime and transcendental 
at all costs in the hope of transforming the universe. Ironically, 
Alastor's poet-figure does transfigure the cosmos, not through a 
realisation of the illusory, but rather by a tragic alteration of the "web 
of human things" brought about through his death. Sadly, only Alastor`s 
narrator and the poem's audience--and not the poet-figure--are aware of 
this transformation, which affirms suffering and mortality over joy and 
immortality. Shelley's early use of dream-visions places emphasis on the 
transformation of the self and world, rather than a Keatsian fictive 
disclosure of the self's fiction-making process and nature, Despite Keats's 
preference for a strategy of disclosure and Shelley's inclination towards 
transformation, both Endymion and Alastor affirm a profoundly tragic and 
human world, 
Shelley was no less conscious of the anxieties of humanity than Keats 
and yet, not unlike Alastor's poet-figure, he seems determined, regardless 
of the risks involved, to chart the topography of the "country of the 
rainbow". To undertake such an exploration was to step into the 
otherworldly terrain beyond "life's dark veil", into the transcendental 
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mode of existence experienced in The Witch of Atlas. This tour of the 
otherworldly opens with an account of the witch's parentage and a 
childhood comprised of a succession of magical self-transformations, 
initially as a "vapour", then flitting "clouds", followed by a "meteor" 
and, finally, "into one of those mysterious stars" (65-6; 69; 71>. These 
metamorphoses are made to appear more numerous by Shelley's inclusion of 
extended simile to elaborate each particular stage of transformation; for 
example, the "cloud" is compared with "splendour-winged moths about a 
taper" (54). One of the witch's strengths is her ability to alter her 
appearance, she is simultaneously an illuminating figure "garmented in 
light" and a form concealed from onlookers within her own brilliance (81). 
When the witch becomes conscious that her beauty is too splendid for 
mortals to gaze upon--as it makes "[tihe bright world dim, and everything 
beside... / like the fleeting image of a shade (137-9)--she weaves a veil so 
that ordinary mortals can glimpse a shadowed sight of her transcendental 
beauty: 
... and she 
As many star-beams, ere their lamps could dwindle 
In the belated moon, wound skillfully; 
And with these threads a subtle veil she wove-- 
A shadow for the splendour of her love. (148-52) 
Weaving becomes symbolic of creating fictions, as the witch's 
preoccupation with this pastime is synonymous not only with the veil 
that 
conceals her real nature from mortals, but with the art of a storyteller, 
who brings together a variety of narrative threads through a rendition of a 
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tale. But any weaving of a "figured curtain", like the illusory mode of the 
Apollonian, risks unravelling itself and exposing its own fictive nature. 
Effectively, the witch's association with weaving emphasises her visionary 
beauty and hints at the fictitious nature of her own existence: 
.. broidering the pictured poesy 
Of some high tale upon her growing woof, 
Which the sweet splendour of her smiles could dye 
In hues outshining heaven--and ever she 
Added some grace to the wrought of poesy. (252-6) 
Shelley's witch, with her extraordinary beauty, is able to "grace"--or 
transfigure--mortals' poetry with some portion of the immortal, yet her 
weaving "Co]f some high tale", as The Witch's narrator subtly and 
persistently stresses, is an indication that she is no more than a fiction. 
The Witch`s storyteller deliberately threatens to unravel the threads of 
his narrative; on several occasions reminding his audience that the tale of 
the witch is only reported by him, as it has been handed down through the 
ages, by slipping into his account, "['tlis said" (65; 585). The Witch's 
narrator takes care to outline the confusing and conflicting versions of 
the creation of her boat, whether it was wrought by Vulcan, or scooped out 
of a plant nurtured by Love (stanzas 31-2>. Doubts are cast upon both 
versions by the narrator, who interjects with "others say" (297), ° 
Distanced from the reader, ironically, by the passage of time and the 
mortal narrator's framework, the witch's ability to resist mutability is 
seriously questioned. Even the witch's visionary state cannot be free of 
the ordinary and, indeed, her supposed existence beyond the cycles of birth 
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and death reduce her to a lonely spectral observer, of human affairs. 
Although the witch appears to rescue the most beautiful from the clutches 
of death, she only transports to a plane of existence--similar to her own-- 
which is neither life nor death, waking nor dreaming, male nor female (for 
the witch is "like a sexless bee / Tasting all blossoms, and confined to 
none" (589-90)): 
Like one asleep in a green hermitage, 
With gentle smiles about its eyelids playing, 
And living in its dreams beyond the rage 
Of death or life... (611-14) 
The witch's attempts to free the beautiful, through her unweaving of 
the "woven imagery / Of childhood's swaddling bands" (605-6), result only 
in a death-in-life state which recalls Keats's abandoned and forlorn knight 
in "La Belle Dame". These attempts to transform the state of affairs in the 
mutable world under the cover of night's darkness, or through influencing 
dreams--particularly her consummation of the "timid lovers" (stanza 77)-- 
serve as a continual reminder of the witch's own sexless state. Shelley's 
witch attempts to rectify her sterile existence by weaving from "fire and 
snow" (321) a companion to share her immortal realms, only 
to create a 
hermaphrodite which mirrors her own sexual sterility: 
A sexless thing it was, and in its growth 
It seemed to have developed no defect 
Of either sex, yet all the grace of both,.. (329-31) 
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This hermaphrodite might appear a passive and automated companion for 
the witch but, by virtue of her prodigious nature, it is superior to her 
creator. " The hermaphrodite is a closer representation of the poetic 
imagination than the witch, because it can pilot her creator's boat, which 
"in joyous expectation lay" (320), through the world of nature. 1 The 
hermaphrodite's skill leads to a feeling of ill-ease about the witch's 
desire to participate in the dim mutable world of mortals. Such a 
participation can only ever be mediated by her own creations, or dreams, 
and so the witch, like the rescued beautiful souls, is confined "beyond the 
rage / Of death or life" (613-4): 
We, the weak mariners of that wide lake 
Vhere'er its shores extend or billows roll, 
Our course unpiloted and starless make 
O'er its wild surface to an unknown goal: -- 
But she in the calm depths her way could take, 
Where in bright bowers immortal forms abide 
Beneath the weltering of the restless tide. (546-52> 
"We" implies that the storytellers and poets are the "weak mariners of 
the "wild surface", who weave their ill-navigated courses (or spin their 
meandering yarns) to get closer to their "unknown goal[s]", Storytellers 
and poets can only ever struggle to represent an approximation of the 
ideal, because the "bright bowers" remain forever obscured or hidden from 
them by the "billows roll" and they can never plunge beneath the surface 
into the witch's "calm depths". Yet the witch's "bright bowers" are not a 
release from the "restless tide" of ordinary life, as her "calm depths" are 
a 
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constantly disturbed by an awareness of her own sexless, barren state and 
an inability to transform the death-in-life state characteristic of the 
"immortal forms" who dwell with her in the depths. These "weak mariners", 
who carelessly navigate their criss-crossing courses, appear to undertake 
fruitless journeys for "unknown goal[s]", but on closer examination, even 
though their existence is confined to the "wild surface", their lives are 
more fruitful and productive than the witch's own "[b]eneath the weltering 
of the restless tide". 
Like Alastor's poet-figure, the witch is never conscious of the exact 
source of her dissatisfaction. Instead, the tensions of her existence are 
ironically played out in the very weaving of the poetic vision of her 
"rainbow country". The Witch forces another collision between visionary 
ideal and ordinary reality. Shelley's witch yearns to participate in the 
world of human affairs, as much as mortal "weak mariners" seek a reprieve 
from the cycle of life and death, and a place amongst her apparently 
tranquil depths. Reality's turbulent troubles can only ever be submerged--- 
or suppressed--by a momentary idealised vision before their "restless tide" 
re-surfaces doubly powerfully, reminding us of the precarious "[ulnpiloted 
and starless" course of human existence. 
Keats's story of Lycius's encounter with Lamia exposes, on one hand, a 
mask of sensual illusion and, on the other, an illusory sense of order 
imposed by a philosophical system, , --: 13 
... Do not all charms fly 
At the mere touch of cold philosophy? 
There was an awful rainbow once in heaven: 
We know her woof, her texture; she is given 
III 
In the dull catalogue of common things... ("hamia" 2,229-33) 
What endangers Lamia's strangely enchanting existence is Apolionius's 
desire to define and contain her nature within his philosophical "catalogue 
of common things". In spite of Lycius's love for the fairy creature he 
cannot entirely shed his mentor's "philosophic gown" (1,365) and persists 
in trying to confine Lamia's identity to a single "name": 
"Hast any mortal name, 
Fit appellation to this dazzling frame? " ("Lamia" 2,88-9) 
Such an impulse to "catalogue" existence will inevitably fail to 
categorise Lamia's elfin nature (a colourful blend of human and animal, 
lover and demon, mortal and immortal), which appears outwardly as a series 
of dissolving "silver moons", eclipsed by shades of "vermillion-spotted, 
golden, green, and blue" (1,51; 48; 52-9). Both Apollonius's and Lycius's 
final naming of Lamia as "a serpent! " reduces her to an inhuman "frightful 
scream" (2,306). The fairy creature's carefully woven illusion is undone 
by the "cold philosophy" of mentor and student alike. Naming Lamia, 
ironically, exposes Apollonius's false claim that language truly represents 
the world, because Lamia's loss of illusion produces a "gordian shape" (1, 
47) not of her former majesty, but a reptilian creature with impassive 
"orbs" for eyes and a "horrid presence" (2,267). Apollonius's "cold 
philosophy" does not give Lamia back her fairy form, but instead constructs 
an empirically based vision of her as a serpent. Apollonius and Lamia are 
not diametrically opposed; rather they are two distinct aspects of the 
Apollonian mode of illusion and order. Apollonius represents an impulse 
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towards sell-knowledge and Landa is aligned with the illusory dream of the 
Apollonian mode. Neither Apollonius nor Lamia are willing to confront the 
fictional status of the order they impose upon the world. 
Apollonius becomes a treacherous weaver of wizardry, entangling Lamia 
in his own illusory spell of philosophy, to conjure her up as a hideous 
parody of her former self and denounce her as a "'foul dream"' (2,271). 
Lycius's initial response recreates Apollonius as a demonic trickster: 
"... Unlawful magic, and enticing Iies. 
"Corinthians! look upon that gray-beard wretch! 
"Mark how, possess'd his lashless eyelids stretch 
"Around his demon eyes! " (2,286-9) 
Lamia's "purple-lined palace of sweet sin" (2,31) is another illusory 
retreat from Dionysian reality. An elaborate product of the Apollonian 
mode, it is as suffocating as Apollonius's restrictive philosophical 
education of Lycius: 
'... from every i11 
'Of life have I preserv'd thee to this day! ' (2,297-8) 
Lamia's palace, for all its apparent abundance, is ultimately sterile 
and imitative, characterised by an artificial "pervading brilliance and 
perfume" (2,174) and its "mimicking... [of] ... a glade / Of palm" (2,125- 
6). Even Lycius's journey--or rather magicking away "by a spell" (1.345)-- 
to Lamia's haunt suggests a state of sleep-walking which blurs distinctions 
between waking and dreaming, knowing and doing: 
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They pass'd the city gates, he knew not how, 
So noiseless, and he never thought to know, (1,348-9) 
At first glance, Corinth appearing to Lycius "[als men talk in a 
dream" (1,350) might suggest he is embarking upon a transcendental voyage, 
when actually, he is receding from reality into a superficial bower of 
sensual pleasure. Lamia does not escape her "'wreathed tomb'" (1,38), 
exchanging incarceration within her serpentine body for imprisonment within 
her self-constructed palace, held hostage by Corinthian society. Lamia's 
blessing and curse is to live out her existence within her illusory private 
realm. To recognise Lamia's fictional status is to unravel her own mode of 
existence, disclosing a Dionysian awareness of individual terror and 
tragedy hidden previously by her Apollonian illusions. 
Lycius links these two kinds of Apollonian modes in yam, fulfilling 
both the role of philosophical apprentice to the cerebral Apollonius and 
passionate lover to the sensual Lamia. The youth dies disillusioned, forced 
to acknowledge that Lamia and Apollonius are two different kinds of 
"deceiving elf" ("Ode to a Nightingale", 74). Lycius is unable to weave his 
own illusory fiction of consolation to come to terms with this lesson and 
make his life bearable. His death at the close of the poem is a macabre 
representation of the Apollonian dream mode disclosing its Dionysian 
counterpart. A public ceremony of marriage should have united the lovers, 
but instead it separates them forever, as the act of matrimony leads only 
to the preparation of Lycius's funeral. The Apollonian illusion of order 
collapses into Dionysian chaos and tragedy, symbolised by Lycius's 
"marriage robe" becoming his death shroud (310): 
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On the high couch he lay! --his Iriends came round-- 
Supported him--no pulse, or breath they found, 
And, in its marriage robe, the heavy body wound. (2,309-11) 
The stifling and exclusive fictions of Apollonius and Lamia are 
translated into actual tragedy. Not even Lamia's exquisite illusory dream 
mode can elide death's Dionysian reality, which bursts in upon her secluded 
palace when the Corinthian wedding guests arrive (a reminder of human 
reality beyond Lamia's enchanted circle). Lamia cannot exist isolated 
forever from Corinth in her Apollonian dream mode, because to possess a 
"body fit for life" (2,39) demands an acceptance of human tragedy and 
death. The lovers' retreat into an artificial romance bower is violated by 
exterior social pressures, symbolic of darker forces repressed by Lamia's 
magical existence. 
In Keats's The Eve of St. Agnes, Porphyro and Madeline apparently 
elude a tragic encounter with social pressures by eloping (not undertaking 
a public ceremony of marriage) and escaping undetected from a castle's 
hostile society. Such a positive reading of the lovers' elopement suggests 
that their escape is one from the dark reality of the castle's interior to 
an ideal exterior existence beyond the confinement of its walls. a4- But the 
castle is only a set for the narrative's dramatic action, intended to 
enhance The Eve of St, Ag es's fairy-tale atmosphere. The interior of the 
castle is not entirely dark, because its inhabitants and structure conspire 
with Madeline and Porphyro. Their escape is aided by a benign beldame, an 
ineffectual "bloodhound", "bolts [which] full easy slide" and "chains 
(that] lie silent on the footworn stone" (365-9). 
115 
Keats's lovers do not retreat from Dionysian reality into an 
Apollonian dream mode, even if their story is absorbed into legend's ideal 
and immutable realm, Instead Porphyro and Madeline flee from a magical 
castle's safe haven--itself a product of Apollonian illusion--into a 
troubled "storm" of Dionysian reality (371). The treachery of their flight 
into a dawn storm can be gauged from Porphyro's optimistic description of 
it as an "'elfin-storm from faery land'" (343) which, recalling Endymion's 
perilous "fog-born elf", anticipates a return to a "habitual self" and 
reality's darkness. The youthful lovers fail to transcend the perils of 
human existence, because whether they remain within or without the castle 
their fate is anticipated by the beldame and Beadsman: 
Angela the old 
Died palsy-twitch" d, with meagre face deform; 
The Beadsman, after thousand ayes told, 
For aye unsought for slept among his ashes cold. (375-9) 
Central to The Eve of St. Agnes's negative fiction is Madeline's 
unrealised dream and sexual encounter with Porphyro, The poem's gothic 
interior is sterile, cold, and lifeless, consisting of a series of 
inarticulate "carven imag'ries" (209), marking out the fairy-tale castle as 
"old romancel's]" (41) last bastion and final tomb. 
Like Madeline performing her rite of "St. Agnes' Eve" (46), Porphyro's 
expression of love for Madeline verbally re-enacts a courtly legend 
captured in "an ancient ditty, long since mute" (291). Both lovers attempt 
to translate "old romance" of an Apollonian mode meaningfully into the 
present (46). Madeline lapses into silence, as her attempt to re-enact 
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courtly tradition leads to her being "hoodwink'd with faery fancy" (70) and 
incapable of one "uttered syllable" (203). Even when she wakes from her 
charmed sleep she is only able "to moan forth witless words with many a 
sigh" (303). Despite being within the castle's safe haven, Madeline's dream 
is not a consolatory Apollonian illusion, rather a disclosure of "old 
romance's" fictional status. This dream experience discloses an awareness 
of absence, desertion and unfulfilment, reflecting the Apollonian mode's 
adoption of a Dionysian language of negative fiction. Madeline's new found 
speech--echoing Keats's abandoned knight--desires an idealised "old 
romance", prefering her own imaginatively created Porphyro over his actual 
presence: 
"How chang'd thou art! how pallid, chill, and drear! 
"Give me that voice again, my Porphyro, 
"Those looks immortal, those complainings dear! " (311-13) 
Porphyro's recitation of "'La Belle Dame Sans Merci "' reduces him to 
an immovable and silent form (305-6), intimating that he and Madeline will 
be absorbed into a tradition of courtly legend. Porphyro resembles the 
castle's decorative stonework, which depict the world of "old romance": 
Upon his knees he sank, pale as smooth-sculptured stone, 
(296) 
The Eve of St. Agnes's portrayal of an idealised romance and dream 
threatens at every narrative instance to unravel itself, laying bare the 
darker elements of Dionysian reality banished from Keats's enchanted 
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castle, Porphryo will be absorbed into a tradition of heroic lovers when 
his actions are consistent with being a voyeur, skulking in a "closet" 
(164-7), and appearing to Madeline' s eyes as "'pallid, chill and drear"'. 
Not even in this fairy tale world is Porphyro ascribed the role of handsome 
prince and legitimate suitor. Instead, he is an inexperienced paramour who 
makes "jellies soother than the creamy curd" (266) rather than love. 
Porphyro only serves Madeline with luxuriant and exotic dishes in an 
attempt to overwhelm her pervading sense of absence with sheer abundance, 
Yet Madeline's Dionysian realisation that life is "'eternal woe'" (314) 
cannot be avoided. The lovers' sexual encounter is framed between Madeline 
fearing for Porphyro's death and Porphyro hearing the "iced gusts" of an 
" elfin-storm"' (327; 343): 
At these voluptuous accents, he arose, 
Ethereal, flush'd, and like a throbbing star 
Seen mid the sapphire heaven's deep repose; 
Into her dream he melted... (317-20) 
Keats's portrayal of their love-making, as an idealistic and 
Apollonian union between Madeline's dream of Porphyro and his actual 
presence is an act of supplementation: j-s, which points towards a deathly 
absence, represented by those darker forces lurking beyond the walls of 
Keats's fairy-tale castle. Silence and death remain a constantly deferred 
threat to the lovers, even after they have "fled away into the storm" 
(371). The narrative projects their escape into the past of immortal legend 
to preserve them against the ravages of time, represented by the beldame 
and Beadsman. The Bye of St. Agnes moves full circle from the lifeless 
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existence of the Beadsman to the hopeful fulfilment of youthful love (or 
the recovery of Apollonian "old romance") to return only to the inevitable 
reality of death. A retelling of Porphyro's and Madeline's legend will once 
again conjure up and break the castle's charmed circle, exposing its own 
tentative existence--undoing the spell of its enchanted spot--to disclose 
what tragedy its Apollonian mode struggles to conceal. 
Keats's retelling of Boccaccio's medieval romance deliberately 
discloses the precarious existence of the idealising visionary mode. 
"Isabella"'s modern narrator establishes a direct relation between the 
tragic love affair of the poem's two lovers and the active retelling of 
their story. 3~- Readers are forced to share not simply in the initial 
delight of the lovers, but in the responsibility of the discovery of their 
secret by Isabella's brothers, as their secret meeting place is revealed to 
them by the narrator: 
All close they met, all eves, before the dusk 
Had taken from the stars its pleasant veil, 
Close in a bower of hyacinth and musk, 
Unknown of any, free from whispering tale. 
Ah! better had it been for ever so, 
Than idle ears should pleasure in their woe. (83-8) 
This romantic bower, for all its atmosphere of closed secrecy and 
concealment in the half-light "before the dusk", is to be engulfed in the 
darkness of a tragic "woe". The reader is implicated in this "woe" in the 
reference to the "idle ears" that will share and have shared in the "many 
doleful stories" (93). Keats's narrator ensures this bower of Apollonian 
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illusion is explicitly aware of its own fictional attempt to conceal the 
tragic Dionysian mode, so the modern and gothic nature of "Isabella"'s 
narrative is forced to disclose itself, Similarly, the lovers' secrecy, or 
the secrecy of the brothers' "jealous conference" (169) to murder Lorenzo, 
or Isabella's secret re-planting of her lover's head in the basil-pot 
(stanza 52), are also disclosed through a retelling of Boccaccio's tale, 
Boccaccio's original story becomes, for Keats, a symbol of a fast-fading 
traditional romance genre, which is about to be displaced by his own 
darker, ironical, and often, black-humoured account of the ill-fated love 
affair of Isabella and Lorenzo: 
0 eloquent and famed Boccaccio! 
Of thee we now should ask forgiving boon... 
And of thy roses amorous of the moon, 
And of thy lilies, that do paler grow 
Now they can no more hear thy gbittern's tune, 
For venturing syllables that ill beseem 
The quiet glooms of such a piteous theme. (145-7; 149-52) 
Lorenzo returns (from beyond the grave) to pay a midnightly visitation 
to Isabella, appearing as a spectre to divulge the secret of his murder. 
The ghostly Lorenzo hovers on the edge of human existence as a "pale 
shadow" (281), who enacts a gothic death-in-life state, with "cold doom / 
Upon his lips", a "lorn voice" and a "miry channel for his tears" (277-8; 
279; 280>. Keats's description of Lorenzo's words as a "strange sound" 
accompanied by a "ghostly under-song", ensures the voice synecdoche 
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displaces the description of his physical state (287), so that the Ilia of 
Lorenzo's earthly semblance can be substituted for the supernatural and 
neuter form; 
Its eyes, though wild, were still all dewy bright 
With love, and kept all phantom fear aloof 
From the poor girl by magic of their light, 
The while ii did unthread the horrid woof 
Of the late darken'd time.., (my italics, 289-93) 
Enthralled by a pair of eyes, rather like Keats's knight, Isabella 
does not produce a consoling fiction of the illusory Apollonian dream mode. 
Lorenzo's visitation reveals her brothers' dark deeds, his own dishevelled 
appearance, and withdraws to leave the "atom darkness in a slow turmoil" 
(322). Despite the tragedy and horror of the situation, conscious bathos 
pervades "Isabella"'s narrative tone, so that Lorenzo's account of his own 
under-handed death appears as, on "the sodden turfed dell / Where, without 
any word, from stabs he feil" (296), or his love's grief and exhaustion 
amounts to, "Lilt made sad Isabella's eyelids ache" (327). Such bathetic 
comments prepare the way for Isabella's transfixed gaze into Lorenzo's eyes 
to pass into her later fixation with a basil-pot, containing her lover's 
recovered head and the plant weaned on her tears: 
,.. it drew 
Nurture besides, and life, from human fears, 
From the fast mouldering head there shut from view: 
So that the jewel, safely casketed, 
1ý1 
Came forth, and in perfumed leaf its spread, (428-32) 
Isabella's dotage on the "fast mouldering head" dramatises the 
predicament of the Apollonian visonary mode, persistently blighted by an 
awareness of the pain and mutability of human existence, which it claims to 
elide, Lorenzo's decaying head and the growing basil plant become 
Isabella's only source of focus and consolation, acting as a grotesque 
parody of the life-sustaining and life-perfecting ideal sought out by the 
questor of romance. Nurturing the basil plant with "the continual shower / 
Prom her dead eyes" may drain Isabella's "drooping" body (452-3; 458), but 
there is little doubt that, without the preserving solace she derives from 
its "magic touch" (459), "sweet Isabel... will die" (486). 
For Isabella the secret of Lorenzo's concealed head is important, 
because it substitutes, rather perversely, the secret love she once shared 
with him, and so when this secret--like that of their love--is discovered 
and taken by her brothers to a "secret place" (474) Isabella is beside 
herself with grief. The brothers' appropriation of Isabella's final secret 
condemns their sister to misery, because she has lost even the decayed and 
tattered remnant of her secret and private exchanges with Lorenzo, whether 
earthly or supernatural. Worse still, Isabella's "lone and incomplete" 
(487) state is a product of what she cherishes most, an intimate secret, 
although one known only by her brothers, who have fled Florence (476-80). 
Isabella is destined to spend the rest of her days in search of the "secret 
place". She never resorts to transcendental fictions of consolation, 
instead deriving comfort from what can be salvaged of Lorenzo's physical 
body, in this instance the re-discovery of the hidden basil-pot along with 
Lorenzo's decomposing head, Even as Isabella descends into insane 
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obssession, black humour is still present in her "lorn voice", 
characterised by a "melodious chuckle in the strings" (492; 491). The 
enchanting and ideal world of romance is forced by Keats's narrator to 
unpick the poetic fabric of its illusory fictions at every turn, reducing 
itself to the chant, heard by "idle ears" and passed onto others, "'0 
cruelty, / To steal my basil-pot away from me! " (503-4). 
Explorations of the alluring literary terrain of romance may have 
provided the young poets with a greater scope for their unpractised 
creative powers, but the genre was never, for either Keats or Shelley, a 
straightforward retreat from the tensions and pressures of reality. Both 
poets portray visionary anxieties that point towards a haunting of 
idealised fictions by the reality they feign to elude. These anxieties 
emerge in the world of romance as a succession of hauntings. Keats's 
Isabella is haunted by the loss of her murdered lover, his "palely- 
loitering" knight is forever haunted by an encounter with a faery creature, 
and Endymion is troubled by the absence of Cynthia. Shelley's witch--in 
spite of her nightly spectral wanderings--is haunted by the vitality of the 
world of human affairs and a desire to be a part of them, and Al sa tor's 
poet-figure is haunted to his grave by a desire for the transcendental 
ideal. 
Although, Keats adopts a strategy of disclosure to chart the world of 
Romance and Shelley explores the "country of the rainbow" through a series 
of transformations, both poets were self-consciously modern 
in their 
employment of the romance genre as a means to criticise and play out 
the 
tensions and anxieties already present in the romance tradition. 
Keats and 
Shelley realised that a fiction of the Apollonian dream mode could so 
easily collapse into the Dionysian waking nightmare of reality. 
Out of the 
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once safe haven of romance's brilliant illusory bowers, Keats and Shelley 
successfully induce a birth of tragedy. 
124 
1 JKE, 140,2,276. 
1 SPY, 21,285, 
a Z, 173. 
- Greg Kucich, Kea , Shelley, and Romantic Sp enseri ani sm (Pennsylvania: 
Pennsylvania UP, 1991), 4-5, hereafter referred to as M. 
S SCR, 20-1. 
'' See E$, 27. See also Karen A. Weisman, I ageless Truths: Shelley's 
Poetic Fictions (Philadelphia: Pennsylvania UP, 1994), 31, hereafter 
referred to as 11. 
Stuart M. Sperry, Keats The Poet (Princeton: Princeton UP, 1973), 90, 
hereafter referred to as LE. 
Martin Aske, Keats and Hellenism: An Essay (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 
1985), 63; 66, 
9 Daniel P. Watkins, Keats's Poetry and the Politics of Imagination 
(Toronto: Associated UP, 1989), 52, hereafter referred to as j'J. 
'" Timothy Clark, Embodying Revolution: The Figure of the Poet in 
Shelley (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989>, 103, hereafter referred to as E$.. See 
also Weisman, who focuses on the self's desire for insight into its own 
nature and that of the phenomenal world, ., 
24-5. Clark and Weisman both 
stress the emphasis the poem gives to the potentiality of attaining such an 
insight suggesting the importance of poetic process and fiction-making in 
IIE, 159. 
125 
` William Wordsworth. The Poetical Works of William , rdsworth, ed. 
Ernst de Selincourt. Vol. 2 (Oxford: Clarendon, 1944), 259,48. All 
subsequent quotations of Wordsworth's poetry taken from this edition. 
11 Dickstein offers both a subtle and illuminating comparison between 
Keats's proem to Erin ymion and Wordsworth's "account of the workings of 
memory" in "Tintern Abbey". Dickstein's account overlooks the "o'er 
darkened ways" present in "Tintern Abbey" and Keats' s opening to Endymion; 
arguing instead that Keats "turned not to the dark Wordsworth.., but to the 
poet of consolation who in "Tintern Abbey" had found 'tranquil 
restoration'" . But Wordsworth's consolation is only attained through a 
willed creation of a retrospective fiction, which has its origins in the 
absence of "half-extinguished thought" and "sad perplexity" (58; 60). See 
KSp, 58-60. 
14 See jam, 81-2; 85-6. 
's Dickstein rightly equates Keats's recognition of these "dark 
passages" with a growing awareness of the problems of individuation and 
self-consciousness, Consequently, his study of Keats (unlike other critical 
studies) draws attention to the important theme of self-exploration in 
End von, "[which]... is more than a love story. It is about a voyage of the 
self, a 'strange journeying' (3,93), whose vehicle is misleadingly called 
'love, '" See OD, 67. 
11 Much critical debate has arisen over whether Alastor portrays its 
solitary poet-figure as morally culpable and is intended as an outright 
criticism of Wordsworthian solitude. Some earlier commentators, 
focusing on 
the Greek meaning of alastor as "evil genius", have insisted that it is the 
self-secluded solitary state of the poet-figure that 
becomes his curse in 
the form of an avenging genius. For a survey of these earlier readings see 
126 
Carlos Baker, Shelley's Major Poetry: The Fabric of Vision (London: Oxford - 
UP, 1948), 41-60. Wasserman offers a more sophisticated reading of 
Alastor's anti-Wordsworthian stance, stressing the dichotomy between the 
poem's narrator and its questing poet-figure to highlight a dialectical 
pattern between idealism and scepticism. See &$., 18-34; 41. Weisman values 
the importance of Wasserman's dialectical reading, although she 
reformulates the "apparently opposed polarities" as "a life of perpetual 
uncertainty or a life of trying to predicate tangible attributes of an 
intangible, metaphysical ultimate". See 11,27; 38. Other critics have 
maintained Shelley's quest for individual poetic identity through anti- 
Wordsworthian tendencies without relying on Wasserman's dialectic, See 
Vincent Newey, "'Shelley's Dream of Youth': Alastor, 'Selving' and the 
Psychic Realm, " Percy Bysshe Shelley: Bicentenary Readings, ed. Kelvin 
Everest. Essays and Studies 45 (Cambridge: Brewer, 1992), 1-23. See also 
Michael O'Neill, The Human Mind's Imaginings: Conflict and Achievement in 
Shelleys Poetry (Oxford: Clarendon, 1989), 11-29, hereafter referred to as 
jam. In addition Clark offers a convincing refutation of Wasserman, arguing 
that the narrator and poet-figure act as analogues for one another. See 
Timothy Clark, F8., 137-42. 
17 E,, 48. 
'3 Timothy Morton has observed that the poet-figure's "break with 
nature" leads to a "flight into abstract knowledge", which "severs the Poet 
from social contact". See Morton, Shelley and the Revolutionary Taste: The 
Body and the Natural World. Cambridge Studies in Romanticism 10. 
(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1994), 105. 
19 51. 
: 20 JI, 37. 
127 
: 2' Samuel Taylor Coleridge, Coleridge: Poetical Works. 1912. Vol 1. Ed. 
E. H. Coleridge (Oxford: Oxford UP, 1964), 367,95. 
-; -2 Walter Kaufmann's translation reads "Apollinian", a term which he 
employed in his own critical works on Nietzsche. Kaufmann's use of this 
extraordinary term has been questioned by recent commentators on Nietzsche, 
who favour "Apollonian" instead, This controversy has been further 
complicated by a recent appearance of a Penguin translation of The Birth of 
Tragedy which favours "Apolline" as a term over either "Apollinian" or 
"Apollonian". For my own purposes I agree with the current critical 
consensus and have, when quoting from Kaufmann's text, altered in square 
brackets his term "Apollinian" to "Apoll[onian]". See Kaufmann, Nietzsche: 
Philosopher. Psychologist, Antichrist. 4th ed. (NJ: Princeton UP, 1974), 
128-9, hereafter referred to as R. See Julian Young, Nietzsche's Philosophy 
gL ALt. 1992. (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1993), 2?, hereafter referred to as 
IPA. See also Friedrich Nietzsche, The Birth of Tragedy: Out of the Spirit 
of Nusic, trans, Shaun Whiteside and intro. Michael Tanner (Harmondsworth: 
Penguin, 1993), 24. 
Tetreault notes a similar irony in Shelley' s treatment of redemptive 
fictions by drawing a parallel with Nietzsche's analysis of fiction. He 
cites Nietzsche's remark that "Without measuring reality against the purely 
invented world,,., without a continual falsification of the world... mankind 
could not live... " See a, 85 and see also B-QB, 35. 
24 Joseph Raben, "Shelley the Dionysian", Shelley Revalued: Essays From 
the Gregynog Conference, ed Kelvin Everest (Leicester: Leicester UP, 1983), 
27-8, hereafter referred to as ERE. 
25 fig, 38. 
128 
ti`° Leon Waldoff has pointed out that the fairy creature is probably 
comprised of actual "unacceptable feelings or attitudes to another person 
or things" disguised by the "silent workings of imagination", He also 
stresses the uncertainty of the knight's experience and compares this with 
Keats's own doubts about the imagination's ability to achieve "symbolic 
restoration". See Waldoff, Keats and the Silent Work of Imagination 
(Urbana: Illinois UP11985), 97, hereafter referred to as LU. 
i7 Douglas B. Wilson makes a similar point about the Dionysian- 
Apollonian dialectic in "La Belle Dame Sans Merci", suggesting that "Keats 
uses the dream to reveal the Dionysiac jeopardy of imagination", 72. See 
Wilson, The Romantic Dream: Wordsworth and the Poetics of the Unconscious 
(Lincoln: Nebraska UP, 1993), 71-4. 
2'3 Ronald A. Sharp, Keats. Skepticism. and the Religion of Beauty 
(Athens, GA: Georgia UP, 1979), 103-4; 64; 160, hereafter referred to as 
MR. 
9 Harold Bloom, The Ringers in the Tower: Studies in Romantic Tradition 
(Chicago: Chicago UP, 1971), 34-5. 
'30 David Rubin and Andelys Wood offer contrasting accounts of Shelley's 
The Witch. See Rubin, "A Study of Antinomies in Shelley's The Witch of 
At-Las, " {8 (1968), 216-28. See also Wood, "Shel ley' s Ironic Vision: 2 
Witch of Atlas, " Keats-Shelley Journal 19 (1980), 67-82, hereafter referred 
to asall. 
: y'' See M, 199-200. 
32 e2 
, 
1, ? 1. 
The readings offered here of Lamia and The Eve of St. Agnes have 
grown out of an earlier reading of a conflict between the "metaphysical" 
and "metaphorical" modes in Keats's narrative poems. See my "Nietzschean 
129 
Aesthetic Self-Construction in the Works of John Keats, " M. A. diss., U of 
Durham, 1994,14-22. 
a4 Dickstein adopts this approach to the poem, Rajan offers a 
contrasting account to which I am indebted, See KM, 190, See also jam, 106- 
9, 
11 Levinson makes this point. KIA, 144. 
3kz, Bennett makes a similar connection between writing, reading and 
responsibility in "Isabella", arguing that one of the poem's other secrets 
is Keats's subversion of Boccaccio, Dickstein offers a contrasting account 
to Bennett's reading, arguing that "Isabella" is not a poem concerned with 
the "private", particularly when compared to "Lainia", See K., 90 and see 
Ki 234; 236-8. See also Kelvin Everest, "Isabella in the Market-Place: 
Keats and Feminism, " Keats and story, ed Nicholas Roe (Cambridge: 
Cambridge UP, 1995), 107-26, hereafter referred to as . 
130 
Chapter 4 
"No Voice Will Tell": Fic on-& 1R& in the Lyrics 
lL Keata and hP1. JJ L 
"No voice will tell... "'' 
(John Keats) 
'I (W]hate'er these words cannot express. "ý= 
(P. B. Shelley) 
"... But you do not understand this? Indeed people will have 
trouble understanding us. We are looking for words; perhaps 
we are also looking for ears. Who are we anyway? "* 
(Friedrich Nietzsche) 
Transgressive tendencies in lyrical poetry have often been noted by 
contemporary critics of Romantic poetry. 4 Comparing the Shelleyan visionary 
lyric with "Satan's transgressive entrance into Eden in Paradise Lost", 
Michael O'Neill recognises the epistemological and moral limits which the 
lyric tests. This analogy indicates a consensus of critical opinion about 
the Romantic lyric as "a test of boundaries"~` and a destabiliser of 
singularity. These deconstructive impulses, according to Tilottama Rajan, 
disclose the "unitary voice as an illusion and [force] us to question the 
idea of the speaker as... a unified person". ' Romantic lyrics aspire to be a 
closed representation of a monologue of a single mind, but constantly 
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disclose that at some level they exist as open, divergent, and complex 
dialogues, 
Despite a variety of literary approaches to the lyric, many critical 
representations of this transgressive mode of writing are viewed through a 
Nietzschean critical lens. Critics have certainly recognised an affinity 
between the Romantic lyric's deconstructive impulses and Nietzsche's own 
thought. Morris Dickstein reads the closing stanza of Keats's "Ode on 
IMelancholy" as a "poetic counterpart" to the tragic affirmation of 
existence in Nietzsche's writings. ' In contrast, O'Neill understands the 
Shelleyan lyric as permitting the audience to glimpse the "interplay 
between what Nietzsche calls 'the lyric genius and the allied non- 
genius'". ' Ronald Tetreault turns toward Nietzsche to appreciate the irony 
that redemptive fictions in Shelley's lyrics "are in themselves a 
'nothing "" ° and Paul H. Fry represents the lyrical poetry of Keats and 
Shelley as enacting a Nietzschean "transvaluation" (, 252), 
Nietzsche's influence on critical representations of the lyric mode-- 
and Romanticism at large--extends far beyond a recognition of these textual 
parallels, as his thought has been disseminated (and enmeshed) in the 
machinery of critical theory. Rajan's early deconstructive account of 
Romantic discourse views "To Autumn" and "Ode to Psyche" as belonging to 
the category "of the defiantly sentimental poem which wears the mask of 
idealism, having already crossed the threshold from blindness into insight" 
and Keats's odes as a "deliberately indecisive" group (DI, 98, n-3). 11 For 
Rajan, the Keatsian lyric, like the Shelleyan, oscillates between light and 
darkness, unity and chaos, surface and depth, and idealism and skepticism 
within an Apollonian-Dionysian dynamic which she openly borrows from 
Nietzsche. Rajan's understanding of the odes as a "mask of idealism" and a 
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"blindness into insight" (U, 98, n. 3) indicates both Nietzsche's influence 
on her own work and the dissemination of Nietzsche's ideas into Romantic 
criticism. Her phraseology recalls the importance of prosopopeia, tropes 
and rhetoric for Nietzsche and Paul de Man, ' :; 2 
De Man's two best known collections of essays, Blindness and InsiZbt 
(subtitled The Rhetoric of Contemporary Criticism) and Th& Rh c__ 
Romanticism, have established rhetorical studies as an important strand of 
criticism. Like subsequent critics, de Man connects Romantic lyric with 
Nietzschean philosophy. In "Anthropomorphism and Trope in the Lyric" de an 
aligns Keats's "Beauty is truth, truth beauty" with Nietzsche's claim that 
"truth" is comprised of an army of metaphor, metonymy and anthropomorphism 
(ER, 239). Nietzsche's "tropological definition of truth" is crucial here 
($$, 239), as the transformation of trope into anthropomorphism, according 
to de lean, is both an alliance of rhetorical "truth" with knowledge and a 
site of impossible conflict between epistemology and the rhetoric of tropes 
(RE, 242-3). De Man's definition of lyrical anthropomorphism, as an 
"illusionary resuscitation of the natural breath of language, frozen into 
stone by the semantic power of the trope" (RE, 247), anticipates recent 
critical focus on tensions within the lyric between surface and depth, 
order and chaos. What is central to de Man's account is the irreversible 
transformation of trope into anthropomorphism; to enact lyrically this 
metamorphosis is to commit the same grammatical and linguistic 
transgression as Nietzsche's metaphorical "army of tropes" (RR, 262). ' 
Following de Man's footsteps, Cynthia Chase stresses the ambivalence of 
tropes in lyric poetry and their tendencies to undo rhetorical illusions; 
its "appeal to voice leaves precariously evident the rhetoricity, the 
fictitiousness, of the vital supposition it imposes" (DE, 70). Chase reads 
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this deconstructive tendency as a sign of a rhetorical crisis, in which 
lyrical poetic language suffers a double failure and "dismays and deceives 
us by not deceiving us thoroughly enough" <F., 70). 
Lyric is again diagnosed as a conflictual site where normal poetic, 
epistemological and linguistic limitations and expectations are 
deliberately challenged. These transgressive--or transvaluing--acts of the 
lyrical mode bear witness to lyrical poetry's fundamental impulse to exist 
above, over and separately from the printed word. Lyric poetry threatens 
its own stability by aspiring to exist as music. This paradoxical impetus 
is played out in the mode's transgressive, often contradictory strategies. 
Lyrical poetry's unified surface veils darker, more turbulent, forces at 
work. Such a fiction is aware of its own fictionality and use of tropes 
which speak only through their silence, or through an awareness of their 
impossible utterance. 
Keats's "Ode to Psyche" opens with a plea to the goddess to "hear" and 
forgive a devotee's words of praise: 
0 Goddess! hear these tuneless numbers, wrung 
By sweet enforcement and remembrance dear, 
And pardon that thy secrets should be sung 
Even into thine own soft-conched ear: 
Surely I dreamt to-day, or did I see 
The winged Psyche with awaken'd eyes? (1-6) 
From the outset, Keats's "hymn to imagination" '4 plays out conflicts, 
contradictions and transgressions typical of lyric poetry. The devotee's 
appeal to be heard is a vocal one of "tuneless numbers" which is nearly 
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stiiied before it is uttered, These "tuneless numbers" suggest a voiceless 
silence at odds with the intentions of' Keats as disciple to give voice to 
Psyche's secrets in her "own soft-conched ear". This lack of voice 
indicates an ontological uncertainty concerning the nature of what 
occurred, a confusion over whether the event was "dreamt" or truly 
witnessed. Both how the song to Psyche is to communicate itself and what 
"secrets" it is to convey are in doubt. Our own and Psyche's "soft-conched 
ear" might strain forever in vain to hear the "tuneless numbers" of the 
devotee's song. "Ode to Psyche"'s opening lines are a problematic reminder 
of the tension between lyric poetry's existence on the printed page which 
demands to be read and its own aspiration to be musical and heard. Keats is 
careful to ensure that his audience do not simply scan poetic lines with 
their eyes, but listen acutely with their own "soft-conched earEs]", °=, 
Doubt over the ability of the devotee/ narrator to sing of Psyche's 
"remembrance dear" reinforces the ode's concern with her waning presence. 
The ode's first two lines mournfully recall Milton's opening in "Lycidas"" 
and anticipate Psyche's deathly fading, even though she is an immortal. 
Echoes of Milton's Paradise Lost in the first stanza also pre-empt Psyche's 
sad plight in the second. Keats as narrator powerfully recreates his 
accidental stumbling upon, and voyeuristic encounter with, the lovers 
Cupid and Psyche: 
I wander'd in a forest thoughtlessly, 
And, on a sudden, fainting with surprise, 
Saw two fair creatures, couched side by side 
In deepest grass, beneath the wh1sp'ring roof 
Of leaves and trembled blossoms... (7-11) 
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Through the narrator's eyes we are permitted a glimpse into the "calm- 
breathing" (15) and unspoilt world of antiquity and romance, Keats's 
secluded scene not only recalls End_ vý, mion's countless bowers through its 
myriad scents and shades, but Milton's "blissful bower" for Adam and Eve 
with its "roof / Of thickest covert" (U, 4,692-3), catalogue of colourful 
flowers containing "Iris all hues, roses and Jessamine" (, 4.698), and 
the smell of "fragrant leaf" (BA, 4.695). Like Milton's spying Satan, 
Keats's narrator intrudes upon a peacefully innocent bower--where "lips 
touch'd not, but had not bade adieu" ("Psyche, " 17)--with an attempted 
utterance of words, Humanity's transgression, in Milton's epic, is nurtured 
by Satan's successiul whispering of words into the "ear of Eve" tom., 4, 
800). Psyche's devotee is only able to sing--or rather write--"tuneless 
numbers" into her "own soft-conched ear", in a manner which recalls Satan's 
temptation of Eve and reminds the reader that the ode's fiction could be 
deceiving them. 
Keats's Miltonic allusions chart the undercurrents at play beneath "Ode 
to Psyche"'s calm surface, reminding those who strain to hear of the 
uncertainty of the devotee's song. Keats's readers are not simply deceived, 
but implicated in the act of their own deception, as they find themselves 
trying to discern "two fair creatures" (9) amongst the "leaves and trembled 
blossoms" (11). They forget that the lovers' bower is an introspective 
creation of a devotee, or a faded memory of a perceived event. 17 The 
audience become party to an imaginative recreation of the moment. They 
place faith in a song which cannot be heard and an incident so lost in the 
past that its recovery conflates perception and introspection, 
epiphenomenon and phenomenon. 
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Keats as poet and devotee celebrates, as does the reader, the 
possibility that Cupid is united with "[ h7 is Psyche true" (23). Doubt and 
uncertainty are momentarily laid aside by a Joyful exertion of poetic faith 
and invention. But Keats's attempt to sustain this confident tone, in the 
opening of the next stanza, gives way to the doubts, uncertainties, and 
underlying disbelief of the ode's beginning: 
0 latest born and loveliest vision far 
Of all Olympus' faded hierarchy! 
Fairer than Phoebe's sapphire-region'd star, 
Or Vesper, amorous glow-worm of the sky; 
Fairer than these, though temple thou hast none... (24-8). 
Psyche's "loveliest vision" is praised for exceeding in youth and 
radiance the other Olympian gods. She outshines both Phoebe the moon- 
goddess and Vesper's "amorous glow-worm", more commonly referred to as the 
evening star. What troubles these lines of devotion to Psyche is an 
awareness of mutability. This passage of time is mapped out in the shift of 
imagery from the joyful "tender eye-dawn of aurorean love" (20) to the 
nocturnal figures of Phoebe and Vesper who--threatening to engulf Psyche's 
brilliance--are a reminder that all Olympians have long since had their day 
of glory. Olympus is a "faded hierarchy" deprived of lustre and eclipsed 
by centuries of disbelief and neglect. The devotee's insistence that Psyche 
excelled any of the other Olympians in beauty leads only to his confession 
that she was not highly rated amongst them since she has no "temple" 
dedicated to her (28), "[n]o shrine, no grove, no oracle, no heat I Of 
pale-mouth'd prophet" (34-5). Psyche's predicament is even worse than that 
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of the other "faded" gods, for if those Olympians who were worshipped have 
long been forgotten, what hope is there for an immortal whose original 
followers were so few? 
Psyche's antique plight of never being "worshipped or sacrificed to 
with any of the ancient fervour" was well known to Keats, who could not 
"let a hef a] then Goddess be so neglected" (Kj,,., 2,106). Keats deliberately 
chooses to dedicate his ode to the least favoured and faintest of the 
"faint Olympians" (42), for wham it is "too late for antique vows" and the 
"fond believing lyre" (36-7). By devoting his "tuneless numbers" to a 
lesser known Goddess, Keats suggests his own justification for the 
continuation of his hymn to Psyche is the need to "make a moan / Upon the 
midnight hours" (44-5), since she has never had a "virgin-choir" to sing 
her praises (30). 
It would seem fitting that a poet not yet ranked in a literary pantheon 
should become the mouthpiece for a minor immortal. Keats's audience are 
"lull'd to sleep" like the "moss-lain Dryads" (57) into a false sense of 
security, so that they accept the ode's apparent logic and momentarily 
forget themselves as those who are deceived. This unavoidable complicity 
with Keats's strategy makes readers transgress coventional norms, as they 
strain to spy on an absent event and listen for a non-existent music, 
Psyche is everywhere and nowhere, seen only because Keats as poet and 
devotee invokes her presence through continual references to sight. At 
first, the narrator questions whether he did see her "with awaken'd eyes" 
(6), making the claim that he saw her embracing Cupid (16) and the 
assertion of Psyche's "loveliest vision" (24), which provides a visual 
impression without resolving whether the initial event was "dreamt to-day" 
(5) or actually witnessed. The narrator's final claim to have spotted 
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Psyche's "lucent fans / Fluttering among the faint Olympians" (41) explores 
further the tension between writing and singing, reading (or seeing) and 
hearing: 
I see, and sing, by my own eyes inspired. 
So let me be thy choir,,, 
Thy voice, thy lute, thy pipe... (43-4,46) 
Once again the audience tries to catch a glimpse of Psyche's flitting 
form, believing her to be the "brightest" Olympian (36), whose beauty will 
be a source of inspiration. Quite the reverse is true, as it is the 
narrator's mental eye which creates and inspires Psyche's divine beauty, 
rather than her form being a source of inspiration for him. Keats is a poet 
of, and a devotee to Psyche, although ultimately not the Psyche of Olympus, 
but the psyche of the human mind's imaginative powers, which are capable of 
dressing a "rosy sanctuary... [wlith the wreath'd trellis of a working 
brain" (59-60). To "see" and "sing" are made synonymous with each other, 
since the figure of Psyche and the song are a product of Keats's own 
poetic invention. Both Psyche's elusive form and the song's unheard 
"tuneless numbers" can only be seen and heard if the reader surrenders 
entirely to Keats's vision of Psyche. The poem's readers might become so 
transfixed by the beauty of Keats's creation that they would be entranced 
like a "pale-mouth'd prophet dreaming" (35; 49). Yet the audience can never 
be these oracles, for as much as it is identified with Keats as poet and 
devotee, it remains troubled by the ode's previous uncertainties and does 
not have enough conviction to take up the role of Psyche's "priest" (50>-. 
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Yes, I will be thy priest, and build a Pane 
In some untrodden region of my mind, 
Where branched thoughts, new grown with pleasant pain... (50-2) 
Keats finally resolves to dedicate himself to Psyche, but it is a 
commitment to his own imaginative powers and the nurturing of their 
"branched thoughts", rather than to reinstating a cult for a lesser 
Olympian. This determination to further his own poetic development may end 
with Keats's optimistic assertion that he will leave "a casement ope at 
night / To let the waren love in" (66-7), but it still remains troubled by a 
much darker and uncertain aspect of imaginative invention. Keats's mental 
landscape contains "all soft delight / That shadowy thought can win" (65, 
my italics >, recalling again the bower in Paradise Lost "}, and is tended by 
the "gardener Fancy [who] e'er could feign" (62, my italics), alerting the 
reader to a further possibility of deception and treachery. The secluded 
security of this "rosy sanctuary" <59) populated by drowsy Dryads acts not 
only as a beacon (with its "bright torch" (66)) to the "warm love", but 
also to all the troubles of the mutable world that are concealed in the 
night outside its boundaries, beyond the "casements", 
Psyche's barely discernible form has vanished in the ode's last stanza. 
Keats's secure "rosy sanctuary" is more than a reappropriation of Psyche's 
female figure to the "untrodden region" of a male poet's mindl'-=', as it 
reminds us that her "faint" existence throughout the ode is dependent upon 
Keats's creative powers and poetic faith. The subject of "Ode to Psyche" is 
the impossibility of Keats's attempt to figure his own poetic soul or 
creative mind, Keats's mental landscape attempts to supplement Psyche, but 
has a fragile fictional existence of its own, threatened from outside by 
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reality's darkness. No adequate figure is found for Psyche, whether as 
goddess, poetic soul, or creative mind. Even Keats's many visual 
references, upon closer inspection, mention only her "pinions" (16) and 
"lucent fans" (41). 20 Keats's hymn to mental creativity can neither be 
figured nor "sung" (3). The poet's creative powers sustain the ode's 
existence, but he is unable to reveal the "secrets" of this imaginative 
process to his own or anyone else's "soft-conched ear" (4). 
Psyche has taken flight even betore our intrusion upon the lovers" 
fertile bower, leaving only echoes of her presence to haunt the ode. This 
gestures at the poet's own essential and elusive creative powers of 
imagination at work, Psyche's identity as goddess is suppressed so that 
Keats can try to exercise his new-found poetic confidence and identity, 
Ironically, Keats must break faith with Psyche if he is to promote his own 
creative and poetic identity, or rather his own psyche. Yet denying 
Psyche's identity as goddess prevents Keats from figuring her immortal form 
or his new poetic identity. 
Both versions of psyche are a product of Keats's fiction-snaking=' and 
are still capable of eluding him through the impossibility of their 
figuration and identification. Nietzsche's description of the poet's role 
supplies a succinct commentary on "Ode to Psyche"'s conflict between 
worshipping her beautiful mysteries and revealing her "secrets" to 
disenchant her, so that Psyche's knowledge and place might be usurped; 
The poet anticipates something of the joy of the thinker at 
the discovery of a vital idea and makes us desire it, so that 
we snatch at it; he, however, flutters by past our heads, dis- 
playing the loveliest butterfly-wings--and yet he eludes us. (H, 96) 
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Whatever profound insight into existence is partially glimpsed through 
the fictions woven by the poet out of language only reminds the reader that 
the "artist has already surrendered his subjectivity in the Dionysian 
process" (, 49). The lyric poet, for Nietzsche, is foregrounded only so 
that he can abandon his subjectivity and reveal his "identity with the 
heart of the world [as] a dream scene that embodies the primordial 
contradiction and primordial pain" <EI, 49>. Essential to lyrical poetry is 
a transformation of the self, whether through a poet's willed attempt to 
cast himself anew in his poetic invention, or by his fiction-making 
challenge to his audience's epistemological and ontological certainties, 
Both strategies make revelations about the nature of self and are mutually 
dependent, Lyrical poetry's creative processes have their origin in a 
desire for self-transformation and self-understanding. Coleridge's comment 
on Wordsworth' s Descriptive Sketches printed in Poems (1815), that "[ tl he 
poetic PSYCHE, in its process to full development, undergoes as many 
changes as its Greek name-sake, the butterfly" <JIL, 78> underlines the 
inextricable link between lyrical process and self-transformation or, in 
Nietzschean terms, "how one becomes what one is". ~- 
"Hymn to Intellectual Beauty" anticipates Keats's difficulty in finding 
a suitable figure for Psyche. Shelley's "Hymn" evokes an unknown god not 
listed amongst the common pantheonsw: ' and so, like Keats's worship of the 
almost forgotten Psyche, its opening turns on the paradox that this "Power" 
is omnipresent and always absent: 
The awful shadow of some unseen Power 
Floats tho' unseen among us, --visiting 
This various world with as inconstant wing 
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As summer winds that creep from flower to flower,., (1-4) 
The human and natural realm, which comprises "[t]his various world" of 
phenomenal experience, is on occasions altered and touched by an 
"inconstant wing" or "glance" (6) of the "awful shadow of some unseen 
power". This "unseen Power" mysteriously casts a shadow over the 
experiential world. Humans only know of the Power's "awful shadow" which 
"[f]loats unseen among us" because they can perceive its effects in the 
phenomenal world. For instance, the Power's force is perceived at work 
behind the invisible "summer winds", moving the flowers' nodding heads. 
Shelley' s use of simile through a repetition of "like" (5,8-11) makes it 
clear that the Spirit plays a part in, but is never identical with, the 
phenomenal world. Shelley's spectral "unseen power" haunts the world, 
concealed "[17ike moonbeams... behind some piny mountain shower" (5), or 
dark "clouds in starlight widely spread" (9). Equally, these attempts to 
represent and define the Spirit signpost its absence from the world, 
serving as a reminder that it is only an act of poetic faith--like 
recollecting a "memory of music fled" (10)--that evokes and believes in its 
presence. Like Keats's intrusion upon Psyche, scepticism pervades Shelley's 
imaginative encounters with the "Hymn"`s Spirit, whose presence indicates 
absence and otherworldliness, pointing to the human world of "[d]oubt, 
chance and mutability" (31): 
[ W7 here art thou gone? 
Why does thou pass away and leave our state, 
This dim vast vale of tears, vacant and desolate? 
Ask why the sunlight not for ever 
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Weaves rainbows o'er you mountain-river,,, (15-19) 
Shelley asserts, in the second stanza, that the "Spirit of Beauty" (13) 
appears as a fleeting manifestation of the "unseen Power". The Spirit's 
absence is directly confronted and lamented, for without its presence 
reality is unbearable and there are no means to ". consecrate ... human thought 
or form" (13,15). Beauty's transience, like the fading rainbow woven out 
of sunlight, is a reminder of human mutability, casting a shadow over 
human belief in a transcendental realm beyond their own "dim vast vale of 
tears". Those who believe in an immutable beauty find the "daylight of 
this earth" (22) tarnished by "fear and dream and birth and death" (21) and 
so turn away from human existence, appealing to a higher authority, for an 
explanation of "C w] by aught should fail and fade that once 
(/iis 
shown" 
(20). This appeal to a realm of absolutes defers the possibility that 
behind all human values there may only be a "vacant and desolate" void. 
Belief in the transcendent is an alluring balm to "life's unquiet dream" 
(36), but in one of the "Hymn"`s more sceptical moments, it is rejected out 
of hand: 
No voice from sublimer world hath ever 
To sage or poet these responses given-- 
Therefore the names of Demon, Ghost and Heaven, ýýý 
ý 
Remain the records of their vain endeavour... (25-8) 
"No voice" from a higher reality has ever responded to allay the fears 
of the "sage or poet" nor answered their questions concerning existence's 
mutability and humanity's "scope / For love and hate" (23-4). Lacking 
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affirmation of their belief in the transcendental, poets and sages have 
invented "the names of Demon, Ghost and Heaven" to fill the "vacant" void 
they fear would exist if it were proven there were no ultimate reality. 
This invention of a "Demon, Ghost and Heaven" is all that is produced from 
the "vain endeavour" of the poet and sage, whose "frail spells" (29) strive 
to create an otherworldliness: 
.. [W]hose uttered charm might not avail to sever, 
From all we hear and all we see, 
Doubt, chance, and mutability. (29-31) 
"[ DI ark reality[ s1 " (48) obstacles of "[ d1 oubt, chance, and 
mutability" are overcome at the expense of misrepresenting existence 
through the fiction-making of sage and poet. Shelley recognises that human 
belief in a transcendental realm or God is a product of poetic fiction- 
making, mistakenly established as dogma and actual. These "frail spells" 
and "uttered charmfsl" are easily broken, when their claim to absolute 
truth depends upon the authority of their self-invented fictions, which are 
understood as one of many possible interpretations of reality. Shelley's 
dogmatic sage and poet are, for Nietzsche, those who: 
.., [Clan find pleasure in life only in 
the intention of falsify- 
ing its image...; one could deterniine the degree to which life 
has been spoiled for them by the extent to which they want to 
see its image falsified... made otherworldly and divine... 
($Q, 85) 
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Shelley rejects the "poisonous names" of his youth (53) and their 
falsification of life. Instead, he favours a poetic language that embraces 
the transience of "mist o'er mountains driven" (32), "music by the night- 
wind sent" (34), or "moonlight on a midnight stream" (35), as the "light 
alone" to give "grace and truth to life's unquiet dream" (36). Shelley's 
act of imaginative fiction-making is crucial, as it invents figures for the 
Power, which would otherwise remain "vacant" and leave human existence a 
"vast vale of tears". After Shelley's rejection of the beautiful as 
transcendental and objective, he attempts a more personal and subjective 
understanding of beauty: 
Love, Hope and Self-esteem, like clouds depart 
And come, for some uncertain moments lent. 
Nan were immortal, and omnipotent, 
Didst thou, unknown and awful as thou art, 
Keep with thy glorious train firm state within his heart. (37-41) 
Beauty is considered in terms of its "awful", or inspirational, effect 
upon the observer. Shelley is concerned with the feeling of harmony an 
aesthetic experience causes in the human mind which, in his view, is 
synonymous with an increased awareness of the ethical virtues "Love, Hope 
and Self-esteem" . y4 Human apprehensions of beauty may be as evanescent as 
clouds gathering and dissipating, but in such moments the observer plays an 
actively subjective part in the perception of what is beautiful and is not 
passively acted upon by an objective form of beauty with "unknown" origins. 
After all, a transcendental realm of beauty is simply a product of one kind 
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of fiction-snaking, which can be re-invented through an act of poetic faith 
to "free / This world from its dark slavery" (70). 
Shelley's newly modified and intellectual version of the "Spirit of 
Beauty" has its own anxieties. Imaginative powers are as creative and 
liberating as they are destructive and enslaving. Shelley's final image of 
beauty--"that to human thought art nourishment" (44)--is one of engulfing 
darkness, rather than enlightenment: 
Like darkness to a dying flame! 
Depart not as thy shadow came, 
Depart not--lest the grave should be, 
Like life and fear, a dark reality. (45-8) 
This repeated appeal to "[d]epart not" almost convinces the reader of 
the Spirit's presence when, in fact, it has always been absent, existing 
only amongst the "Hymn"'s tropes. The poet's plea, "[d]epart not as thy 
shadow came", reinforces the "Spirit of Beauty[ ' sl " absence-presence, 
recalling the "Hymn's" first paradoxical and doubly negative assertion that 
there exists "[t]he awful shadow of some unseen Power" (1), 2 The Spirit is 
not a torch illuminating reality's darkness, instead "[alike darkness" its 
beauty seals the "dying flameC's)" fate, extinguishing it from existence. 
Only the "dark reality" of "life and fear" remains, underlining human 
existence's "vacant and desolate" condition. These lines point to the 
ultimate absence of death, indicating a vacancy of meaning beyond life and 
language. Shelley's own personal poetic language of mutability recognises 
its own fictionality, even as the "Hymn"'s fiction-making tries to fill 
this vacancy. The "Hymn"s attempt to cast light onto "dark reality" 
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through "shadow" is a reminder that the Spirit is a part of existence and a 
product of a poet's psyche. The poet's pleas to prevent beauty's departure 
are useless, as the Spirit has already flown away at the start of Shelley 's 
poem. 
Shelley's "Hymn" and Keats's "Ode to Psyche" are unconventional 
dedications, sensitive to the power of beauty and its relation to 
imagination. Neither Keats nor Shelley dedicates his hymns to commonplace 
immortals amongst accepted pantheons; they decide instead to address a 
lesser known goddess and an unknown Power. This liberating manoeuvre 
permits both poets to humanise and be more sceptical about a transcendental 
form of beauty. Keats's Psyche verges on death through lack of faith in her 
and Shelley's Spirit is only expressible through images of mutability and 
shadow. Both poems oscillate between optimism and scepticism, human 
mutability and divine immutability, and epistemological certainty and 
uncertainty. 
Keats and Shelley locate beauty in their own imaginative fiction- 
making, understanding its power as a part of aesthetic experience which 
requires no outside referents. 26 For Keats and Shelley beauty, even if it 
is only the imaginative product of a poet's psyche, affirms 1ife. 27 The 
fiction-making celebrated in Keats's ode and Shelley's "Hymn" exhibits, in 
Nietzsche's words, "the great means of making life possible, the great 
seduction to life, the great stimulant to life" Off, 3,4,853), in their 
refusal to deny life for a transcendental alternative. Like Nietzsche, 
Keats and Shelley understand the aesthetic apprehension of beauty as a 
profoundly human experience: 
Man believes that the world itself is filled with beauty-- 
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he forgets that it is he who has created it. He alone has 
bestowed beauty upon the world--alas! only a very human, all 
too human beauty... (11,89 [19]) 
Keats' s "Ode to Psyche" and Shel ley' s "Hymn" adopt images of mutability 
to represent their imaginative recreations of Psyche or the Spirit, so that 
their versions of the beautiful are introspective and include human 
suffering. For Nietzsche, art must transfigure life into something 
beautiful, so that it can be life-affirming, even when "art... makes 
apparent much that is ugly, hard, and questionable in life" (IL, 93 [241). 
The tragic, or Dionysian, artist does not seek an idealist escape from 
existence through a transfiguration of life but, with "[b]ravery and 
composure in the face of a powerful enemy" (11,93 1241) confronts life's 
"great hardship" and suffering (IL, 93 1241). Nietzsche' s Dionysian artist 
embraces the mutable world as an eternal flux of becoming, as "Eh]e enters 
into every skin, into every emotion; he is continually transforming 
himself" (11,84 1101), accepting that "all becoming and 
growing.. . postulates pain... [flor the eternal joy in creating to exist" 
(11,120 141). Tragic art, in Nietzsche's sense, requires both a 
transfiguration of human existence and a transformation of the artist. 
A lyric poet's transfiguration of the world is dependent upon his own 
imaginative powers, implicating the transformation of his own self in the 
creative lyrical process in which, according to Nietzsche, "the images of 
the lyrist are nothing but his very, self" (BI, 50). Shelley's concern 
about the limitations of his own fiction-making are reflected in his hope 
that "awful Loveliness / Wouldst give what'er these words cannot express" 
(71-2). At the close of Shelley's "Hymn" his doubt gives way to a "more 
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solemn and serene" scene of an imagined "harmony / In autumn" (73,74-5). `-` 
In the absence of a revelation from the "awful Loveliness" about meaning 
and the nature of things, Shelley seizes upon this vacancy as an 
opportunity to exercise his imagination, by creating a consoling and 
supplementary fiction. Shelley's self-doubt, as in "Mont Blanc"'s final 
lines, is transformed into a positive assertion of his imaginative powers; 
And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, 
It to the human mind's imaginings 
Silence and solitude were vacancy? ("font Blanc", 142-4) 
It is Shelley's fiction-making which recreates the phenomena of the 
"earth, and stars, and sea" and "Mont Blanc", so that their "[s]ilence and 
solitude" are meaningful in human terms, The mountain's "still and solemn 
power of many sights" (128>, consisting of "moonless nights" and "voiceless 
lightning" (130,137), are unwitnessed by human eyes (132) and subject only 
to conjecture in Shelley's doubly negative fiction-making. An unwitnessed 
scene is imaginatively invented from the negative images of "darkness" 
(130) and silence (135-6) to give voice to the mountain's "solemn power". 
"Xont Blanc'lls "human mind's imaginings" are conscious of their own 
fictionality, knowing that their poetic language of consolation may, 
ultimately, be as "vacant" as the absent "power" of the mountain (127, 
128). 29 This vacancy, ironically, is what motivates fiction-making in "I(ont 
Blanc". Shelley endeavours to imagine an order and meaning out of the 
"everlasting universe of things" (1) which, in the poem°s opening lines, 
threaten to drown the mind with "its rapid waves, / Now dark--now 
glittering--now reflecting gloom-- / Now lending splendour" (2-4). In 
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fact, these tumultuous waters of the ravine are no more than another 
invention of Shelley's "human mind's imaginings" . `'° 
The imaginatively recreated sights and sounds of these lyrics are often 
found to be wanting. Darkness constantly threatens to engulf emblems of 
beauty and power. Shelley's "serene lights of heaven" will be shrouded in 
"profoundest midnight" ("Stanzas--April, 1814", 4), as the "clouds that 
veil the midnight moon" are "lost forever" amongst the closing in "[n]ight" 
("Mutability", 4), or "the calm darkness of the moonless nights" which 
threatens to swallow the "lone glare of day" ("Mont Blanc", 131). Equally 
for Keats, darkness is a trope for absence, In Keats' s sonnet "Why did I 
laugh tonight? No voice will tell", when he receives no "reply from heaven 
or from hell" (3) he equates existence's "mortal pain" with "darkness" and 
a desire to "on this very midnight cease" (6-7; 11). Beyond "[v]erse, fame 
and beauty" (13) is the ultimate absence of death, which Keats seizes upon 
as "life's high need" (14). In absence of a "voice" from "god" or "demon" 
(1-2), Keats turns to his "human heart" (4) to invent his own consoling 
fiction, embracing mutability as the impetus of his fiction-making. A 
"human heart" knows all too well that the Naiad must, inevitably, "darken 
her pure grot with muddy gloom" ("On Fame", 8), The darkness of the "night" 
and "shadowy thought" ("Psyche", 65; 66) indicates that the absence of 
"warm Love" ("Psyche", 67), Psyche and music, inspires Keats's fiction- 
making in "Ode to Psyche". 
Shelley's "Hymn" can never become song because music proves to be as 
elusive as the Spirit itself, dimly existing in the faint "memory of music 
fled" (10), or as a ghostly player "by the night-wind sent" strumming the 
"strings of some still instrument" (34; 33). Such "forgotten lyres" never 
repeat a "mood or modulation" ("Mutability", 8), emphasising both human 
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transience and music's absence. Music in Shelley's "Hymn" (recalling 
Keats' s predicament of the "tuneless numbers" in "Ode to Psyche") remains 
outside of poetical language's expression and beyond the lyric as text on 
the page. Shelley's gothic fiction of the "voiceless grave" ("Hymn", 65), 
or the negative fiction of the "voiceless lightning" ("Mont Blanc", 137), 
is necessary to express the inexpressible Spirit, 
Keats and Shelley can only speak of what is unspeakable through tropes 
of silence, as they endeavour to voice, in Shelleyan terms, "what'er these 
words cannot express" ("Hymn", 72) and what, in Keats' s words, "C n] o voice 
will tell". This issue is further complicated when Keats and Shelley 
recreate encounters with works of art, which exist apart from language in a 
tempting silence of their own: 
Thou still unravish'd bride of quietness, 
Thou foster-child of silence and slow-time. 
Sylvan historian, who canst thus express 
A flowery tale more sweetly than our rhyme... 
("Ode on a Grecian Urn", 1-4) 
The urn's silence demands a response, accusing Keats of being a voyeur 
of its "unravish'd" innocence and challenging his skill as poet, because 
its "Attic shape" (41) can "express /A flowery tale more sweetly than our 
rhyme". Keats is both observer and creator of the urn, weaving its 
"overwrought" shape out of his poetic language. The poet's hasty questions 
are a necessary assault upon this "foster-child of silence". This 
questioning begins Keats's verbal creation of what "leaf-fring'd legend" 
(5) might be seen on the Grecian Urn: 
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What. men or gods are these? What maidens loth? 
What mad pursuit? What struggle to escape? 
What pipes and timbrels? What wild ecstasy? (8-10) 
No reply is made by the urn's "silent form" (44). Keats turns the urn's 
lack of music from its sculpted "pipes and timbrels" into a vacancy, which 
allows him to elicit imaginatively a response from the reluctant artefact, 
Keats's assertion that "[h]eard melodies are sweet, but those unheard / Are 
sweeter" (11-12), enables a portrayal of the urn's visual representation of 
its lovers in musical terms, so that the "[f]air youth" (15) is unable to 
escape his "song" rather than his frozen position on the Grecian urn, 
Keats's "more endear'd" and imagined music of "no tone" (13-14) provides 
the means to unfold the lovers' narrative, which would otherwise remain 
still and silent. This music of "no tone" appears to celebrate the 
immutability of the "[f]air youth" and his lover, who "cannot fade" (19): 
And, happy melodist, unwearied, 
For ever piping songs for ever new; 
Xore happy love! more happy, happy love! 
For ever warm and still to be enjoy'd, 
For ever panting, and for ever young; 
All breathing human passion far above... (23-8) 
The eternal spring of the lovers, which always anticipates "winning 
near the goal" of consummation (18), is thrown into relief against the 
temporal and human world of spent passion with "a heart high-sorrowful and 
cloy'd" (29). Yet the excessive repetition of "for ever" and "happy" fails 
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to conceal a sense of sterility and vacancy about what is depicted on the 
urn, The lovers avoid the ephemerality of "[a]ll breathing human passion" 
at the cost of never consummating their love, for the "[flair youth" can 
never attain sexual "bliss" (19) and must forever remain a "happy 
melodist", capable only of making an unheard music rather than love. ''' 
Keats's urn does not recommend either of these modes of existence over 
the other, although what appears to be depicted on its reverse side 
underlines the death-in-life condition of the lovers. The sight of a 
"mysterious priest" leading a "heifer lowing at the skies" (32-3) triggers 
a series of questions: "[wlho are these coming to the sacrifice? " (31), 
what "green altar" do they seek out? (32) and, finally, what "little town" 
has been" emptied on "this pious morn? " (37; 38). Unlike Keats's earlier 
demands from the "foster-child of silence", which opened up a variety of 
possible narratives, these questions form a distinct narrative out of their 
conjectures. This narrative is more explicitly concerned with human 
existence beyond the urn's death-in-life condition, as the story of the 
sacrificial procession is comprised of Keats's imaginatively invented 
future and the past of those who go to the "sacrifice", rather than out of 
actual details depicted on the urn. `32 Both Keats' s imagined future of the 
"green altar"--never to be arrived at--and the past of an abandoned "little 
town"--never to be returned to--are clear indications that mutability is a 
necessary contingency of human existence. The desolation of the "little 
town" places the urn's sterility and silence within a human context of 
community: 
And, little town, thy streets for evermore 
Will silent be; and not a soul to tell 
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Why thou art desolate, can e'er return. (38-40) 
This imagined otherside of Keats's urn divulges the ode's fiction- 
making process at work. The "little town" and sacrificial procession are 
more obviously a product of imagination than Keats's closely observed 
description of the lovers "beneath the trees" (15). But to make such a 
comparison is to sorget that the accurate detail of the lovers' scene is 
also a product of Keats's poetic invention. Keats's conjectures, in stanza 
tour, savour the mutablility of human existence over immutability. They 
elicit an unshared bias from the urn's silent impartiality. The "silent" 
town, devoid of "a soul to tell", is dependent upon Keats's words for its 
imagined existence, so that its silence, which ought to be complicit with 
that of the urn's, gives voice to his own prejudice. Keats is both an 
observer of a silent artefact in a museum and a craftsman who sculpts out 
of words the urn's silent existence on the page. 
Confronted by this "silent form [that] dost tease us out of thought" 
(44), Keats adopts tropes of silence to disclose the sterility of the urn's 
condition, speaking the unspeakability of what "Info voice will tell". This 
disclosure produces both Keats's denouncement of the urn's disengagement 
with human affairs as "Cold Pastoral" (45) and assertion that its "[a]ttic 
shape" is "a friend to man" (41,48). Keats's label of "Cold Pastoral" 
tries to define--or rather confine--the urn as an antiquity in a museum, 
silencing the endless speculation its "silent form" gives rise to and which 
threatens to "tease us out of thought". The Grecian urn cannot be so simply 
dismissed, as Keats's label with its deathly "[c]old" recalls its original 
purpose of containing funeral ashes, indicating its rightful place in a 
social ritual. Keats's urn is "a friend to man", because as a "Cold 
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Pastoral" it forces us to face all that is, in Nietzsche's terms, "hard and 
questionable in life". Those who strain to hear the urn's silent message 
are reminded that "breathing human passion" (28) is only possible in a 
transient existence and will, inevitably, end in death, Keats's "Ode on a 
Grecian Urn" makes these hard lessons bearable by offering a consolatory 
fiction of immutability, which always returns its readers to the human 
sphere of mutability, aware that its death-in-life condition is an 
unsatisfactory alternative to living. Put differently, Keats's Grecian urn 
does not recommend a transcendental escape from reality. Instead it is a 
reminder of what is valuable about human existence in contrast to the 
shelter of its "leaf-fring'd legend" (5). Keats ensures that neither the 
urn nor its aphorism point to ideal beauty as a vehicle for escaping from 
life's hardships, The inscription, "[ bl eauty is truth, truth beauty"' 
(49) , affirms an earthly and, to borrow from Nietzsche, "all too human 
beauty" which encompasses existence's pleasures and joys as well as its 
horror, terror and fear. 
Shelley's encounter with an artwork shares Keats's understanding of 
beauty as a category that incorporates the terrible. "On the Medusa of 
Leonardo Da Vinci in the Florentine Gallery", written in 1819, is more 
explicitly concerned with the petrifying experience of the observer than 
Keats's "Ode on a Grecian Urn". '-3--Both of these lyric poems blur their 
subject and object. They alternate between the artwork as poetic subject 
and its observer as the subject of the poem: 
Yet it is less the horror than the grace 
Which turns the gazer's spirit into stone, 
Whereon the lineaments of that dead face 
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Are graven, till the characters be grown 
Into itself, and thought no more can trace; 
'Tis the melodious hue of beauty thrown 
Athwart the darkness and the glare of pain, 
Which humanize and harmonize the strain. ("On the )Iedusa", 9-16) 
Shelley, gazing upon a painting of Medusa's silent and decapitated 
head, which is in turn "gazing on the midnight sky" (1), confronts and is 
confronted by a demonic version of human desire for ideal beauty. "On the 
Medusa" focuses on the perplexity and petrification of the "gazer's spirit 
into stone" at the precise moment Medusa herself is turned to stone. 
Shelley recreates his experience of the painting through a shift to an 
imaginative representation of Perseus's encounter with the Gorgon. 
Shelley's reflection upon the painting produces a reflection upon Perseus's 
experience. He was only able to witness Medusa's beauty as a reflection in 
his shield, pointing to the incomprehensibility, unrepresentability and 
unspeakability of the "[l]oveliness like a shadow" that she possesses. d 
Beneath the absent-presence of Aedusa's unrepresentable beauty lurks a 
further vacancy "of anguish and of death" (8), which "thought no more can 
trace", as the terrified observer cannot reconcile her "melodious hue of 
beauty" with "the darkness and the glare of pain". 
Shelley's "On the Medusa", like Keats's imagined turning of the urn, 
confronts the price which must be paid for the attainment of an ideal and 
immutable beauty. Medusa forever transfixes the observer as she remains 
eternally transfixed "gazing in death on Heaven" (40), reminding those who 
look upon her of "[tihe torture and the death within" (23). The Gorgon's 
fate of petrification is shared by those who dare look directly upon her, 
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recalling those sculpted figures on Keats's urn and their death-in-life 
existence. Shelley, unlike Keats's manipulation of his audience's gaze in 
"Ode on a Grecian Urn", is unable to tear our eyes away from those 
"Gorgonian eyes" (26), which after all are only a refracted reflection of 
our own. Entranced by Medusa's "brazen glare" (34), Shelley is caught in a 
process of endless self-reflection, evolving around the loss of self, 
death, and horror, necessary to being a devotee of ideal beauty. This 
process of self-reflection turns into a series of "unending involutions" 
(21), which trigger an unfathomable maze of tropes, culminating in a 
transformation of "thrilling vapour" into an "ever-shifting mirror 1 Of all 
beauty and terror" (36,38-9). Medusa's "[ 17 oveliness" is the inverse of 
the "awful Loveliness" of the Spirit and cannot "give whate'er these words 
cannot express" ("Hymn", 71-2). Shelley as observer can do nothing other 
than stare speechless in horror into an "ever-shifting mirror" of inverted 
and refracted self-reflections. 
What emerges from Shelley's contemplation in "On the Medusa" is a 
confrontation with the vacant horror that lies behind all of the "human 
mind's imaginings" ("Mont Blanc", 143), Such a confrontation is terrifying 
and fascinating, urging the observer both to turn toward and turn away from 
this vacancy, symbolised by the Medusa with "its horror and its 
beauty [which] are divine" (4). Shelley' s "On the Medusa" offers a more 
extreme dramatisation of the scepticism present in his "Hymn to 
Intellectual Beauty" and "Mont Blanc", as reflections upon Medusa's ideal 
and unified beauty are forever about to transform into the petrified, 
decapitated, head of "[a] woman's countenance, with serpent-locks" (39). 
The unified, perfected, beauty of an immortal gives way to the mortal 
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tragedy of death, absence, and mutability. Equally, Keats's beautifully 
crafted surface of his imagined Grecian urn conceals its darker 
function as a vessel for the ashes of the dead. This terrifying moment 
of recognition is when the Apollonian mode of ideal beauty reveals and 
resists its tragic Dionysian counterpart, symbolised for Nietzsche by 
the "figure of Apollo, [who] rising full of pride, held out the Gorgon's 
head to this grotesquely uncouth Dionysian power--and really could not 
have countered any more dangerous force" (131,39). 
Both Shelley's imaginatively retrospective account of his experience 
in the Florentine Gallery and Keats's invented recollection of a museum 
visit dissolve a distinction between the consciousness of the observing 
subject and the artistic object under observation. Whether imagined or 
real, these artworks become for Keats and Shelley, symbols which enable 
a dialogue of the self with the self. j When addressing these artistic 
objects, Shelley and Keats do not find their ultimate value in what 
glimpses they provide of a transcendental plane as art per se, but in 
their mediation of the human anxieties and fears of an individual 
consciousness to itself. The silence of the Medusa painting in the 
gallery and the Grecian Urn in the museum remind their observers of the 
emptiness and chaotic flux behind the fictions, which are used to 
interpret existence and the self. The observing subject is forced to 
confront its own annihilation and loss of identity, because it realises 
there is a vacancy at the heart of language's attempts to be meaningful. 
Keats and Shelley explore further a lyrical conflict between surface 
and depth, seeing (or reading) and listening, and printed text and 
music, when they encounter the distinctly feminine objects of the urn 
and the Medusa painting. Keats feels compelled to speak to his urn's 
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"ditties of no tone" and Shelley is drawn to the pictorial 
representation of Medusa's "melodious hue of beauty" (14, my italic). 
Keats's urn and Shelley's "On Medusa" question how language can be truly 
representational, as these visual objects are represented through tropes 
of silence and the use of dom . This complicates an already 
paradoxical relation between reading and listening in their lyrics, 
making the reader strain to hear both the poet's address to the object 
and that visual object's silent music, as he or she peers between the 
words read on the page to discern the object's features. 
In this sense readers are eavesdroppers, reminiscent of their 
voyeuristic role in "Ode to Psyche", on a private dialogue of a 
consciousness with itself. Fascinated, readers are unable to cover their 
ears, or tear their gaze away fron the terrible beauty which mesmerises 
them. Shelley's portrayal of Medusa provides a perfect image for the 
audience's predicament, as her concealed ears amongst her hair of 
serpents and irresistible, yet terrifying, gaze are a reminder that her 
siren song: - and agony can only be voiced through a visually silent 
"melodious hue of beauty" (my italics). To gaze upon the urn, like 
staring into Medusa's eyes, is to confront an inner horror of vacancy 
and self-annihilation, which Keats's poetic manipulation ensures does 
not immortalise its observers by petrification. 
The scepticism Keats and Shelley cast over transcendental 
explanations of the universe has serious implications for the self 
which, once again rooted in the world, is set adrift on dark and 
treacherous waters, speeding towards its final annihilation in death. 
Such a self is without the security of epistemological, ontological, or 
moral certainties. For Keats and Shelley, the self and the universe 
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cannot be constructed through any one single fiction, not even that of 
transcendentalism, but must be invented and re-invented by numerous 
competing fictions concerning the self's relation to the universe. These 
imaginative fictions embrace a life that has no metaphysical truth and 
an existence with all its Joys and pains. This kind of imaginative 
fiction-making, conscious of its own illusory nature, is not 
prescriptive of any one single truth, but celebrates the endless 
possibility of meaning that life may have. 1' Through a multiplicity of 
fictions and a multivalency of meanings, a self is perpetually re- 
invented and re-discovered, undergoing Nietzsche's paradoxical task of 
"how one becomes what one is" (ui, 31). Both Keats and Shelley share 
Nietzsche's notion of self as process, reflected by the Dionysian artist 
who "is continually transforming himself" <11,84 [103), and understand 
that a Journey of self-exploration is "[a] dangerous going-across, a 
dangerous wayfaring, a dangerous looking-back, a dangerous shuddering 
and staying-still" <Z., 43). Self-exploration amongst a series of 
competing fictions is "dangerous", as any sort of self-recovery requires 
an encounter with a loss of self, because "that one becomes what one is 
presupposes that one does not have the remotest idea what one is" (, 
64). 
Shelley, in "To a Skylark", embraces this loss of self and what 
vacancy lies behind these invented fictions with joyful exuberance. The 
poetic handling of Shelley's skylark, as another absent addressee, is 
different from his previous treatment of the Spirit's "[u]nseen shadow" 
or the Power's absence, because it directly confronts the bird's 
corporeal non-presence from the outset: 
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Hail to thee, blithe Spirit! 
Bird thou never wert, 
That from Heaven, or near it, 
Pourest thy full heart 
In profuse strains of unpremeditated art. ("To a Skylark", 1-5) 
It is an invisible tumbling down from "Heaven", or somewhere "near 
it", of the "unpremeditated art" of the skylark's song which gives only 
a vague impression of its unseen presence. Shelley deliberately denies 
his skylark a physical presence when he addresses it as "[b]ird thou 
never wert". The bird's physical presence is surpassed by Shelley's 
appeal to its incorporeal existence, What is important are the "profuse 
strains" of song rained down upon the world from the bird's Spirit; they 
matter more than the skylark's physicality which is consumed in a "cloud 
of fire" and submerged in the "blue deep" (8-9). The "unbodied joy" (14) 
of the skylark is heard as "shrill delight" (20), represented through an 
intermingling of light and sound imagery suggestive of both the 
skylark's melodious "strains" and invisibility: 
Keen as are the arrows 
Of that silver sphere, 
Whose intense lamp narrows 
In the white dawn clear 
Until we hardly see--we feel that it is there. (21-5) 
Shelley's skylark "showers a rain of melody" (34-5) radiating out 
song like the "intense lamp" of the morning star upon earthbound 
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mortals. " This stanza is a culmination of a poetic connection between 
Venus, as morning and evening star, and the skylark, which is previously 
unperceived "[i)n the golden lightning / Of the sunken sun" (11-12) and 
"[l]ike a star of Heaven, / In the broad daylight... unseen" (18-19). The 
transition from sunset to the "pale purple even" (16), leading to the 
break of a "white dawn clear", charts a joyous yet unsuccessful effort 
to figure the skylark's voice that fills "[aill the earth and air" (26). 
The skylark elides Shelley's tropes, which strain to capture the bird's 
essence, as its indiscernible form dissolves before him, exactly as 
Venus's "silver sphere" is extinguished to the naked eye when dawn 
breaks. This movement from dusk through to dawn marks a journey to the 
limits of perception and knowledge, anticipated by the repetition of 
"[hligher still and higher" (6) and "singing still dost soar, and soar- 
ing ever singest" (10), where the listener who desires to image the 
skylark's "voice" (27) is forced to ask "[w]hat thou art we know not; 
/ What is most like thee? " (31-2). 
Shelleyan fiction-making once again confesses its fictive nature, 
but this time without the vacant horror dramatised in "On Medusa" or the 
negative tropes that haunt "Mont Blanc", Shelley recognises the skylark 
as unknowable, beyond our powers of perception or representation, as its 
"Spirit" is akin to that of "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty", which can 
only make itself known to the world through its effects. Such a 
realisation in "To a Skylark" produces a celebration of imagination's 
power to invent and reinvent numerous fictions and delight in a 
multiplicity of images. Shelley's dedication to the skylark's melodious 
"voice" also celebrates the ingenious struggle of a poet's voice to 
represent what is unknowable: 
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Like a Poet hidden, 
In the light of thought, 
Singing hymns unbidden, 
Till the world is wrought 
To sympathy with hopes and fears it heeded not.,. (36-40) 
A parallel is drawn between Shelley's "unseen" skylark and a poet- 
figure "hidden" from the public gaze by the obscurity of what he 
contemplates. Concealed "Ci]n the light of thought" a poet weaves and 
sings "hymns unbidden" until, eventually, his "singing" evokes a 
"sympathy" from "the world" of "hopes and fears it heeded not", Poet and 
skylark share a certain similitude in that their voices can have an 
effect in the world even if their corporeal presence is undetectable. 
This stanza initiates a series of similes, including a secret romance of 
a "high-born maiden / In a palace-tower" who makes "music sweet as love" 
(41-2,44), a mysterious "glow-worm" which scatters "unbeholden its 
aereal hue" (46,47-8) and, finally, a "rose embowered / In its own 
green leaves" which invisibly "[m]akes faint with too much sweet those 
heavy-winged / thieves" of the wind's gusts (51-2; 54-5). 
Each simile depicts an instance where an effect occurs and the cause 
remains obscured. These sensuous images attempt to approximate what it 
is like to experience the skylark's music and testify to Shelley's 
celebration of the elasticity of poetic language even when faced with 
its limitations. "To a Skylark" gains imaginative impetus from Shelley's 
pronouncement of "[alll that ever was / Joyous, and clear, and fresh, 
thy music doth surpass" (58-60), because it highlights an inadequacy in 
his images (of solitary poet, love-lorn princess, secretive glow-worm 
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and scented rose) and leads to a new strategy of questioning the 
skylark: 
What objects are the fountains 
Of thy happy strain? 
What fields, or waves, or mountains? 
What shapes of sky or plain? 
What love of thine own kind? what ignorance of pain? (71-5) 
Shelley's second acknowledgment of the limitations of poetic 
language and the skylark's unrepresentability triggers a series of 
speculative questions about the transcendental world the bird may 
inhabit. These questions are an innovative way of making language work, 
when confronted by its own inadequacies, which protects Shelley's poetic 
voice from being silenced. Both a poet's "hymns unbidden" and the 
skylark's "rain of melody" risk being devoid of music, existing only as 
the silent words of a poem on a page. The skylark questions Shelley's 
competence as a poet by eluding a variety of poetic images, intended to 
express the bird's melodious "voice" through the poet's own. Shelley's 
skylark and Keats's Grecian Urn threaten to tease their respective poets 
out of thought, forcing both poets to resort to a series of questions to 
avoid lapsing into poetic silence. Shelley's speculations about the 
realm to which the "unseen" skylark belongs suggests it exists without 
"pain", or "shadow of annoyance" (78), able to love without knowing 
"love's sad satiety" (79-80). Set against this immortal and untroubled 
realm is the human sphere of troubles, pain and anguish: 
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We look before and after, 
And pine for what is not: 
Our sincerest laughter 
With some pain is fraught; 
Our sweetest songs are those that tell of saddest thought. 
(86-90) 
Despite Shelley°s assertion that the skylark "of death must deem / 
Things more true and deep / Than we mortals dream" (82-4), he does not 
favour the skylark's transcendence over human mutability. Shelley 
recognises that to value the skylark's song, as a sign of a 
transcendental realm, is a result of a human prediliction to "pine for 
what is not", What Shelley's "blithe spirit" knows of love, anguish and 
death is limited, lacking the richness of human experience, where 
knowledge is acquired through suffering and even the "sweetest songs are 
those that tell of saddest thought". Like Keats's encounter with his 
imaginary urn, Shelley's celebration of the skylark's "clear keen 
joyance" (76) avoids recommending a transcendental flight from reality, 
favouring instead, in Nietzsche's view, an all too human world with all 
of its contingencies and inadequacies. Shelley's enthusiastic 
celebration of the skylark's unearthly "voice" leads to a poetically 
innovative and ecstatic acceptance of life: 
Teach me half the gladness 
That thy brain must know, 
Such harmonious madness 
From my lips would flow 
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The world should listen then--as I am listening now, (101-5) 
In "To a Skylark" the bird's song is not, ultinately, valuable for 
its transcendent quality, but rather for the poetic "skill" (99) it 
emblematlses: a skill which, if known to Shelley, would enable him to 
command attention from the world. Ironically, Shelley's efforts to find 
a suitable image for the skylark's "voice" compose an excited 
"harmonious madness" of their own. The challenge of representing the 
skylark's song has tested and improved Shelley's skills as a poet, In 
fact, Shelley's poetic outpouring improves upon the skylark's own, 
because as one of the "sweetest songs... that tell of saddest thoughts", 
his imaginative fiction-making embraces a human suffering unknown to the 
bird. "To a Skylark" is an intoxicated version of the tragic and 
Dionysian understanding of existence, in which an encounter with absence 
and vacancy is transfigured into a positive creation of what Nietzsche 
calls an "exuberant, floating, dancing, mocking, childish and 
blissful ... freedom above all things" (aa, 4). 
This Dionysian intoxication celebrates vacancy and self-annihilation 
as a liberation to an endless process of "becoming" and self-invention. 
Such a Dionysian awareness understands that only art or poetry make 
life's suffering acceptable, because it is only "[als an aesthetic 
phenomenon [that] existence is still bearable for us" (aa, 107): in this 
state our desire to be the "poets of our lives" (Ga, 299) comes closest 
to fulfilment. 
A desire for self-annihilation, expressed through imagery of 
intoxication, characterises Keats's opening to "Ode to a Nightingale". 
Overhearing a nightingale singing "of summer in full-throated ease" 
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(10), hidden amidst a "melodious plot / Of beechen green, and shadows 
numberless" (8-9), turns the listener from a contemplation of its "happy 
lot" (5) to a consideration of human anguish: 
My heart aches, and a drowsy numbness pains 
Ky sense, as though of hemlock I had drunk, 
Or emptied some dull opiate to the drains 
One minute past, and Lethe-wards had sunk... (1-4) 
The listener knows that to be transported to the nightingale's world 
of "happiness" (6) requires a dissolution of the self and an 
obliteration of life's pain and suffering. To be united with the 
nightingale requires a loss of self-consciousness and is comparable to 
sipping fatal "hemlock", anaesthetising pain with a "dull opiate", or 
seeking a watery death in the "Lethe", Keats as poet desires to sing--or 
write poetry--with the effortless and "full-throated ease" of the 
nightingale. 
Recalling Shelley's skylark's ignorance of pain, the nightingale's 
world symbolises a transcendental plane beyond human anguish which 
appears, at first, so enticing that Keats considers taking a "draught of 
vintage" (11) in order that he "might drink, and leave the world unseen" 
and "fade away into the forest dim" (19-20). Draining "a beaker full of 
the warm South" (15) would ensure the desired state of forgetfulness and 
trigger an inspirational flight of imagination, as its contents are 
likened to "the blushful Hippocrene" (16). Keats's "vintage draught", on 
one level, is a natural product "It]asting of Flora and the country 
green" (13) and, on another, is attributed an aesthetic and mythological 
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significance as the "Hippocrene" of the Muses. This dual significance is 
equally applicable to the nightingale, which is both a natural bird of 
the "beechen green" and an aesthetic "light-winged Dryad of the trees" 
(7), crucial to the mythology of Philomel. ='`' Such an imaginative 
transformation of nature into an aesthetic object of supernatural, 
universal and mythological"' importance underlines an irreconcilable 
distance between the listener and the nightingale, despite a desire for 
a forgetful union with its "melodious plot". Even Keats's imagined 
merging with the nightingale in the "forest dim" turns his thoughts back 
toward humanity's suffering: 
Fade far away, dissolve, and quite forget 
That thou among the leaves hast never known, 
The weariness, the fever, and the fret 
Here, where men sit and hear each other groan; 
Where palsy shakes a few, sad, last gray hairs, 
Vhere youth grows pale, and spectre-thin, and dies... (21-6) 
The impulse to "[f]ade far away, dissolve, and quite forget" into 
the nightingale's transcendental realm is immediately counterbalanced by 
an awareness of the human "weariness, the fever, and the fret", which 
the bird as removed artistic ideal "hast never known". Keats's first 
imagined flight fron reality fails to enact his desire to "leave the 
world unseen", because "to quite forget" produces a recollection of 
human mutability, represented by the ghostly synecdoche of "[w]here 
palsy shakes a few, sad, last gray hairs" and a phantom of "spectre- 
thin" youth. To "fade away" and "dissolve" consciousness act as 
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reminders of the self-consciousness Keats sought to avoid, leading to 
the reflection that "to think is to be full of sorrow / And leaden eyed 
despairs" (27-8). This reflection points to the ephemerality of "Beauty" 
and "Love" (29-30), marking an end to Keats's pastoral fiction of escape 
into an idealised world of "[d]ance, and Provencal song, and sunburnt 
mirth" (14). 
Keats's fiction-making in "Ode to a Nightingale" is not, like 
Shelleys in "To a Skylark", preoccupied with finding an appropriate 
figure for the bird's song; rather, it tests imaginative fictions as a 
means of achieving union with the nightingale. So Keats's rejection of 
"Bacchus and his pards" (32) produces the urgency of "Ca] way! away! for 
I will fly to thee" and an assertion that imagination alone can secure 
unity with the nightingale's world. Keats will fly to the nightingale: 
on the viewless wings of Poesy, 
Though the dull brain perplexes and retards: 
Already with thee! tender is the night, 
And haply the Queen-Moon is on her throne, 
Cluster'd around by all her starry Fays; 
But here there is no light, 
Save what from heaven is with the breezes blown 
Through verdurous glooms and winding mossy ways. (33-40) 
Confronted with the limitations of his pastoral fiction of "the warm 
South" (15), Keats constructs a romance scene under the reign of a 
"Queen-Moon" attended to by "all her starry Fays", reminiscent both of 
the earlier bowers in Endymion and the figure of Cynthia. Keats's 
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ecstatic claim "[a]lready with thee! " implies he is at one with the 
nightingale, "pouring forth" song (57) and soaring with the bird "on the 
viewless wings of Poesy". This imagined harmony is disturbed by an 
ambivalence about the workings of the mind in this stanza, Keats's 
reference to "the dull brain [that] perplexes and retards" is double in 
effect: it recalls, on one hand, an oblivion of self-consciousness 
previously equated with a "dull opiate" and, on the other hand, it 
points to the self-conscious mental effort required to create an 
imaginary romantic bower. Such creative mental effort recalls "the 
wreath'd trellis of a working brain" in Psyche's bower. Keats's imagined 
harmony is further troubled by awareness of the difference between the 
ethereal brilliance of the "Queen-Moon" and "her starry Fays" and our 
earthbound existence, located firmly in "[blut here there is no light / 
Save what from heaven is with the breezes blown" (my italic). " The 
illusory harmony of the romance mode discloses a darker Dionysian 
reality of "verdurous glooms and winding mossy ways". This disclosure 
forces Keats to adopt a different kind of imaginary flight which 
embraces the absence and darkness of these "winding mossy ways": 
I cannot see what flowers are at my feet, 
Nor what soft incense hangs upon the boughs, 
But, in embalmed darkness, guess each sweet 
Wherewith the seasonable month endows 
The grass, the thicket, and the fruit-tree wild; 
White hawthorn, and the pastoral eglantine; 
Fast fading violets cover'd up in leaves,.. (41-7) 
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Keats supplements his loss of sight in the "embalmed darkness" with 
the smell of "soft incense" and "each sweet / Wherewith the seasonable 
month endows". These seasonal scents provide the only foundation for the 
sensuous descriptions of the spring flora. Keats's use of synaesthesia 
ensures that, in spite of his claim "I cannot see what flowers are at my 
feet", the reader strains to smell "what soft incense hangs upon the 
boughs" or to spy out the "[f]ast fading violets cover'd up in leaves". 
Keats continues to withdraw from the transcendental (or fake 
transcendental) "Queen-Moon" into a location where there is no light 
"from Heaven.. with the breezes blown", So Keats's desire to abandon and 
"leave the world unseen" is counterbalanced by a return to a world that 
cannot be seen. 
Keats recreates the scene as a mental landscape through a negative 
fiction. Much of what, in Keats's description, is absently present is 
doubly unseen, like the colourful "violets" hidden in the darkness and 
"cover' d up in leaves", or "[ tJ he coning musk rose, full of dewy wine" 
(49) concealed in the gloom and not yet fully blossomed, to enhance 
their visual impression. Keats recognises the solipsistic limitations of 
being absorbed by the imaginative products of his own mind and turns 
away from his unseen world of "embalmed darkness". To live solely in the 
world of imagination is to turn away from reality and "leave the world 
unseen". Consequently, Keats rejects both a transcendental fiction of 
flight and a solipsistic fiction of withdrawal from the world. For Keats 
to "[f]ade far away, dissolve, and quite forget" is to remember human 
suffering and transience at the crucial moment of dissolution. Keats's 
persistent return to the hardships of existence after each rejection of 
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a particular mode of fiction leads to a confrontation with the ultimate 
absence of death: 
Darkling I listen; and, for many a time 
I have been half in love with easeful Death, 
Call"d him soft names in many a mused rhyme, 
To take into the air my quiet breath; 
Now more than ever seems it rich to die, 
To cease upon the midnight with no pain.,. (51-6) 
This deathly absence was already implicit in the doubly negative 
descriptions of the "embalmed darkness", which give rise to a highly 
poeticised fiction of death. There is no mention of the physical 
realities of dying; Keats's imagined annihilation of the self consists 
of being "half in love with easeful Death" and an exquisite ceasing 
"upon the midnight with no pain". Keats's weaving of fictions in "many a 
mused rhyme" has often forced him to confront absence and self- 
annihilation, Yet "[tbo cease upon the midnight" is not to become one 
with the nightingale, to which he listens, unable to discern it in the 
darkness. Keats's desire to write poetry with the same musical ease that 
the nightingale sings, ultimately, points not to the similarity between 
poet and bird, writing and music, but to their differences. He listens: 
While thou art pouring forth thy soul abroad 
In such an ecstasy! 
Still wouldst thou sing, and I have ears in vain-- 
To thy high requiem become a sod. (57-60) 
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The nightingale's "high requiem" is forever immortalised in the myth 
of Philomel, famed by subsequent generations for its melodious singing, 
and preserved as an aesthetic object in Keats's ode, In contrast, if 
Keats surrenders to an "easeful death", he will "have ears in vain" to 
hear the nightingale's song and "cease" to aspire to pour forth his own 
"soul" in poetry. Keats's nightingale would still sing even when the 
poet is in the grave, no more than an insensitive "sod". This 
realisation anticipates Keats' s proclamation, that "[ t) hou was not born 
for death, immortal Bird! " (61>, which asserts the immutability of the 
nightingale's song and the dependence of this immutability upon those 
who record history and write literature: 
No hungry generations tread thee down; 
The voice I hear this passing night was heard 
In ancient days by emperor and clown: 
Perhaps the self-same song that found a path 
Through the sad heart of Ruth, when, sick for home, 
She stood in tears amid the alien corn.,, (62-7) 
Keats's nightingale is portrayed as a steadfast friend to the 
present "hungry generations", a companion to "emperor and clown" in 
"ancient days", and a comforter in biblical times to "the sad heart of 
Ruth". These lines are characterised by a profound sense of loss and 
longing, emphasised by the starved down-trodden "generations", a regret 
for the passing of "ancient days" and the "forlorn" (70,71) figure of 
Ruth weeping "amid the alien corn". Such a sense of longing recalls 
Keats's previous image of a dying "spectre-thin" youth and a world 
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filled with "leaden-eyed / despairs"; it shows Keats's sympathy for a 
human and mutable world over the immortality of the nightingale's realm. 
Keats"s fiction-making offers the consolation that "Cplerhaps the 
self-same song" heard by Ruth was also heard by subsequent generations 
and so can comfort Keats in the present. Ingeniously, this fiction of 
consolation relies upon a tentative "[plerhaps" and a re-writing of the 
biblical account of Ruth to ensure that her lonely figure becomes an 
internalised symbol for Keats's mental state. 42 Mythology, history and 
literature are reappropriated into Keats's fiction-making to ensure that 
the nightingale's song is seen as a consolation which is limited but 
richly expressive. Keats's poetic fiction-making seeks to immortalise 
itself by preserving the immortality of the nightingale's song, but 
remains constantly aware of its own fictionality and transience. The 
nightingale's song and Keats's fiction-making permit us to wander in 
everlasting and imaginary realms without forgetting the darker elements 
of human reality. Even when the ode unlatches "magic casements" they 
open "on the foam / Of perilous seas, in faery lands forlorn" (69-70), 
echoing the window ajar at the close of "Ode to Psyche". These "magic 
casements" allow the reader to gaze upon the imaginary "faery lands" of 
poetic invention, although the "perilous seas" act as a reminder of the 
risks involved in an imaginative voyage of self-exploration. These 
"faery lands forlorn" point, simultaneously, to what is wanting in 
poetic fictions of transcendence and to the absence, longing, and 
transience which characterises human existence: 
Forlorn! the very word is like a bell 
To toll me back from thee to my sole self! 
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Adieu! the fancy cannot cheat so well 
As she is fam' d to do, deceiving elf. (71-4) 
Keats recognises the limitations of these alternative modes of 
fiction explored in the ode and denounces the "fancy" of poetic fiction- 
making as a "deceiving elf". The word "Cflorlorn" sounds like a funeral 
bell, which draws Keats's attention back towards his "sole self", firmly 
situated in the human world of suffering and death. The nightingale's 
fading "plaintive anthem! ' (75) does not mourn Keats's death, imagined or 
otherwise, because what is "buried deep" (77) and grieved for is the 
nightingale's "music", along with the "vision" or "waking dream" its 
song occasioned (80), Keats's "sole self" is altered by these imaginary 
flights of the imagination as, like those who observe the Grecian Urn, 
he comes to understand the importance of affirming a life of 
contingencies over a transcendental realm, or immortal work of art. In 
spite of a finality to Keats's separation from the nightingale, the 
ode's closing lines suggest an uncertainty that might trigger further 
flights of fancy and self-exploration. In this instance, Keats avoids 
solipsism by expressing his epistemological and ontological doubts as 
questions: 
Was it a vision, or a waking dream? 
Fled is that music: --Do I wake or sleep? (79-80) 
"Ode to a Nightingale" and "To a Skylark" celebrate the creative 
freedom offered by a Dionysian understanding of reality. Keats and 
Shelley rejoice in the "harmonious madness" of their innovative fiction- 
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making and language's elasticity in its struggle to convey what "[n1o 
voice will tell". Both poets embrace negation, absence and death as an 
impetus for their fiction-making, as they expose what is wanting in 
fictions of transcedence, This scepticism means that the self is free 
to explore and re-invent itself through alternative modes of fiction. 
These modes are explored in Keats's contemplation of potential methods 
of self-annihilation and exercised by Shelley's inventions of images to 
represent the skylark. Keats and Shelley display a "tragic feeling" 
which, in Nietzsche's words, is characterised by an "overflowing feeling 
of life and energy within which even pain acts as a stimulus" (11,121 
[5]): 
Affirmation of' life even in its strangest and sternest problems, 
the will to life rejoicing in its own inexhaustibility through 
the sacrifice of its highest types-- U at is what I called 
Dionysian that is,,. the psychology of the tragic poet, Hat so as 
to get rid of pity and terror, not so as to purify oneself of a 
dangerous emotion... but.., to realize in oneself the eternal joy 
of becoming--that joy which also encompasses joy in 
<11,121 [511) 
A celebration of the West Wind's "t w] ild spirit" (13>, in Shelley's 
"Ode to the West Wind", embraces destruction and renewal as essential 
aspects to a cylical process of becoming, The "unseen presence" of the 
Wind animates the universe by driving the dead leaves "like ghosts from 
an enchanter fleeing" (3). The West Wind, as the "breath of Autumn's 
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being" (1), is only detectable through the effects it has on the world 
and recalls Shelley's concealed Spirit in "Hymn to Intellectual Beauty" 
and "Mont Blanc"'s hidden Power. 
Shelley's West Wind is both "[d]estroyer and preserver" (l4), 
responsible for the onset of autumn, with winter close behind, and for 
the renewal of life in spring. Traces of the same West Wind, "[ w1 ho 
chariotest to their dark wintry bed / The winged seeds" (6-7), are found 
in the "azure sister of the Spring" who drives "sweet buds like flocks 
to teed in air" (1i). ß' The deathly shades of autumnal leaves, which 
appear as "[p]estilence-stricken multitudes" (5) are carefully balanced 
against the "living hues and odours" of spring's renewal (12). The 
seasonal patterns of autumn and spring, death and lire, mirror each 
other perfectly to ensure that the reader sees them as inseparable and 
the West Wind as "[dlestroyer and preserver". 4.4 Shelley's poetic 
assertion of a cyclical process of death and re-birth in nature, 
represented by the "winged seeds", attempts to console humanity's 
awareness that "a corpse within its grave" (8) has no escape. 
Consequently, Shelley's ode moves beyond this kind of fiction-making to 
confront human suffering and death in his image of "rain and lightning" 
(18) as a dedicated devotee of Dionysus: 
Like the bright hair uplifted from the head 
Of some fierce Maenad, even from the dim verge 
Of the horizon to the zenith's height, 
The locks of the approaching storm, Thou dirge 
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Of the dying year, to which this closing night 
Will be the dome of a vast sepulchre, 
Vaulted with all thy congregated might 
Of vapours, from whose solid atmosphere 
Black rain, and fire, and hail will burst: Oh, hear! (20-8) 
This is a truer representation of the West Wind's "uncontrollable", 
unfettered, and inexpressible destructive power. Shelley directly 
confronts the necessity of change and death, as he shifts from being a 
passive observer of cyclical nature to an active participant who, like 
the "fierce Maenad", rejoices in the Wind's destructive powers. There is 
no attempt to offer any consolation for this destruction, as the West 
Wind's "congregated might" threatens to break the "blue surface" of 
"Heaven and Ocean" (19,17> with its "t bi lack rain, and fire, and hail" 
and seal all living things in "a vast sepulchre". Only the indifferent 
"dirge" of thunder marks the passing of those who are "[v]aulted" in by 
the darkness of the "approaching storm" and the "closing night". 
A far less animated and hectic Dionysian acceptance of death is 
presented in Keats's "To Autumn", Keats acknowledges death as a 
necessary fulfilment of process and so his poem's final stanza signifies 
the end of day, the season of autumn, and the passing away of a year: 
While barred clouds bloom the soft-dying day, 
And touch the stubble-plains with rosy hue; 
Then in a wailful choir the small gnats mourn 
Among the river sallows, borne aloft 
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Or sinking as the light wind lives or dies; 
And full-grown lambs loud bleat from hilly bourn.., (25-30) 
"To Autumn"'s movement can be characterised by the "light wind 
[which] lives or dies", as the poem oscillates between the oppositional 
states of spring and autumn, day and night, action and inaction (16-20), 
freedom and enclosure (32-3)4", and life and death, The end of this 
"soft-dying day" is inextricable from the "barred clouds [that] bloom"; 
the sheep are described as "full-grown lambs" to emphasise their 
affinity with the life of spring and the inevitable death of autumn. 
Keats understands that the "treble soft" of the "red-breast" (32), 
heralding winter, is the natural fruition of autumnal processes and a 
vital prelude to the renewed "songs of spring" (23). Keats's whistling 
"red-breast" ensures a controlled fading away of autumn's music, which 
softly silences the gnats' "wailful choir" (27), the sheep's "loud 
bleat from hilly bourn" (30), and the singing "[h]edge-crickets" (31). 11 
"To Autumn"'s mournful music underlines Keats's unflinching 
"Calffirination of life even in its strangest and sternest problems" 
through a joyful acceptance of destruction and death. " 
This final stanza's preoccupation with death is anticipated by 
Keats's imaginative re-invention of the mythical figure of death in the 
previous one. Autumn's personification transforms the conventional 
imagery of death as a reaper into a female figure 4Es, who is drugged by 
the overwhelming scent of the poppies and whose scythe is an impotent 
"hook" (17). She gives herself over to sleep rather than reaping corn, 
or human lives. Keats's mythical figure of death is not actively 
antagonistic to humanity; instead, she watches with her "patient look" 
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the "last oozings hours by hours" (21-2) of the fermenting cider and the 
final drops of human existence. In "To Autumn" Keats maintains a careful 
balance between transience and eternity by not describing anything as 
reaching its final end: autumn's conspiracy is able "to set budding 
more, And still more" (3,8-9), the cider is still in its "last 
oozings", and the "soft-dying" day is never extinguished. So Keats's 
poetic fiction affirms human transience against the eternal cycle of the 
seasons and an eternity of human suffering and death as a necessary part 
of nature's transience. Keats's "To Autumn" and Shelley's "Ode to the 
West Wind" in their own individual ways affirm Nietzsche's "joy in 
destruction", which is expressed in a more parodic and playful a manner: 
All joy wants the eternity of all things, wants honey, wants 
dregs, wants intoxicated midnight, wants graves, wants the 
consolation of graveside tears, wants gilded sunsets... 
(Z, 332) 
Keats's fiction-making presents death in the female figure of 
autumn, as an integral part of a necessary process, through his poetic 
rewriting of established mythology. Alternatively, Shelley creates a 
cyclical mythology of consolation in order to expose its fictionality 
through a confrontation with the figure of a frenzied Maenad. 
This Dionysian fiction of the "fierce Maenad" achieves an apparent 
unity between Shelley and the West Wind, but the poet does not have the 
Wind's power to command "the steep sky's commotion" (15) and so is one 
of the many living things which will be consumed by its destructive 
forces. Shelley desires poetic mastery over the Wind and struggles to 
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contain its "[w]ild spirit" only to find himself in danger of being 
contained by the storm's "vast sepulchre". The turmoil of the "zenith's 
height" stretches Shelley's poetic language to the point that it 
threatens to "burst" the ode's fiction-making and the darkening night 
sky. Shelley recognises the inadequacy of his consolatory cyclical myth 
of the seasons and the linguistic shortfallings of his Dionysian 
fiction-making. Both these attempts at fiction-making lead to a 
realisation of the all-pervading presence of the Wind and the 
difficulties of containing its power in language. 
Shelley's aspiration to be at one with the West Wind forces him to 
test out alternative modes of fiction, moving from the failed 
consolation of the seasonal cycles on land, to the tumult of the sky 
and, then, to the depths of the sea, The Mediterranean's "summer dreams" 
(29), the "sapless foliage of the ocean" (40), and the stormy "chasms" 
of the "Atlantic's level powers" (38,37) suggest the sea's mirroring of 
the seasonal cycles on land. This cyclical movement is echoed in the 
previous stanza, where "[lioose clouds like earth's decaying leaves are 
shed" (16), so that they can provide new life in the form of the 
"approaching storm". These alternative fictions modify the original myth 
of consolation in the cycle of the seasons by extending and repeating 
their movement in the sky and sea, " y The sky mirrors the change of the 
seasons on land with its gathering storm and the sea reflects both what 
occurs on the land "within the waves intenser day" (34) and in the sky. 
In the water cycle the sea and sky are intermingled with one another, 
as the "decaying leaves" of the brewing storm clouds are "[ sl hook from 
the tangled boughs of Heaven and Ocean". 
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Shelleys emphasis on the water cycle over his earlier humanised 
account of seasonal change incorporates the ode's pattern of life and 
death--creation and destruction--into a crucial natural process which is 
indifferent to human affairs. This repetition of circular movement 
underlines the extent of the West Wind's influence over earth, sky and 
sea, supporting the description of its "[w]ild spirit... moving 
everywhere" c13). Each of these attempts to represent and contain the 
Wind's effects upon land, sky and sea close with a plea of "oh, hear! ", 
which occur just after a recognition of its omnipresence and power (14- 
15,27-8,41-2). Shelley's pleas to the West Wind mark the inability of 
his poetic language to capture its essential spirit and are also an 
assertion of poetic faith that the Wind can be controlled by language in 
the future, as each unsuccessful representation is turned into an 
invocation of its presence. The West Wind's resistance to language 
underlines nature's separateness from and indifference to a humanity 
troubled by mortality. The sceptical and Dionysian Shelley knows all too 
well the impossibility of a transcendental communion with nature: 
If I were a dead leaf thou mightest bear; 
If I were a swift cloud to fly with thee; 
A wave to pant beneath thy power, and share 
The impulse of thy strength, only less free 
Than thou, 0 uncontrollable! (43-7) 
Confronted with nature's resistance and antipathy, Shelley 
endeavours to re-invent himself imaginatively as part of the natural 
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world, so that he can fully participate in the Wind's power, Shelley's 
desire to be driven 'by the Wind like a "dead leaf", "swift cloud", or 
"wave" recalls his other unsuccessful attempts to capture its effects in 
language through the images of land, sky and sea. What makes this 
attempt even less hopeful is Shelley's tentative repetition of "[ilf I 
were". Shelley is forced to acknowledge again the divide between the 
natural and the human, between the Wind's spirit and his own. More 
significantly, Shelley realises that to be one with the West Wind is to 
be enslaved to the "uncontrollable" force which he sought to contain and 
master. Faced with nature's indifference to humanity's plight and the 
limitations of poetic language, Shelley must either lapse into silence 
and despair, or assert his ability to invent fictions by means of 
language's elastic capacity: 
I would ne'er have striven 
As thus with thee in prayer in my sore need. 
Oh, lift me as a wave, a leaf, a cloud! 
I fall upon the thorns of life! I bleed! (51-4) 
In a moment of almost utter despair Shelley confronts the futility 
and necessity of vying with nature through the invention of competing 
fictions, such fictions make it possible to confront all that is painful 
in life, yet they remain aware of their fragile status. The fragility of 
these fictive modes is reflected in Shelley' s plea of "[ o] h, lift me as 
a wave, a leaf, a cloud! ", which weakly repeats the fictions of analogy 
with nature that he has exhausted earlier in the ode, Even when 
Shelley's imaginative fiction-making verges on collapse, it reasserts a 
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hoped-for connection between the human and natural, mortal and immortal, 
transcendental and real, through the salvific claim that "I fall upon 
the thorns of life! I bleed". Momentarily, Shelley is both sacrificed 
god and broken prophet. Shelley's inability to tame the Wind's "L wl ild 
spirit", or humanise an indifferent universe ultimately gives rise to a 
renewed poetic faith and a claim that the Wind's spirit is kindred to 
his own. The only difference between these two spirits is that the 
poet's has been tethered by mutability: 
A heavy weight of hours has chained and bowed 
One too like thee: tameless, and swift, and proud. (55-6) 
Shelley's unsuccessful efforts to contain the Wind's spirit in his 
fiction-making leads to a realisation of the containment of his own 
spirit by time and transience. This realisation brings with it an 
awareness that after the poet's physical death his spirit will survive, 
for future generations, in the words he leaves behind. Like the West 
Wind which makes its presence felt by causing effects in the world, the 
ode's poetic language can create and destroy meaning long after its 
author has passed from the world. sO Shelley reconciles himself with his 
own mortality and defers the responsibility for circulating the meaning, 
or spirit, of his words to the power of the Wind: 
Drive my dead thoughts over the universe 
Like withered leaves to quicken a new birth! 
And, by the incantation of this verse, 
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Scatter, as from an unextinguished hearth 
Ashes and sparks, my words among mankind? (63-8) 
The ode's assertion of a similarity between poet and West Wind 
enables them to act as instruments of one another. The Wind will drive 
Shel ey's "dead thoughts over the universe" like autumn's "withered 
leaves" with the hope that they will "quicken a new birth" of meaning. 
Shelley' s words can regenerate if their "[a]shes and sparks" are fanned 
and scattered "among mankind" by the West Wind. Shelley calls upon the 
Wind to act as his messenger with the "incantation of this verse" and 
his request that "[ble thou, Spirit fierce / My spirit! Be thou me, 
impetuous one! " (61-2). These instructions reverse an earlier image of 
the Wind as an "enchanter" from which the leaves fled, by suggesting 
that Shelley is now a magician, who utters incantations to bend the Wind 
to his poetic will. ' Clearly, Shelley does not become a passive "lyre" 
to the West Wind's "mighty harmonies" (57,59>, but the agent through 
which the Wind could be a "trumpet of a prophecy" to the "unawakened 
earth" i69,68). Shelley's final mode of tiction-making absorbs the 
tempestuous autumn scene into a mental landscape, where his thoughts are 
"withered leaves" like those "falling" in the forest <57-8> and the West 
Wind is an inspirational spirit, which must be shaped into words through 
a poet's "lips" (68>. 
In "Ode to the West Wind" Shelley forcibly struggles to come to 
terms with the universe's indifference to humanity and to harness the 
natural phenomena of the West Wind to his human purposes. What is 
dramatised in the ode is the conflict between Shelley's desire to 
commune with the Wind and nature's resistance to the linguistic 
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constraints this poetic communion would impose. Shelley is an active 
participant in the ode's conflict; his presence is either felt as a 
solitary poet-figure crying out to the Wind, or as, in the final stanza, 
a prophet who interprets the divine spirit of inspiration for present 
and Muture generations. 
"To Autumn" elides these difficulties by presenting an implied 
observing seit and so avoids a conflict between an explicit observing 
consciousness and a universe indifferent to humanity. Keats intricately 
entwines the human and natural with his portrayal of the implicit 
cottage which--like the observing self--is scarcely glimpsed amongst 
"the inoss'd cottage-trees" with its "thatch-eves" (5-6). There is no 
distinction between observer and observed. This is emphasised by the 
presence of the bees who "think warm days will never cease" (my italic, 
10), representing a further union between questioning human 
consciousness and instinctive feeling. The bees' belief that "days will 
never cease" underlines "To Autumn"'s overall concern with the fruition 
of process and its silent refusal to delineate different modes of time. 
Keats's implied observing consciousness is only brought once to the 
foreground of "To Autumn". In a moment of doubt over his imaginative 
powers, Keats's tests the strength of his fiction-making with the 
regretful question, "[wlhere are the songs of spring? Ay, where are 
they? " (23). Posing this question does not unravel "To Autumn"'s fiction 
of acceptance, because it is countered immediately by Keats's 
affirmation of his poetic faith in the powers of imagination with his 
dismissive "[t]hink not of them, thou hast thy music too" (24). The 
introduction of "songs of spring" into the final stanza does not lead to 
remorse for the absence of spring's vibrance, but allows a celebration 
167 
of autumn's sombre music that carries "To Autumn" to its triumphant 
conclusion of the "gathering swallows twitter in the skies" (33). Like 
the closing stanza of "Ode to the West Wind", Keats both affirms and 
celebrates the "sadness" of autumn's "mighty harmonies" with its "deep, 
autumnal tone" ("Ode to the West Wind", 59-61). "To Autumn" and "Ode to 
the West Wind" endeavour to fuse the music of autumn with the act of 
writing. Keats deliberately forgets the distinction between writing 
poetry and the processes of the season by never mentioning the falling 
leaves in his description, so that the ode becomes one of autumn's 
"leaves" on the printed page. Equally, Shelley combines poetic writing 
and vocality in order that the "leaves''--or pages--of his ode can be 
scattered by the West Wind and sounded as a "trumpet of a prophecy". - 
Shelley's ode ends with an internalised fiction of a hoped for 
artistic and social renewal, which is asserted in the final line: "0, 
Wind / if Winter comes, can Spring be far behind? " (69-70). Shelley's 
fiction-making ensures a bias towards the positive affirmation of 
spring's assured regeneration. Yet this question is a test of poetic 
faith, as spring's return will be all too closely followed by autumn, 
which will herald another deathly winter, Keats and Shelley have come to 
understand that to desire the "eternity of all things" is to also desire 
endless pain, loss and death. 
Both poets contront the pain of human existence by inventing 
Dionysian fictions that avoid lapsing into silence by overcoming moments 
of imaginative doubt. These potential moments of creative despair were 
seized upon as opportunities to demonstrate imagination's versatility 
and the elasticity of poetic expression, Poetic language resists any 
lyrical impulse to translate it into the medium of music because, 
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ultimately, language signifies in ways that complicate the assumed 
relation between sound and sense, as well as sensuous experience, 6*1 It 
is often this dissonant note of language which unsettles lyric poetry's 
bid for harmonic unity. Such disharmony unsettles the calm waters of 
lyrical unity to expose the troubled waters charted by Keats and 
Shelley. Steering this course involve Keats and Shelley maintaining a 
delicate balance between competing fictions of unity and disunity, 
absence and presence, silence and sound, and scepticism and 
transcendentalism, Through an exertion of their imaginative powers, 
Keats and Shelley transformed moments of poetic desperation into a 
celebration and triumph of creative ingenuity and invention, 
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Chapter 5 
"When I Have Fears That IM Cease To Be": e11e 's Re-inveLtion ofi fiTvth. 
History. and Identity in Adonais, 
... [T]hen on the shore of the wide world I stand alone... ' 
(John Keats) 
Death, the immortalising winter ... 2 
(P B. Shelley) 
I shall show you the consummating death, which shall be a spur and 
a promise to the living. 
(Friedrich Nietzsche) 
In Adonais Shelley returns to the romance world of his earlier poetic 
career. Shelley's decision to write an elegy on the death of John Keats 
using Spenserian stanzas, overflowing with literary allusions to Milton's 
Lycidas and Sidney's "Astrophel" and "November Eclogue", and his choice of 
Bion's lament for Moschus as epigraph, mark a self-conscious return to the 
pastoral and classical tradition. This return is often characterised as 
sceptical by those commentators who, following in the wake of Wasserman's 
detailed account of Adonis, argue that Shelley's elegy rejects life and 
aligns itself with the bleak outlook of Alastor's visionary (&R, 462). 
198 
Lloyd Abbey rejects Wasserman's transcendental emphasis on death as an 
"access to eternity", suggesting instead that "[t]his skepticism calls into 
question the thematic validity of all the preceding poems, excepting 
perhaps the totally skeptical Alastor", 4 Ross Woodman also finds parallels 
between Adonais and Aastor, although his reading of the "moral dimension 
of the elegy" as a "metaphysical defence of suicide" is more extreme than 
Abbey's account. ' 
Adonais, Stuart Curran has observed with "Ode to the West Wind" in 
mind, is the only place that Shelley alludes to a work of his own canon in 
any of his poetry. 6 These echoes of his own literary compositions underline 
the elaborate rhetoric and inter-textuality of Shelley's elegy. The 
complexity of Adonais's poetic fabric has led to critical agreement 
between James A. W. Heffernan, Angela Leighton, Peter Sacks and William A, 
Ulmer over Shelley's self-conscious exploitation of literary tradition and 
rhetorical figures. ' Such diverse readings of Adonais rely upon identifying 
a process of substitution at work in its poetry: Heffernan argues that 
biography and history are exchanged for Shelleys "version" of the 
circumstances surrounding Keats's death (RC 173), Leighton understands 
Shelley's act of writing as a deferral of mourning, so that Adonais 
replaces the "real nature of grief" (S, 126) with a "'leisure' for grief" 
(; zE, 129), Sacks offers a psychological account of how Shelley' s imagery 
substitutes Adonais for Keats, and Ulmer views Shelley's elegy as 
reconstituting "relations of figure and truth, absence and presence, poetry 
and history as structurally supplementary" (AJ&, 447). Shelley's 
substitution of mythical Adonis for an invented Adonais, Urania for Venus, 
Keats's poetic character for his own, and death for life is precisely 
mirrored in these interpretations. Emphasis on the elegy's suspension of 
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mourning, its substitution of Keats's death for a "prospective death of 
poetry" cA , 438) and mythologised vision for historical circumstance, has 
caused criticism to re-enact Adonais's aesthetic process of supplementation 
and deferral, Any reading, as Curran notes, "so committed to [Adonais's] 
aesthetic principles verges on the critical reductionism that sees all 
literature as being about the making of itself" tom, 166), Curran reminds 
critics that onais's meditation on the murder of a poet by a literary 
review lends itself all too readily to a reading which foregrounds the 
elegy's creative and literary processes. Nonetheless, a wide variety of 
critical interpretations have testified to Adonais's processes of rhetoric, 
supplementation and literary ingenuity. Although Curran is right to warn 
against such "critical reductionism", he does not answer the question why 
critics have persisted in reading Shelley's elegy as a revelation of its 
own imaginative and psychological processes. "' Such critical persistence 
shows how integral disclosure about the creative process is to Adonais's 
poetic fabric. 
Adonais reveais the poet's desire to ensure his own future apotheosis 
and his struggle to represent the silence of death. To chart these 
difficult, unknown waters, Shelley invents his own mythology to ensure an 
emotional and creative distance from the specific historical moment of 
Keats' s death. Adonais gains this distance through a process of forgetting 
biographical detail and historical circumstanced, a process which itself is 
paradoxically predicated on commemorating the actual event of Keats's 
death. A critical emphasis on forgetting in Adonais shares certain 
assumptions with Heffernan's reading of the poem: Heffernan offers an 
excellent account of what Shelley knew, or did not know, about Keats's 
death when composing Adonais. Unfortunately, Heffernan's argument places 
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too much emphasis on Shelley's desire to avenge himself against Southey 
which, by implication, might suggest there was some malicious intention 
behind Shelley's portrayal, in Adonais's early stages, of Keats as weaker 
than he actually was. "-' Indeed, Shelley's portrait of Keats is part of a 
rhetorical strategy which ensures that they both have access to the 
literary pantheon. Shelley's difficulty is that he must assert his own 
poetic identity against established literary forefathers as well as against 
Keats, who is about to become one of them, Shelley's elegy plays out 
Nietzsche's mystery of "a moment, now here and then gone, nothing before it 
came, again nothing after it has gone, nonetheless returns as a ghost and 
disturbs the peace of a later moment" (0,61). Aware that to forget is, 
ultimately, to remember what has been repressed, Adonais understands the 
impossibility of evading history and time. 
Shelley's confrontation with death is born out of a tragic awareness 
earlier cultivated in Alastor and out of a scepticism developed in his 
lyrical poetry. Shelley specifies only Endymion and "Hyperion" from the 
Keatsian canon in his subtitle to Mdonais, combining Keats's earlier tragic 
romance with his mature, darker Titanic epic. " Shelley self-consciously 
adopts an outmoded pastoral tradition to reanimate Keats's poetic identity. 
This revival of genre and identity is dependent upon Shelley's revision of 
them both. Shelley reappropriates Keats's identity into his poetic revision 
of classical mythology at the start of his elegy: 
I weep for Adonais--he is dead! 
0, weep for Adonis'. though our tears 
Thaw not the frost which binds so dear a head! 
And thou, sad Hour, selected from all years 
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To mourn our loss, rouse thy obscure compeers, 
And teach them thine own sorrow, say: "With me 
Died Adonais; till the Future dares 
Forget the Past, his fate and fame shall be 
An echo and a light unto eternity! " (1-9) 
Keats is immediately aligned with the fair youth of Greek mythology who 
meets an untimely demise (Adonis), the Hebraic God of the Old Testament 
(Adonai) and the sacrificial, though salvific figure of Christ, 12 Shelley's 
fictional re-invention of Keats as Adonais, at this stage, combines a pagan 
world with a Christian one and links the individual death of a particular 
"sad Hour" to the universal significance of "ta]n echo and a light unto 
eternity". 11 The "sad Hour" is not simply the occasion for Adonais's death 
but, aided by the "obscure compeers", the historical chronicler of that 
tragic moment. Shelley's "sad Hour, selected from all years" is only an 
instance of time, although inextricable from the history and "eternity" it 
helps to record, just as Keats's mortal demise is immortalised in the 
fictional figure of Adonais. Historical recognition is crucial to the 
survival of a deceased poet's reputation. Adonais's "fate and fame" can 
only be assured if the temporal dynamic of the "Past", the present "sad 
Hour", and the "Future" continues to perpetuate itself and his name. 
Invocation of the "sad Hour" appears to create an impression of 
activity and assert a faith in this historical process when, in fact, 
Shelley's words as elegist cause no effect and recognise their own 
futility. 14 Shelley's rewriting of the historical event of Keats's death 
into mythology suggests his own reservations about history securing a dead 
poet immortality. Yet Shelley's concept of eternity is dependent upon its 
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opposition to, or overcoming of, a temporal and historical dynamic, The 
speaker's prosaic, and seemingly incontrovertible, claim that "I weep for 
Adonais--he is dead! " is set against a plea for others to mourn, even 
"though our tears / Thaw not the frost which binds so dear a head! ". 
Mourning will not revive the perished youth. Incapable of grieving, Adonais 
defers Shelley's own mourning by projecting his grief into the 
personification of the attending "sad Hour" and its "obscure compeers", who 
will "mourn our loss" and speak for him the words "'L wl i th me / Died 
Adonais"". '' The immediacy for others to mourn is counterbalanced by 
Shelleys distant withdrawal from the process of mourning. Shelley as 
Adonais°s elegist is aware of how pointless it is to mourn and yet from 
this sceptical position, confronted by the final silence of death, he must 
test language's elasticity to secure Adonais's place "among the sons of 
light" (36). Shelley's silent call for weeping is answered only by a series 
of self-generated rhetorical questions to ensure narrative momentum: 
Where wert thou, mighty Mother, when he lay, 
When thy son lay, pierced by the shait which flies 
In darkness? where was lorn Urania 
When Adonais died? (10-13) 
Shelley revises the myth of Adonis, mortally wounded by a boar, to 
portray Adonais's death as a slaughter of an innocent youth, who is 
incapable of surviving an injury from a single "shaft which flies / In 
darkness". This cowardly "shaft" is synonymous with the Quarterly Review's 
"savage criticism" of EEnn ym which, according to Shelley's description, 
is a carelessly aimed "poisoned shaft [that] lights on a heart made callous 
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by many blows or one like Keats's composed of more penetrable stuff" 
(Preface, 431). Even before Adonais has begun, Shelley displaces the 
precise biographical circumstances of Keats's death with a scenario in 
which his deceased contemporary's "susceptible mind" becomes so agitated 
over a harsh review that he ruptures "a blood vessel" (Preface, 431), 1 
Keats, like Adonais his mythopoeic counterpart, is unable to survive being 
struck by a single "poisoned shaft". 
"[Tlhe closing scene of poor Keats's life" (Preface, 431) is twice 
removed from the reader by Shelley's mythologising of his own fictional 
version of events which, Shelley admits, "were not made known to me until 
the Elegy was ready for the press" (Preface, 431), Keats's actual death is 
actively forgotten in Shelley's memorial act of writing Adonals. In turn, 
Shelley's composition of an elegy defers his grief and his mythological 
figure of the "sad Hour" swerves away from those historical forces which 
determine "fate and fame". Shelley erases actual events surrounding Keats's 
illness and death to swerve away from history and time, so he can secure 
Keats's name through the figure of Adonais, along with his own, as "Cain 
echo and a light unto eternity". What is at stake in Adonais's "fate and 
fame" are the destinies of the poetic identities of Keats and Shelley. 
Keats's poetic identity must be absorbed into Shelleyan poetic language if 
Shelley's fiction-making is to revive his "mute voice" (27). 
Remoulding Keats's poetic character requires an emptying out of its 
original contents, so that it can be revitalised and absorbed into a 
poetics that favours Shelleyan identity and imagery. Such a poetic strategy 
means that Keats's identity must be remoulded through imagination's 
"plastic stress" (381) into "more penetrable stuff" than Shelley's own. 
Shelley's poetic character is superficially superior, outliving the 
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identities of Keats and Adonais, by virtue of this imaginative "plastic 
stress", because its flexibility is more suited to a world of harsh 
realities and criticism, This superiority is only made possible by a re- 
writing of mythology and an obscuring of biography, which is dependent upon 
a forgetting of the past. By implication, Keats displays inferiority 
through being unable to forget the Quarterly Review's "savage criticism", 
which caused him to perish. Adonais's appeal to time is viewed as hopeless 
by the elegiac speaker who, as Nietzsche writes, understands that "the past 
has to be forgotten if it is not to become the gravedigger of the present" 
(2h, 62). Shelley does not think Keats was an inferior poet but knows that, 
if he is to rescue Keats successfully from the oblivion of death, his own 
poetic words must, at least rhetorically, appear stronger and his 
imaginative powers greater than those of the poet he mourns. Adonais's 
absorption of Keatsian imagery is only feasible if Shelley is seen to 
possess the poetic high ground even when, in reality, he is straining under 
the weight of a literary heritage to which Keats will, shortly, be 
admitted. Consequently, Shelley sees Keats as unable to accommodate an 
unaccommodating world, because he cannot exercise imaginative "plastic 
stress", or what Nietzsche terms a "plastic power", as well as Shelley can: 
I mean by the plastic power the capacity to develop out of 
oneself" in one's own way [eigener J, to transform and 
incorporate into oneself what is past and foreign, to heal 
wounds, to replace what has been lost, to recreate broken 
moulds. There are people who possess so little of this power 
that they can perish from a single experience, from a single 
painful event. (U, 62) 
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In the elegy°s early movement, Keats and Adonais are fashioned by 
Shelley's fiction-making into those who are made of ". more penetrable stuff" 
and so "perish from a single experience", Shelley ensures that he and Keats 
are portrayed as possessing, to varying degrees, similar imaginative 
powers. Such inherent weakness in Keats's poetic identity is suggested by 
an early description of his "genius" as both "delicate and fragile" and a 
"young flower [which] was blighted in the bud" by the "cankerworms" of 
harsh reviews (Preface, 431). Sheiley reinforces this association between 
Keats's imaginative powers and the image of a fragile, pale and impotent 
flower in his description of Adonais's fate: 
But now, thy youngest, dearest one, has perished-- 
The nursling of thy widowhood, who grew, 
Like a pale flower by some sad maiden cherished, 
And fed with true-love tears, instead of dew... 
Thy extreme hope, the loveliest and the last, 
The bloom, whose petals nipped before they blew 
Died on the promise of the fruit, is waste; 
The broken lily lies--the storm is overpast. (46-9; 51-3) 
A Dionysian "storni" of suffering, pain and tragedy has overwhelmed 
Adonais's potential, which perishes "on the promise of the fruit", before 
its "petals" could be scattered on the breeze and so is turned to "waste". 
The "pale flower[s]" unspoilt innocence, nurtured by Urania as if "by some 
sad maiden cherished", cannot survive reality's darker forces and is 
reduced to a beautiful but powerless "broken lily". Adonais, like Keats's 
poetic character, is weaned upon the tender emotions of'"true-love tears" 
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and easily laid to "waste" after "a single painful event". Shelley's 
portrait of a Keats unable to endure suffering and tragedy draws upon the 
imagery of Isabella where, bereft of Lorenzo, Isabella waters a basil-pot 
containing her lover's head. Apparently, as Curran has observed, this 
Keatsian allusion enhances an atmosphere of sadness, melancholy and despair 
when, in actuality, Keatsian imagery is used to substitute Shelley's 
genuine mourning for the artistic pathos of Isabella's tragic 
circumstances. 17 Shelley reappropriates Isabella's plant motif, grafting a 
grieving Isabella onto the event of Adonais's death, so that her desperate 
figure, an imaginative product of Keats's own encounters with tragedy, 
pain, and suffering, is absorbed into his own mythology. It is these 
tempestuous darker forces, evoked and explored in Keats's self-conscious 
romance, which supposedly devastate his poetic identity and mythopoeic 
counterpart, Yet Shelley's echo of Isabella implies the exact opposite, 
rendering Keats and Adonais, as those "petals nipped before they blew", 
without a creative breeze to inspire, and proclaim, their poetic or heroic 
achievements. 
Shelley does not emphasise the tragic nature of Keats's poetic 
character, reducing the poet of Isabella to an image of a "broken lily" in 
a pastoral elegy and his petrifying Grecian Urn to "a lucid urn of starry 
dew" (91). In Adonais, Shelley attempts to translate Keats's Dionysian 
poetic identity back into a pastoral poet of the Apollonian mode, who is 
unable to bear reality's burden. Such a misreading of Keats's poetic 
character might seem to be another way of judging Keats inferior, when 
Shelley's design hinges upon establishing an equality and affinity between 
their poetic reputations. Shelley's revival of the literary tradition of 
pastoral elegy casts him in the role of Spenser lamenting Sidney and, 
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consequently, he must remould Keats's identity into a pastoral poet, who 
shepherds his "passion-winged Ministers of Thought" like they "were his 
flocks" (74-75). If Shelley's "extreme hope" of apotheosis is to be found 
in Keats's demise their identities must be made to mirror one another, so 
that the living and deceased poet are found to be alike: 
Most musical of mourners, weep again! 
Lament anew, Urania! --He died, 
Who was the Sire of an immortal strain, 
Blind, old, and lonely, when his country's pride, 
The priest, the slave, and the liberticide, 
Trampled and mocked with many a loathed rite 
Of lust and blood; he went, unterrified, 
Into the gulf of death; but his clear Sprite 
Yet reigns o'er earth; the third among the sons of light. (28-36) 
In spite of an awareness of the futility of mourning Shelley as eiegist 
persists in his plea to Urania to mourn, not simply Adonais's passing, but 
others who have gone before him "unterrified / Into the gulf of death". The 
"[ m3 ost musical of mourners" must "[l]ament anew" to acknowledge the 
worthiness of the "clear Sprite" to take his place "among the sons of 
light", if Adonais is to be recognised as a legitimate claimant to being 
one of the "immortal strain". The three "sons of light" represent a 
mythologised version of a literary pantheon consisting of Homer, Dante and 
Xilton. Adonais's potential apotheosis depends upon Urania's recognition of 
his right to become one of the "immortal strain" and finds its counterpart 
in Shelley's claim, on behalf of Keats, that he should be immortalised in 
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the literary canon. Adonais must be deified when Urania, his mother, 
acknowledges his claim of lineage and Keats, who looks towards her as the 
muse of Paradise Lost, must be admitted to the canon when he is recognised 
as a poetic disciple of a "[b]lind, old, and lonely" Milton (31). 
Shelley's own future apotheosis is more secure if Keats's poetic 
character, on the verge of deification and canonical acceptance, resembles 
Shelley's own poetic strengths and weaknesses. Adonais's elegiac speaker 
wants Urania to admit Adonais and Keats to the "immortal strain", so that 
Shelley can follow after, just as Keats's Thea needs Saturn to recognise 
his divinity for her own sake. " On one hand, Shelley is determined to 
place Adonais with immortal deities and Keats among the literary Titans of 
Homer, Dante and Milton and, on the other, he must defer their moment of 
apotheosis to stress the similarity between them and his self-styled role 
as an aspirant Apollo. Consequently, Shelley is eager to align himself and 
Keats with "Hyperion"'s Apollo, who seeks deification as a poet and god to 
rival these Titans. Keats's poetic character is remoulded into a poet of 
Flora and Pan, throwing into relief Shelley's apparently stronger poetic 
identity. Adonais's calculated forgetting of history and biography, 
paradoxically, initiates a process of transformation and provides an 
anchorage for Shelley's poetic identity amidst a flood of becoming. 
Forgoing historical and biographical circumstance is the means by which 
Shelley struggles to deify Keats in the present and preserve his own 
identity in the future. As Nietzsche writes "a man who did not possess the 
power of forgetting... would no longer believe in his own being, would see 
everything flowing asunder in moving points and would lose himself in this 
stream of becoming" (VA, 62). 
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The "quick Dreams" (73) which gather to mourn Adonais's death enact the 
elegy°s impulse towards forgetfulness: one of them "with trembling hands" 
fades "like a cloud which had outwept its rain" (82; 90) and "C a] pother 
Splendour" is aligned with aa "dying meteor [that] stains a wreath / Of 
moonlight vapour, which the cold night, clips" (100; 106-7). These mourners 
in the act of remembering Adonais forget themselves to the extent that his 
unfulfilled potential becomes symbolically their own, as one of them 
"clipped her profuse locks" (93) and "[ a7 nother in her wilful grief would 
break / Her bow and winged reeds" (97). Both actions echo Adonais's image 
of a "broken lily" and recall his untimely demise. Even "the moving pomp", 
comprised of "Desires", "Adorations", "Persuasions", "Destinies", 
"Splendours", "Glooms" , "Incarnations", "Phantasies" and "Sorrow, with her 
family of Sighs" (116; 109-13), appear as a spectral "pageantry of mist on 
an autumnal stream" following "Pleasure [with] her own dying smile" (115- 
6). Both the "quick Dreams" and "slow pomp" (116) are on the verge of their 
own "eclipse" (108) or fading. As they forget themselves in remembering 
Adonais they are themselves forgotten without "the living streams 1' Of his 
young spirit" to feed upon (75-6). Shelley's images of fading and 
incompleteness anticipate the introduction of a grief-stricken Echo, who 
forgets her own identity through mourning for Adonais: 
Lost Echo sits amid the voiceless mountains, 
And feeds her grief with his remembered lay, 
And will no more reply to winds or fountains, 
Or amorous birds perched on the young green spray, 
Or herdsman's horn, or bell at closing day; 
Since she can mimic not his lips, more dear 
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Than those for whose disdain she pined away 
Into a shadow of all sounds; --a drear 
Murmur, between their songs, is all the woodmen hear. (127-35> 
"Lost" in the silence of her sadness Echo renders the mountains 
"voiceless" and feeds "her grief with his remembered lay", forgetting her 
own name and no longer echoing back the noise of "winds or fountains", or 
"amorous birds", or "herdsman's horn, or bell". Mourning Adonais's death 
fuels Echo's previous grief over her unrequited love for Narcissus, 
reducing her to a silence beyond the "shadow of all sounds". Her 
"voiceless" grief is a reminder of how Narcissus's self-obsession caused 
Echo to pine away into a "drear / Murmur" and, given that she cannot mimic 
Adonais's "lips", an indication of the extent to which she is affected by 
his loss. Echo "will no more reply" to her surroundings, because she 
forgets her own shadowy existence in remembering Adonais. Like Echo, Spring 
is so overcome with grief she casts off her identity and the duties she 
should perform; 
Grief made the young Spring wild, and she threw down 
Her kindling buds, as if she Autumn were, 
Or they dead leaves; since her delight is flown, 
For whom should she have waked the sullen year? 
To Phoebus was not Hyacinth so dear 
Nor to himself Narcissus, as to both 
Thou, Adonafs: wan they stand and sere 
Amid the faint companions of their youth, 
With dew all turned to tears; odour, to sighing ruth. (136-44) 
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Without Adonais's living presence Spring can find no reason for giving 
life to the "sullen year" and so throws "down / Her kindling buds, as if 
she Autumn were". The youthful exuberance and vitality of Spring take on 
the appearance of an autumnal demise of "dead leaves", intimating that what 
might seem to be life is actually death and decay. This idea is played out 
in this episode, where Apollo's immortalising transformation of 
Hyacinthus's corpse into a hyacinth is set against Apollo's responsibility 
for the youth's death. Apollo's love for Hyacinthus leads to his untimely 
demise, as Narcissus's love for "himself" causes Echo to fade away. Neither 
Hyacinthus nor Narcissus's own reflection was as "dear" to Apollo and 
Narcissus as Adonais, whose death leaves them to "stand and sere / Amid the 
faint companions of their youth". 
It is the "sighing ruth" of these "faint companions" which Shelley 
compares with "the lorn nightingale", who "Im)ourns not her mate with such 
melodious pain" (145-6), making an association between their pity and 
Keats's presentation of Ruth "in tears amid the alien corn" ("Ode to a 
Nightingale", 67). Yet at the moment Shelley seems to have fully absorbed 
Keats's poetic diction, his allusions to the myth of Hyacinthus and 
Narcissus expose Adonais's strategy of forgetting circumstance and identity 
to transform Keats into Adonais and ensure his deification into a 
mythological and literary pantheon. The introduction of' Narcissus in the 
company of Apollo points toward such poetic machinations on Shelley's part. 
To pair the self-obsessed Narcissus with Apollo, the god of poetry, is to 
align self-deception and poetic fiction-making. "I Shelley and the reader 
are poignantly reminded, even in the moment of forgetting, that Adonais is 
fashioned more in his own image than Keats' s and that Adonai s' s fate will 
mirror his own. Adonais's departure from the mortal world may momentarily 
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alter the appearance of the seasons according to Shelley as elegist, but it 
does not have any long-term effect upon the cycle of material nature: 
Ah woe is me! Winter is come and gone, 
But grief returns with the revolving year; 
The airs and streams renew their joyous tone; 
The ants, the bees, the swallows reappear; 
Fresh leaves and flowers deck the dead Season's bier.., (154-8) 
In spite of nature's ephemerality it can survive a wintry death and 
attain a new lease of life, in which "the airs and streams renew their 
joyous tone" and "the ants, the bees, the swallows reappear" with Spring's 
arrival as part of the seasons' perpetual cycle. In contrast to those who 
mourn Adonais, this cyclical renewal serves only as a reminder that "grief 
returns with the revolving year". This "quickening life from the Earth's 
heart", which invigorates the world of "change and nnotion°" (164-5) with a 
"renewed might" (171), cannot revive Adonais's "leprous corpse" (172), but 
only with exhaled flowers "illumine death and mock the merry worm that 
wakes beneath" (175-6). The animating "spirit['s]" (172) failure to 
resuscitate Adonais's material and decaying body prompts a question 
concerning the destiny of his intangible spirit, or mind, which oscillates 
between hope and despair: 2° 
Nought we know, dies. Shall that alone which knows 
Be as a sword consumed before the sheath 
By sightless lightning? --the intense atom glows 
A moment, then is quenched in a most cold repose. (177-80) 
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At first, Shelley's speculation as elegist suggests that mental 
knowledge might outlive the physical body, but this positive assertion is 
countered by his own question. Although the invisible mind or spirit of an 
individual which "knows" does not rely upon the physical body for 
existence, it may be "consumed. .. [b]y sightless lightning" before the event 
of the body's death. An individual's animating mind or spirit, represented 
by the "sword", is withdrawn prior to, and as a trigger for, the demise of 
the material body, which acts as its protective "sheath". A person's mental 
and spiritual life is like a transient and glowing "intense atom", which is 
extinguished at the moment of death by "a most cold repose", This 
epistemological speculation does not instantly secure Adonais's salvation, 
but it does mark a significant turning point within Shelley's elegy. y' ' 
These speculative claims separate an invisible realm of knowing from the 
apparent cycle of material nature and, ambiguously, portray death as both 
quenching life and satiating "life's sacred thirst" (169). Yet Shelley as 
elegist dwells on the negative inplications of his assertions to 
contemplate a temporal world of "change and motion" where even grief 
perishes: 
Alas! that all we loved of him should be, 
But for our grief, as if it had not been, 
And grief itself be mortal! Woe is me! 
Whence are we, and why are we? of what scene 
The actors or spectators? Great and mean 
Meet massed in death, who lends what life must borrow. 
As long as skies are blue, and fields are green, 
Evening must usher night, night urge the morrow, 
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Month follow month with woe, and year wake year to sorrow. (181-9) 
Even the grief of those who "have loved... him" is transient and will 
soon be forgotten with the passage of time, because the memory of Adonais 
is only preserved in the present by those mortals who continue to mourn his 
loss. This realisation that "grief" is "mortal" produces a series of 
questions, which struggle to preserve life and language as meaningful in 
the face of death. Uncertainties about life's origin, purpose, and a 
confusion over who observes and what is observed, indicate death as an 
origin that lends "what life must borrow". Death gives significance and 
impetus to existence, because life derives its meaning from being defined 
against, and opposed to, its extinction. Although the stanza's existential 
questions can only be posed in the world of "change and motion", their 
answers rest with death and are inaccessible to the living. 112 
Such momentary uncertainty and confusion produce an affirmation of 
remembered grief and a perpetual cycle of nature. The rhetorical assertion 
of an empirically verifiable universe, where "skies are blue" and "fields 
are green", leads to a temporal continuity that "teivening must usher 
night" and "night urge the morrow". But the allusion to azure skies recalls 
an earlier image of Adonais's "fitting charnel-roof" made from "the vault 
of blue Italian day" (59-60), reinforcing the idea that what is mistakenly 
assumed to be life is actually death. Shelley as elegist, like the mourning 
Echo and "quick Dreams", seeks a refuge in forgetfulness to elide 
historical circumstance and to value death higher than life, for it is in 
dying that Adonais "takes his fill / Of deep and liquid rest, forgetful of 
all ill" (62-3). This state of forgetfulness establishes a further link 
between a living Shelley as elegist and a deceased Keats as Adonais. 
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Nietzsche understands this human desire to forget, so that "every moment 
really dies, sinks back into night and fog and is extinguished for ever" 
(J(, 61), and the importance of remembering, if life is not to be a 
"blissful blindness between the hedges of the past and future": 
If death at last brings the desired forgetting, by that act it 
at the same time extinguishes the present and all being and 
therewith sets the seal on the knowledge that being is only an 
uninterrupted has-been, a thing that lives by negating, consum- 
ing and contradicting itself. (VA, 61) 
So a fiction of forgetfulness is a vital reminder of what is supposed 
to have been forgotten, because without remembering the contradictions of 
existence will go unnoticed. In Adonais, Shelley exposes and exploits these 
contradictions, deftly ensuring that forgetfulness is a way of remembering, 
that eternity is comprised of the "sad Hour[ 's)" temporality, that life 
leases meaning from death, and that being awake is dependent upon sleeping: 
He_ will awake no more, oh, never more! 
"Wake thou, " cried Misery, "childless Mother, rise 
Out of thy sleep, and slake, in thy heart's core, 
A wound more fierce than his with tears and sighs. " 
And all the Dreams that watched Urania's eyes, 
And all the Echoes whom their sister's song 
Had held in holy silence, cried: "Arise! " 
Swift as a Thought by the snake Memory stung, 
From her ambrosial rest the fading Splendour sprung. (190-8) 
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Echo's recitation of Adonais's "remembered lay" had caused her to 
forget herself and the other Echoes to abandon their observance of a vigil 
of "holy silence". The silence is broken by Misery's cry for Urania to 
"rise / [o]ut of thy sleep" and a rejoinder from the Echoes (which wake 
from the trance of "their sister's song" and watchful Dreams> of 
Urania waking from "her ambrosial rest" places an ambiguous 
emphasis on a mutual dependency between states of waking and sleeping which 
might, potentially, rescue Adonais from his "deep and liquid rest", or 
reinforce his inability to awake frone the sleep of death. By implication 
what provokes Urania to rise and become a "fading Splendour" is the act of 
forgetting which, eventually, becomes a reminder of the necessity of 
remembering and so she ascends "Cslwift as a Thought by the snake Memory 
stung" (197): 
She rose like an autumnal Night, that springs 
Out of the East, and follows wild and drear 
The golden Day, which, on eternal wings, 
Even as a ghost abandoning a bier, 
Had left the Earth a corpse. Sorrow and fear 
So struck, so roused, so rapt Urania; 
So saddened round her like an atmosphere 
Of stormy mist... (199-207) 
Urania`s journey is depicted as "autui al Night" pursuing "Ctihe golden 
Day", which flees on "eternal wings" and, like a "ghost abandoning a bier", 
leaves the living Earth for "a corpse". This nocturnal imagery, by 
associating "Night" with autumn and Urania, revises the transience present 
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in Adonais' s earlier image of "[ e7 vening must usher night, night urge the 
morrow. " In stanza twenty-one, the endless round of day following night 
produced only another "month with woe" and a year to "wake year to sorrow" 
which, at best, can only lead to the tragic rememberance of Adonais's 
departure from the mortal world. The extended simile which describes 
Urania's flight, at first glance, seems to endorse a concept of 
temporality, comprised of sorrowful nights, days, months and years when, in 
fact, the "golden Day['s]" escape on "eternal wings" establishes a link 
between time measured by mortals and eternity. The "golden Day" and "sad 
Hour" have their part to play in the eternal and eternity has a part to 
play in them. This description enforces, literally, a previous speculation 
about life's derivation of meaning from death, through rendering "the Earth 
a corpse" and anticipating the "stormy visions" of existence (345). 
Autumn's connotations of a wintry death and a promise of renewed life in 
spring are pertinent to Urania's association with a "wild and drear" 
autumnal night, which signifies her coalescence of Adonais's symbolic 
states of waking and sleeping (even in her ascent she is both "roused" and 
"rapt"), life and death, and temporality and eternity: 
"Now thou art dead, as if it were a part 
Of thee, my Adonais! I would give 
All that I an to be as thou now art! 
But I am chained to Time, and cannot thence depart! " (231-4) 
Urania's address at "the mournful place where Adonais lay" (207), 
expresses her own grief for Adonais's death which, as both his mother and 
Muse to the mortal poets, has left her with a "heartless breast and burning 
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brain" (228). Urania's paternal aspect understands the death of her son in 
terms of losing a "part", or extension of herself, a loss that motivates 
her desire to cease being and become "as thou art", Such a desire wishes to 
be at one with Adonais, who is "forgetful of all ill", and to abandon a 
painful existence which only "lives", in Nietzsche's words, "by negating, 
consuming and contradicting itself" (92,61). Unlike Adonais, Urania 
"cannot thence depart" from the "stormy visions" of existence, because she 
is "chained to Time" through her role as inspirational Muse to the living 
poets, Paradoxically, Urania is both a divine muse (who must recognise 
Keats as one of an "immortal strain") and a grieving mother for a "gentle 
child": 
"Defenceless as thou wert, oh where was then 
Wisdom the mirrored shield, or scorn the spear? 
Or hadst thou waited the full cycle, when 
Thy spirit should have filled its crescent sphere... " (239-42) 
Adonais's daring of "the unpastured dragon in his den" (238) was 
premature, because his mental and spiritual faculties were not sufficiently 
developed for such a venture, for he neither wielded Perseus's "[w]isdom 
the mirrored shield" nor "scorn the spear". Adonais acts before these 
faculties have made their "full cycle" and so perishes without fulfilling 
the promise of his destiny, waning like a moon that had not "filled its 
crescent sphere". Adonais's undeveloped spirit is connected with the 
celestial body of the moon, suggesting, on one hand, that it has been 
eclipsed by the darkness of death and, on the other, connecting it with the 
endless cycle of night and day, which has a part to play in eternity, This 
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link is strengthened through Urania's analogy between existence, when 
Adonais lived, and the rising and setting sun: 
"So is it in the world of living men: 
A godlike mind soars forth, in its delight 
Making earth bare and veiling heaven, and when 
It sinks, the swarms that dimmed or shared its light 
Leave to its kindred lamps the spirit's awful night. " (257-61) 
The brilliance of Adonais's "godlike mind" laid the "earth bare" with its 
light and outshone the stars, "veiling heaven" from sight. But once 
Adonais's creative mind is extinguished, all those minds of lesser 
brightness that had "dimmed or shared its light" are left to the "awful 
night" caused by its extinction. 
Urania's flight and address reappropriate the temporal cycles of 
material nature, as represented by night's continual ushering of day, to an 
eternal realm of a "godlike" conception of time, where day departs on 
"eternal wings" and the incorporeal spirit could live forever. Shelley as 
elegiac speaker is forced to face, even as he deliberately seeks to forget, 
the fictionality behind his myth of material nature's cyclical renewal, 
when his personification of spring can only "illumine death" and not 
revive Adonais, 2 Shelley as elegist is replaced by the figure of Urania 
who, through her actions and subsequent speech, fashions material nature's 
indifferent cycles into a symbolic logic of its own, which permits a vital 
reversal of polarities. Urania's ambivalent status, as an immortal Muse for 
mortal poets, initiates this revision of imagery and polarities in Adonais, 
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Moreover, Urania's recognition of Adonais implies that Keats may have a 
legitimate claim to a place among the literary pantheon, 
This is emphasised by the arrival, after Urania has "ceased" speaking 
(262), of the poets Byron and Thomas Moore, in the pastoral guise of 
"mountain shepherds" with their "magic mantle rent" (262-6; 267-70). It is 
"Imlidst others of less note" (271) that Shelley humbly enters into his own 
elegy, as one of Adonais's mourners: 
., [ Cl ame one i rai 1 Form, 
A phantom among men; companionless 
As the last cloud of an expiring storm 
Whose thunder is its knell; he, as I guess, 
Had gazed on Nature's naked loveliness, 
Actaeon-like, and now had fled astray 
With feeble steps o'er the world's wilderness, 
And his own thoughts, along the rugged way, 
Pursued, like raging hounds, their father and their prey. (271-9) 
Recalling those "passion-winged Ministers of thought", the poet's 
"frail Form" wavers on the verge of extinction, drifting in solitude as "a 
phantom among men" and "the last cloud of an expiring storm". The poet- 
figure's doomed existence is not only implied by the image of the last 
fading storm-cloud, "[w]hose thunder is its knell", but through his 
association with Actaeon, This "frail Form", echoing the ill-fated youth of 
Alastor, has once caught a glimpse of "Nature's naked loveliness" and now 
searches "o'er the world's wilderness" with "feeble steps" in the vain hope 
of gazing upon such beauty again. Actaeon's fate, which having stumbled 
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upon a naked Diana is to be torn apart by his own "raging hounds", 
illustrates the perils of looking upon beauty's quintessence. 
Tragically, death is the ultimate price to be extracted for seeking out 
"Nature's naked loveliness". It is not "raging hounds" that threaten to 
savage the poet-figure, but "his own thoughts" which pursue, torment, 
and hound him towards his premature death. Although the "frail Form" is 
associated metaphorically with Actaeon, who is torn to pieces, his 
appearance suggests that he is a votary, or representative, of Dionysus: 
His head was bound with pansies overblown, 
And faded violets, white, and pied, and blue; 
And a light spear topped with a cypress cone, 
Round whose rude shaft dark ivy tresses grew 
Yet dripping with the forest's noonday dew, 
Vibrated, as the ever-beating heart 
Shook the weak hand that grasped it; of that crew 
He came the last, neglected and apart; 
A herd abandoned deer struck by the hunter's dart. (289-97) 
Shelley's newly cast role of tragic poet and mourner in Adonais 
bears the Dionysian symbol of a thyrsus--or "light spear topped with 
cypress cone"--and is associated by his "pardlike Spirit" (280) with the 
leopards which drew Dionysus's chariot. Such symbolism coupled with 
Shelley's earlier allusion to Actaeon's fate, which also suggests a 
ritual mutilation of the body, confirms the figure as at least a 
devotee of Dionysus- Shelley's description of this isolated and 
"neglected" Dionysian figure, who grasps his "rude shaft" with a "weak 
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hand" and is likened to an "abandoned deer struck by the hunter's 
dart", recalls two versions of Adonais's fatal encounter. This image of 
a wounded deer alludes to Shelley's first account in which Adonais is 
"pierced by the shaft" (ii) and his "weak hand" echoes the second, 
narrated by Urania, who tells of Adonais's "weak hands" which dared "the 
unpastured Dragon in his den" (236-7). 2 Shelley's Dionysian mourner 
half symbolises a poet's solitary, vulnerable, existence and half points 
to a potential strength: 
A pardlike Spirit beautiful and swift-- 
A Love in desolation masked; --a Power 
Girt round with weakness; --it can scarce uplift 
The weight of the superincumbent hour; 
It is a dying lamp, a falling shower, 
A breaking billow; --even whilst we speak 
Is it not broken? (280-6) 
Since the creative "storm is overpast" for Adonais, or more 
significantly Keats, the "broken lily" of his creations must be judged 
by others. 21-5 Equally, Shelley's own powers of poetic ingenuity are 
tested to breaking point under the strain of "the superincumbent hour" 
of Keats's death. The "weight" of this tragedy is only bearable if 
Shelley's imagination can translate historical circumstance into a 
revised mythology. The tragic poet-figure, like others who have poetic 
sensibilities, is a spent force in the creative moment of exercising his 
imaginative power. He is a momentary radiance from a "dying lamp", 
shining at the expense of its own extinction, or a rejuvenating "falling 
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shower" that exhausts itself to nourish life. This mourning poet-figure 
extends beyond a mere image of a poetic type, like that represented in 
Glastor, to symbolise the aesthetic process itself. The poet's "Power" 
circumscribes his self-destructive nature and enacts the imaginative 
process that creates poetry from language. Both a poet's fragile nature 
and its delicate poetical creations, like "[a] breaking billow", beg the 
question: "even whilst we speak / Is it not broken? ". Poetry is a 
"broken" sign left for future readers to utter, or interpret, long after 
the mind from which it came has been exhausted. Shelley's Dionysian 
figure depicts what a blessing and curse it is to exercise such an 
imaginative "Power / Girt round with weakness": 
He answered not, but with a sudden hand 
Made bare his branded and ensanguined brow, 
Which was like Cain's or Christ's... (304-6) 
The tragic figure's arrival appears hopeful; his outward weakness, 
reminiscient of the elegy's earlier presentation of a defenceless 
Adonais and Keats, is a sign of an inner power. Yet there is no 
certainty that having such inner strength guarantees salvation fron 
oblivion for Adonais or Keats. Shelley' s poet-figure is a bearer of an 
ambivalent brand which suggests damnation and salvation, curse and 
blessing, murder and sacrifice, Shelley's allusion to the sign Cain bore 
after killing Abel exacerbates these ambivalences, as it was both a 
symbol of' his crime and a protective talisman that kept him from harm 
during his wanderings as an outcast . 2-7 This Dionysian "frail form" 
embodies a poet's ambiguous status and imagination's creative and 
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destructive potential without passing a decisive judgement on the future 
of Adonais or Keats. 
Shelley's poet-figure, like Adonais and Keats, must prove himself to 
be worthy of belonging to a poetic lineage endorsed by Urania, He only 
reveals his "ensanguined brow" in response to Urania's question, "who 
art thou? ", so that his "[sltranger's mein" can be recognised by her 
(303). The enigmatic poet-figure must, like all aspiring poets, have his 
"accents of an unknown land" (301) acknowledged if he is to gain 
acceptance into "Fame's serene abode" (45), Shelley's adoption of a 
Dionysian guise dramatises in symbolic action the historic process 
whereby literary canons are established to which new poets seek 
admittance through recognition. Once historical process is translated 
into a series of constantly revised symbols, which reverse polarities 
and exploit ambivalences, Adonais and Keats can be preserved from total 
oblivion: 
He wakes or sleeps with the enduring dead; 
Thou canst not soar where he is sitting now. -- 
Dust to the Dust! but the pure spirit shall flow 
Back to the burning fountain whence it came, 
A portion of the Eternal, which must glow 
Through time and change.,. (336-41) 
Within Shelley's invented mythology, Keats and Adonais attain an 
uncertain mode of being "with the enduring dead", caught between 
transience and eternity, life and death, and waking and sleeping. "Time 
and change" reduce their physical bodies to dust, but it is their 
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temporal destruction which allows "the pure spirit [to] flow / Back" to 
a "portion" of eternity. "[T]he Eternal" saturates the material world of 
"time and change" with its overspilling and radiant "burning fountain" 
to which the "pure spirit" of Adonais and Keats return after their 
physicai deaths, Spirit and matter, eternity and transience, 
interpenetrate one another, Adonais survives physical death through 
asserting a posthumous influence as a part of "the one Spirit's plastic 
stress [that] / Sweeps through the dull dense world" (381-2). Equally, 
immortality for Keats and Shelley depends upon the posthumous survival 
of their works to assert an imaginative influence on the world. ý8 Such 
imaginative influence can only be conjectured about from Shelley's 
historical vantage-point and finds its symbolic counterpart in Adonais's 
speculative assertions about an unproven metaphysical absolute. This 
type of fiction is necessary if the uncertain terrain beyond the "shadow 
of our night" (352) is to be charted with Shelley's poetic language. The 
central claim that Adonais "hath awakened from the dream of life" (344) 
is dependent upon a rhetorical confidence in an "Eternal" absolute and 
the elegy's previous revisions of the relationship between waking and 
dreaming, living and dying: 
'Tis we, who lost in stormy visions, keep 
With phantoms an unprofitable strife, 
And in mad trance, strike with our spirit's knife 
Invulnerable nothings. --Y& decay 
Like corpses in a charnel; fear and grief 
Convulse us and consume us day by day, 
And cold hopes swarm like worms within our living clay. (345-51) 
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Life is utterly detestable and futile, populated only by frenzied 
"phantoms" who are "lost in stormy visions" of at nightmarish existence. 
The emphatic "1 decay" incoporates everyone in the final, terrifying, 
throes of death which "[c]onvulse us and consume us day by day". Human 
existence has been mistaken for actual living when, in fact, it is a 
plague of "fear and grief" which aided by our "cold hopes" devours "our 
living clay". By contrast, Adonais is secure "from the contagion of the 
world's slow stain" and no longer need "mourn /A heart grown cold, a 
head grown gray in vain" (356-8). The familiar temporal world of 
historical circumstance and change is devoid of significance and 
vitality, rendered as "that unrest which men miscall delight" (354), to 
permit Adonais's safe refuge in a transhistorical haven of the "Eternal" 
without "[e]nvy and calumny and hate and pain" (353). 
In a moment of rhetorical exuberance, Shelley ignores how crucial 
temporality is to his notion of eternity and history's role in 
establishing a posthumous influence for a poet. Ironically, Shelley's 
success in saving Adonais from death's oblivion relies upon his own 
insistence that waking and dreaming, living and dying, time and eternity 
are interpenetrable. There are no life-affirming signs in this 
description of human existence, as if Shelley has surrendered his faith 
entirely to an absolute and metaphysical reality. Any scepticism here is 
apparently concerned with life and not metaphysical systems, which 
Shelley had previously called into question in "Hymn to Intellectual 
Beauty" and "Mont Blanc". The "dull dense world" is entirely dependent 
upon the metaphysical realm and Adonais, as "a portion of the 
loveliness", must compel the material world with "its beauty and its 
might" (379; 386): 
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He is made one with Nature: there is heard 
His voice in all her music from the moan 
Of thunder, to the song of night's sweet bird; 
He is a presence to be felt and known 
In darkness and in light, from herb and stone, 
Spreading itself where'er that Power may move 
Which has withdrawn his being to its own... (370-6) 
lt would appear that Shelley's decision to represent his conjectures 
about a deceased poet's literary influence in the guise of metaphysical 
speculations about an afterlife has led him into his own rhetorical 
trap. Shelley is compelled, thLrough his own symbolic logic, to deny life 
in favour of a transcendental haven for Adonais to ensure that aspirant 
poets, like Keats and himself, have a potential influence upon the world 
after their deaths. Paradoxically, a poet's only hope for a continued 
influence is to entrust his imaginative legacy to the inhabitants of a 
worthless and denigrated world, from which he should be relieved to have 
escaped. Shelley's account of Adonais's union with "Nature" emphasises 
his dilemma and appears to endorse a universe animated by a 
transcendental "Power" over which the poet has no control. 2-9 Yet 
Adonais's idealised communion with the universe restores a balance 
between the spiritual and material, as "Chle is made one with Nature" 
through his absorption into a "Power", which with "never wearied love" 
nourishes the physical world (377-8). This transcendental "Power" is not 
entirely alienating or alienated from a -natural, transient, world. 
Although Adonais's character is obliterated in the "Power", he can, as a 
"portion of the Loveliness", mould the "unwilling dross" to "its own 
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likeness" (384-5). Adonais's influence upon Nature, with its tyrannical 
"torturing" of unbending material, echoes more strongly Wordsworthian 
poetic encounters with Nature than that of a Keatsian Negative Capable 
poet.: ý" Nonetheless, Shelley's allusion to "the song of night's sweet 
bird" is a reminder of Keats's own self-conscious poetic song about a 
nightingale and of his own self-conscious lament, in the form of 
Adonai, E, for "Ode to a Nightingale"'s deceased author. Metaphysical 
speculation about Adonais's spiritual union with the "Power" turns out 
to contain a more literary concern about a dead poet's literary legacy, 
which it is hoped will remain as a posthumous "presence to be felt and 
known". This potent Adonais, who energes in the second movenent of 
Shelley's elegy, is to act as a beacon to subsequent generations, 
exerting an influence analogous to a dead author's works once they have 
been accepted into the firmament of literary tradition: 
The splendours of the firmament of time 
May be eclipsed, but are extinguished not; 
Like stars to their appointed height they climb, 
And death is a low mist which cannot blot 
The brightness it may veil. When lofty thought 
Lifts a young heart above its mortal lair, 
And love and life contend in it, for what 
Shall be its earthly doom, the dead live there 
And move like winds of light on dark and stormy air. (388-96) 
Momentarily, those poets who shone in "the firmament of time", are 
"eclipsed" from view as they are enshrouded by death's "low mist". Their 
229 
brilliance is not permamently "extinguished" and, passing beyond death, 
these poets ascend "Illike stars to their appointed height". Death may 
obscure a deceased poet's "brightness", but its diaphanous "veii" is not 
substantial enough to "blot" out such heavenly bodies, When these 
writers' "names on Earth are dark", like the "many more", their 
"transmitted effluence cannot die / So long as fire outlives the 
parent spark" (406-6). These past greater writers and thinkers leave 
their legacies behind, so those of "young heart" touched by "IwAy 
thought" can chart their own course, through those who "move like winds 
of light on dark and stormy air", to beyond their "mortal lair". 
Authors' reputations rely upon their literary works being read, 
interpreted, and re-interpreted by new and successive generations of 
readers. ' 
To plot such a course is to discover the "thrones" of those 
"inheritors of unfulfilled renown", which are "built beyond mortal 
thought" (397-8). Shelley names Chatterton, Sidney and Lucan as 
"inheritors of unfulfilled renown" suggesting, ambivalently, that their 
youthful demises both denied them earthly fame and an opportunity to 
fulfil their literary potential. These allusions are particularly apt to 
circumstances surrounding Keats's untimely death and Shelley's view that 
"Hyperion" was proof of his contemporary's tremendous poetical potential 
which, tragically, was never to be fulfilled, Although Adonais's 
strength of intellect, or spirit, was not fully exercised in life, its 
. mighty legacy triumphs, burning through death's "veil" to a "kingless 
sphere" prepared for him (412-3) to become the "Vesper" (414) amongst 
those "inheritors of unfulfilled renown". 
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Counterpointed against Adonais's triumphant ascent, on the verge of 
apotheosis, is an imagined return to the Protestant Cemetery in Rome, 
where Keats, and Shelley's son, William, were both buried, Shelley's 
poignant description permits a personal note of grief to enter his 
elegy, which is intended to act as a spur for the living to pursue 
Adonais beyond "life's decay" (431): 
[TIhese graves are all too young as yet 
To have outgrown the sorrow which consigned 
Its charge to each; and if the seal is set, 
Here, on one fountain of a mourning mind, 
Break it not thou! too surely shalt thou find 
Thine own well full, if thou returnest home, 
Of tears and gall. From the world's bitter wind 
Seek shelter in the shadow of the tomb. 
What Adonais is, why fear we to become? (451-9) 
Shelley must, if he seeks out Adonais, pass beyond the deaths of his 
literary ancestors and contemporaries, or even the painful loss of his 
own child, to a direct confrontation with his own death. Death, 
represented by "the shadow of the tomb", offers a comforting haven 
"IfIrom the world's bitter wind" of pain, suffering and sorrow. 
Shelley's efforts to recover Adonais from oblivion have led to the 
construction of a poetic logic which, inescapably, arientates his own 
being towards death, The question, "What Adonais is, why fear we to 
become? " , both urges us to orientate ourselves towards our own deaths 
and suggests that we might have good cause to linger before charting the 
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unknown territory of' our own extinction, Yet to entertain doubt is to be 
aligned with the "Iflond wretch" (416), who is incapable of exercising 
imaginative power to cast his "spirit's light / Beyond all worlds" (418- 
9). 
Adonais's rhetorical strategy forces Shelley as elegaic speaker and 
its audience into choosing between an active confrontation with their 
own destruction or a life in which they "decay / Like corpses in a 
charnel". Over a death comprised of rotting in the "charnel" of life, 
Adonais recommends an active confrontation with death's oblivion which, 
in the words of Nietzsche's Zarathustra, is a consummating and 
"voluntary death that comes to me because L wish it [weil ich will]" (Z, 
97). Such an active seizing of death, in Zarathustra's view, is a "spur 
and a promise to the living" (Z, 97), because dying worthily requires 
that "your spirit and your virtue still glow like a sunset glow around 
the earth" (7,99). This kind of confrontation with death is not a 
denial of an individual's life; it is a means to affirm what a 
particular existence has meant by stamping its extinction with its own 
unique character, or as Derrida has written; 
In order to put oneself to death, to give oneself death in the 
sense that every relation to death is an interpretative appre- 
hension and a representative approach to death, death must be 
taken upon oneself. One has to give it to oneself by ta"-i-t 
upon oneself, for it can only be nine adone, irreplaceably.: B: 4i! 
Xone-ntarily, Shelley's verbal urgency passes over any fears about 
becoming "lwlhat Adonais is", and governed by an overriding desire to 
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undergo the same transformation as Adonais, he faces his own 
irreplaceable death in order to perpetuate his unique literary legacy. 
What occurs, at first, appears to be a final affirmation. of' a 
metaphysical reality to which death will permit access: 
The One remains, the many change and pass; 
Heaven's light forever shines, Earth's shadows fly; 
Life, like a dome of many-coloured glass, 
Stains the white radiance of Eternity, 
Until Death tramples it to fragments. --Die, 
If thou wouldst be with that which thou dost seek! (460-5) 
The Neo-Platonic "One" is an ultimate manifestation of the 
transhistorical. reaim of eternity encountered previously in AdQnals. 
"The One" endures, with a constant "Heaven's light", outside of the 
historical, temporal, sphere of "Earth's shadows", Life imaged as a 
fragile "many-coloured glass" dome underlines how, all too easily, 
it De Death tramples it to fragments". Shelley's rhetorical skills ensure a 
more positive response to the instructive assertion of "I dlie, / If thou 
wouldst be with that which thou dost seek! " than to the passive inage of 
being trampled to death. Shelley's imagery plays out his previous 
dilemma, on a universal scale, with an increased urgency and continues 
to favour putting "oneself to death" over a passive extinction. It is, 
according to Adunais's poetic logic, more desirable to be at one with a 
"white radiance of Eternity" than to view its pure brilliance through a 
distorting lens of life's "many-coloured glass" dome. If speculating 
about eternity's "white radiance" from life's vantage point is invalid, 
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then Shelley is challenging the foundations of his own elegy and risks, 
as a poet, surrendering his power over language to a force beyond his 
imagination and control, This revelation allows a re-emergence of 
repressed fears, as it becomes increasingly evident that Shelley's 
command to "die" is tense with anxieties over encountering the 
uncontrollable, inexpressible, and unknown. ýý'ýý These anxieties find 
direct expression in a series of questions, which find their reply in 
rhetorical bravado: 
Why linger, why turn back, why shrink, my Heart? - 
'Tis Adonais calls! oh, hasten thither, 
No more let Life divide what death can join together. 
(469; 476-7) 
There is a moment of trepidation, an awareness of an attachment to 
life that cannot be severed without reluctance or a desire to "turn 
back" towards human existence. Yet Shelley is forbidden by his own 
poetic logic, which he has come to question, to "linger" forever in 
anticipation of embarking upon this dark, treacherous, voyage. Vorse 
still, Shelley must chart a course he cannot record accurately for a 
haven he fears his poetic language cannot represent. Shelley's 
scepticism, at this point, renders him impotent to resist the power of 
his own mythology and he finds himself compelled to "hasten thither" to 
where "Adonais calls" in the hope that there "death can join together" 
what life divides. Nietzsche is sensitive to what kind of conviction is 
required for *5,6ceptic to put out an a perilious voyage for an uncertain 
harbour and understands how important it is to make such a Journey: 
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Enough and more than enough of the wild and erring voyage over 
strange 1jFreMgjen1 dark seas! At last a coast appears in sight: 
we must land on it whatever it may be like, and the worst of 
harbours is better than to go reeling back into a hopeless 
infinity of scepticism. (Ul, 116) 
Adcjnais's f inal stanza bears witness to the conviction and doubt, 
impotence and strength, elation and fear, optimism and scepticism, 
required to undertake such an uncharted "voyage over strange [Fremden 
dark seas": 
The breath whose might I have invoked in song 
Descends on me; my spirit's bark is driven, 
Far from the shore, far from the trembling throng 
Whose sails were never to the tempest given; 
The nassy earth and sphered skies are riven! 
I an borne darkly, fearfully, afar... (487-92) 
Shelley relinquishes hinself and his poetical powers to the 
uncontrollable "breath" his "song" for Keats has "invoked". He must 
abandon the "trembling throng" of life and sail in solitude "Iflar from 
the shore", abandoning those II(w1hose sails were never to the tempest 
given". Shelley's ascent begins when the "breath" he has invocated 
"Idlescends" upon him and drives his "spirit's bark" beyond "Ctlhe massy 
earth and spheried skies". Both "earth" and "skies" are "riven" by 
Shelley's flight "from the shore", implying his transgression of 
conventional physical and spiritual boundaries, His voyage is a 
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thrilling and terrifying transcendence of transient existence and the 
f ormal, constraints of the genre of elegy.: -.,,, Once again, in Adondis, 
metaphysical speculation turns out to have a literary significance. The 
basis for Shelley's strength of conviction about an "abode where the 
Eternal are" (495) is rooted in his desire to establish his own literary 
legacy. Shelley's literary works, as much as his being, are "borne 
darkly, fearfully, afar" on the mighty "breath" of inspiration over 
which he has lost control. His dark, uncertain journey is analogous to 
the fate of his literary creations which will be scattered, like 
Shelley's "dead thoughts" at the Qlose of "Ode to the West Wind" (63), 
on a powerful, inspirational breath to unknown tuture generations of 
readers .: j= 
In Adonais the single historical moment of Keats's tragic death 
occasions a meditation on the posthunuous fate of writers and their 
works. Such a meditation witnesses Shelley's deferral of grief, through 
a forgetting of historical circumstance, to clear an artistic space for 
his own imaginative rhetorical strategies, This creative act oi 
forgetting cannot, indefinitely, suppress historical pressures and 
circumstance. Shelley's contemplation of a transhistorical realm is 
shown to be integral to a notion of a temporal sphere, which allows a 
re-emergence of history and a human need for remembrance. AdC2nai5 is an 
enduring monument to the -spirits of Adonais, Keats and Shelley, which 
are suspended in the moment of their becoming, "like flame transformed 
to marble" (447). Yet their f inal fates must be determined outside of 
language and life. Adonais transforms one specific historical moment 
into a complex universal mythology to empower a deceased Keats at the 
expense of Shelley's own poetic powers. Shelley is forced to orientate 
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his being towards death. He finally realises that his poetic reputation 
is dependent upon entrusting his literary legacy to an audience of 
unknown inheritors over whon, save the traces of his own imaginative 
power in AdoUais, he is powerless. Adonais's encounter with human 
mortality affirms life and liberates existence from death's tyranny, For 
Shelley, John Keats's moment of death occasioned a timely meditation on 
an untimely denise. 
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Adonis" such ritual mourning is for a "lovely one [who] lies wounded in 
the mountains" and causes Echo to resound- "[w1ho will weep -not thy 
dreadful woe o Venus", See Fair-Copy Manu, 5cripts of Shelley's Poems in 
European and Anerican Libraries, The Manuscripts of the Younger 
Ronantics vol. 8. Ed. Donald H. Reinan and Michael O'Neill, (New York: 
23 
Garland, 1997), 263; 267; xix-xx, See also Jennifer Wallace, Shelley and 
Gr! eece, Re: LhinkiUg Romantic Hellenisa (London, Macmillan, 1997>, 111-14, 
"I use the term "Shelley as elegist" to distinguish between the 
earlier movement in Adaliala where Shelley calls for mourning and his 
later entrance in the elegy as the Dionysian mourner with the 
"Stranger's mien" in stanzas 33 and 34. 
1'5 Leighton makes the point that "Shelley's elegy admits the fact 
that to write is to forgo the real nature of griei". See b12E, 126. Sacks 
argues that the earlier part of Adonais lacks a personal voice as grief 
is delegated to other mourners. See 1&', 382. 
" RCR, 174. 
17 Curran offers a detailed account of Shelley's borrowings of 
Keatsian imagery from the 1820 volume in Adonais. See 6UE, 170-1. 
11 Sacks notes this parallel with "Hyperion" and the scepticism 
involved in the efforts to wake Adonais and Saturn, See LQ, 383-4. 
11 Tetreault makes this observation. See a, 230. 
11 Wassernan similarly argues that Shelley ensures nature's ability 
to renew is transmuted into the capacity to resurrect the spirit. See 
SCR, 476, 
2" 1 agree with Wasserman that Adonais's overall strategy is to 
promote mind, or spirit, over material nature. However, I consider the 
elegy's second movenent more speculative than his account allows. See 
S-CR, 470-3. 
11 Tetreault makes a similar point. Curran understands this stanza 
as reworking the questions Keats poses at the close of "Ode to a 
Nightingale". See a, 230-1. See also ala, 173-4. 
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: 2ý':! Leighton "emphasises the disassociation of the song and the 
facts". See 3. a, 139; 137-6, 
24 There is general critical consensus concerning links between this 
figure and Dionysus. See a, 167 and M, 443. See also a, 221-2, 
Wasserman identifies similarities between the Dionysian mourner 
and Adonais, See b"ýU, 500; 484-8. Although, I do not agree that 
Shelley's use of the Actaeon myth is only a slight distortion of 
Adonaia's final disclosure. Wasserman, as Clark notes, makes a "hasty 
assumption of a personal immortality" at this point in the elegy. See 
ER, 222. 
Hogle understands the "broken lily" image as a sign that has been 
"cut off from... their own acts of reference". I an extending this 
notion, so that the "sign" is a poetic work and the missing referent is 
its deceased author. See a, 299. 
21 Clark points to the ambivalence of Cain's mark. See BE, 223. 
; 28 Clark discusses Shelley's "type of immortality" as "an enduring 
influence". See BE, 222. 
11 Tetreault argues that the speaker has given himself over to a 
governing transcendental "Power". See a, 231. 
: 3") Sacks argues that Keats is misrepresented as favouring an 
"egotistical sublimity". He also notes parallels between Adonais's 
closing stanzas and Wordsworth's "Immortality Ode", See LQ, 396-7. 
: 31 Similarly, Kelvin Everest reads this stanza as implying "Keats's 
innortality will take the forn of endless imental reincarnations in the 
minds of idealistic young readers. " See Everest, "Shelley, " in Iju 
Ronantic Period. The Penguin History of Literature Ser. val 5. Ed. David 
B. Pirie (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1994), 339. 
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Jacques Derrida, The Gilt of DP-atb, 1992. Religion and 
Postmodernism Ser, Trans. David Wills (Chicago: Chicago UP, 1995), 45, 
Tetreault makes this point about Shelley's command to "Idlie". 
Alternatively, Woodman argues that "Shelley is describing the suicidal 
moment". See P-L, 232. See also Al, 173. 
: Z4 4 Sacks argues that Adollais closes by striving beyond life and 
literary form. See LQ., 400. 
: 36 Clark suggests important similarities between "Ode to the West 
Wind" and Adonais. See BR, 222-3. 
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Chapter 6 
,,. Knowledge rº; Sell-Fashioning in tna Fragments 
and Shelley's The Irlu " of LIfe, 
But cannot I create... " 
(John Keats) 
I have suffered what I wrote... 2 
(P. B. Shelley) 
[We want to be the poets of our lives... ' 
(Friedrich Nietzsche) 
Romantic fragments receive a unique status from literary scholars, who 
understand this poetical form as being distinctly different from the 
fragmentary writings of Classical authors such as Sappho, or even Chaucer's 
incomplete pro. ject of The Canterbmry Tales .4 Both Keats's "Hyperion" 
projects and Shelley's unfinished The Trium1ph of Life belong to the 
category of Romantic fragment poem, although their incomplete states 
occurred for very different reasons, The Triu=h of Life ends abruptly with 
Shelley's accidental drowning whereas Keats's "Hyperion" fragments are 
curtailed by inherent structural difficulties in their poetic design. These 
literary fragments heighten a sense of reader responsibility, as a complete 
reading of their texts relies upon the audience's creative speculation. 
Their abrupt endings make a reader conscious of being actively involved in 
a relationship with an author's text, Critics have often observed how 
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Romantic fragment poems foreground the audience's role, so that "ItIhe 
writer and the reader both have a part to play in the poetic process"-`ý and 
become "actors rather than spectators" who teach "the text what we would 
learn fron it". 6 Reader and author are jointly inplicated in the fiction- 
making process, acutely aware that the re-invention of one by the other 
involves a reconstruction of their own identity. 
In Romantic f ragment poens, meaning and identity are forever 
indeterminate, only to be endlessly invented and interpreted, This 
continual process is emphasised by the unfinished form of a Romantic 
fragment, which questions Enlightenment's obsession with fixed, totalising, 
metaphysical explanations of the universe. Keats's "Hyperion" fragments and 
Shelley's The Triumph of Life offer a critique of Enlightenment belief in a 
stable world of the rational and suggest that Reason, as Nietzsche 
diagnoses, has "made the 'real' world a world not of change and becoming, 
but one of being" (ýT, 3,3,507). Like Nietzsche, Keats and Shelley 
understand metaphysics as only one interpretation of the universe out of an 
infinite series of other possible lictions. Such a view incorporates 
metaphysics into the metaphorical mode, regarding Enlightenment philosophy 
as merely another fiction, rather than a fixed absolute. Beyond 
metaphysical constraints, the self and world are open to an endless 
invention and revision, This creative freedom requires an embracing of 
existence's pleasures and pains without consolation from the transcendental 
realm of metaphysics. Nietzsche defines such an act as "amor fati. that one 
wants nothing to be other than it is, -not in the future, not in the past, 
not in all eternity" (BR, 68). Encounters with human suffering, mutability 
and tragedy are essential aspects of "EkInowledge enormous" (Hyperion, 3, 
113) which the self must master, if it is to realise its full potential in 
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Keats's "Hyperion" poems or Shelley's The TriumpIl of Life. Yet to master 
tragic knowledge of this kind is to have attained a perspective on human 
existence above and beyond life which, for Nietzsche, is the vantage-point 
of the Overman LUbermenschl. This perspective is hard-won because, as Rajan 
has commented on The Triumph of Lije, "to be our own gods is also to submit 
to the lasting misery and loneliness of the world" (U, 71). 
Struggle between the Classical gods of the Olynpian and Titanic factions 
is central to an understanding of Keats's "Hyperion" fragments. This 
conflict allows Keats to explore further his anxieties about identity and 
finds a NietzscheauL counterpart in the warring of metaphorical and 
metaphysical modes oi language. Like fiery aspirant Apollos, Keats and 
Nietzsche rise from the ruins of a fading metaphysical order, prophesying a 
new metaphorical era to replace the old scheme. Emphasis on self-invention 
as a revisionary process means that construction of a new identity must be 
rooted in what previously existed. This paradox is played out in Keats's 
"Hyperion", where the ardent promotion of revolution results not in Titanic 
downfall but points to a revolutionary change occurring at some future 
time. 
What prevents narrative and revolutionary fruition in Keats's fragment 
is a profound crisis of self*-identity, enacted both by Saturn, who must 
define a new identity without the power relations of kingship (1,125-6), 
and the aspiring Apollo, who must define a new ruling identity. Lifeless 
silence governs the fallen Sat-urn "quiet as a stone" in the "shady sadness 
of the vale" (1,4; 1), intimating the death of his Titanic voice and his 
inability to hold sway in the universe. If Saturn is incapable of "'god- 
like exercise'" (1,107), the netaphysical fiction of a "strong identity'" 
or "'real self'" Q, 114)--once the guarantee of his universal power--is no 
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longer meaningful in a changing cosmos. Paradoxically, Keats's description 
of the negations of sound, resonance, and life evoke their presence through 
the depiction of their absence. The text abounds with fresh outgrowths of 
meaning at the exact narrative point where all else is supposedly silenced 
and barren. Saturn is never robbed entirely of his capacity for "'godlike 
exercise'". He remains frozen as "natural sculpture" (1,85), but 
contemplates a new fiction for interpreting the self and world. "'But 
cannot I create? / Cannot I form.? Cannot I fashion forth / Another world, 
another universe... '" (1,141-3). 
Silencing the Titanic voice is constantly intimated but never achieved, 
Clearly, "Hyperion"Is cultural transition, represented by a transference of 
power from Titan to Olympian, cannot occur simply as a sharp break with 
Titanic reign. Apollo must fashion his own identity, voice, and order, in 
the light of past Titanic experience, much as Keats must f urge his poetic 
character through a revision of the gigantic literary legacy of Dante, 
Shakespeare, Spenser, Milton and Wordsworth. Using a similar strategy, 1he, 
Triumph of LUP, revises substantial parts of Petrarch's TrioafQ dAmore, 
Dante's Divine Comedy and Wordsworth's "Ode: Intinations of Immortality"', 
so that Shelley can distinguish his poetic character from these established 
poets and authorise his poem with the seal of literary tradition. Keats's 
revisionary figure of Apollo re-animates a past cultural and poetical 
legacy with his own lifef'orce--or rather inaginative powers--so that he can 
confront his own self-negation and ''fashion forth'" a new cultural and 
literary identity for himself. Keats's description of Saturn's lifeless 
condition does not seal him within a sarcophagus of silence, but reaninates 
the fallen Titan so that a new poetical voice--whether Olympian or 
Keatsian--can be liberated. 
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Apollo's predicament parallels Saturn's past and present dilemma: he 
must "'fashion'", or create, a new identity if his "'unpractis'd hands"I 
(1,62) are ever to command the universe. Apollo's deification falters an 
the text's margins, caught between identity and non-identity, between a 
metaphysical system of certainty and the uncertainty of a metaphorical mode 
and, ultimately, between life and death, Such a failed transformation, like 
Saturn's faltering decline on the "margin-sand" (1,15), highlights the 
poem's ability to blur distinctive states of being and modes of 
consciousness. "Hyperion"'s abrupt ending forces life and literature to 
spill over into one another, so that its failed self -transformations force 
a disclosure about the author's and reader's own inventive efforts to 
fashion new self-identities. 
No matter how the lesson of Thea's tragic "eyes eterne" (1,117) is 
interpreted, Apollo's transformation and reign (if it were included within 
the boundaries of the text) would only create a "strong identity" and 
incarcerate Apollo within a metaphysical scheme. The superiority of 
Apollo's reign over Saturn's depends upon its strategic deferral to a point 
in time and space outside the text, which avoids fixing his identity in the 
poem's narrative: "At length / Apollo shriek'd; -and lo! from all his limbs 
/ Celestial. .- '" (3,134-5). 
Apollo occupies a threshold between mortal man and immortal deity, a 
transition indicating a crisis on the margin--or what Derrida, terms the 
"borderline" --of the text. -' The Derridean "borderline" marks a cross-over 
point between the life and work of an author, forcing a merging of life and 
literature. Derrida chooses this expression for the subtitle of his own 
oblique piece of criticism on Ihe Triu=h of Life which, on one hand, 
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obscures an already difficult text and, on the other, unravels many of the 
problems that criticism has encountered with Shelley's poem; 
I register, I record this remark on the shore of what is called 
the unfinishedness of "The Triumph of Life", at the moment when 
Sheliey is drowned. 9 
Derrida's laconic remark collapses and conflates the complexity of 
Varying critical accounts of Shelley's fragment. The notion of 
"registering" and "recording" appears to suggest a certainty about the 
relation between the processes of writing and reading in The Triumph of 
Life-, particularly as in Derrida's view both are allegories of one 
another. 10 This critical certainty is belied by a repetition of "I" and the 
inscription of this reimark upon a sandy sea-washed shore, which re-enacts 
the poemi's uncertainty about who or what is persistently asking questions 
about origin, presence and meaning, Cleverly, Derrida evokes de Man's 
-notion of "effacement... [as] ... the loss of af ace" and the reading process 
as one of erasure (IRE, 100). Consequently, the "I" confidently asserted to 
a register" or "record" The Triunph of Ule. 's meaning is threatened by an 
evocation of de Manian "effacement" and its status questioned. Derrida's 
comunent is a pointed reminder not only of Shelley's Ble Triumph of Life as 
fiction, but of the fictive nature of any critical reading, Recalling 
Keats's "margin-sand", The Triuzpla c2f Life's inage of the shoreline 
suggests its occupation of a textual and geographical verge and 
preoccupation with an undetermined transitional "borderline": 
"And suddenly my brain become as sand 
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Where the first wave had more than half erased 
The track of deer on desert Labrador, 
Whilst the fierce wolf from which they fled anazed 
"Leaves his stamp visibly upon the shore 
Until the second bursts--so on my sight 
Burst a new Vision never seen before. --" (405-10) 
The fragment's concern with problems of identity, symbolised by 
Rousseau's quest for origin and the unknown figure in the car of Life, is 
perfectly expressed in this image of the waves erasing "CtIhe tracks" in 
the sand. For de Man, Shelley's image represents a "failure to satisfy a 
desire for self-knowledge" (RE, 99), because of the ultimate impossibility 
of accurately recording such knowledge on the sandy surface of Rousseau's 
transformed "brain". These lines are rendered by de Xan as recording a 
nihilistic erasure of the figural "I" at the exact noment of its own 
positing, To go against the tide of de Manian opinion would be to interpret 
these lines as a tragIc attempt at self-invention and an exploration of the 
linguistic difficulties involved in such a process. II This deconstructive 
reading turns on the impossibility of knowing and reading, implying that 
central to all attempts at self-fashioning, or self-knowledge, is a 
subscription to the illusion of idealism, 
For de Man, Rousseau asking "Islhew whence I came, and where I am, and 
why-10 (398) is a question posited with a nalve expectation that he will be 
answered with a revelation of the metaphysical absolute underpinning self 
and life, Yet it is precisely the idealisn of Rousseau's question which 
permits a sceptical realisation about the impossibility of metaphysical 
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absolutes. Idealistic illusions are stripped away to disclose a sceptical 
mode of epistemological and ontological uncertainty, as the self is 
perpetually erased by the constant action of shifting sands and a continual 
sea-change, The questioning "I" Of The Tr-iumPh of LIfe is never entirely 
erased, for as one identity fades the creation of another modified one 
begins. These washed-away deer "tracks" are replaced by those of the 
pursuing wolf which, momentarily, "leaves his stamp visibly upon the shore" 
before they are also swept away, just as this particular vision "bursts" 
into another. 
Paradoxically, de Man's analysis of this image as one of self-erasure 
presupposes a metaphysical notion of self. If the desire for self-knowledge 
had been realised in The Triumph of Life, the "tracks" would remain forever 
imprinted on the shore. Such indelible markings would echo the "large foot- 
marks" (1,15> left behind by Keats's Titans, for their successors to 
follow at their own peril. Put differently, de Nan's critical effort to 
erase the self leads only to a re-emergence of its importance and an 
awareness of its elusive fictional status. De Xan's concept of the 
"disfigured" (RE, 123) in ]: he Triu=h of Life is indicative of scholarly 
endeavours to create a readable text of Shelley's fragnent, but not of the 
impossibility of reading. Donald Reiman's editorial task was occasioned by 
the random occurence of Shelley's death"', as this event rendered the 
manuscript of the poem forever fragmented, displaced, incomplete and, for 
precisely these reasons, forever readable. Like the allegorical relation 
between reading and writing, the readability of The Triu=11 of Wfe is a 
direct result of its unreadability in manuscript form, De Man's endless 
"madness of words" (ER, 122) is avoidable if, as Rajan suggests, the 
effacement of one reading is the means to recovering another (ER, 349). 
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The conflict between Olympian and Titan, in Nietzsche's words, repre-sents a 
transitory stage between the "old shattered law-tabies", or the "name" of* 
the deceased poet, and the "new-law tables--half written" (Z, 216>, which 
are the partly completed processes of the readers' countersignatures to the 
author's autograph. 
Transformation oi Apollo falters in the indistinct textual twilight of 
the "borderline", caught between mortality and immortality, linguistic 
certainty and uncertainty, and identity and non-identity, all of which 
indicate a return to the prefiguring event of Saturn's crisis on the 
threshold of the "marsin-sand". This transitional twilight imagery 
characterises The Triumph of Life's description of daybreak where, 
according to the narrator who relates his "waking dream" (42>, "before me 
fled / The night; behind me rose the day" (25-6) as the "Sun sprang lorth 
Rejoicing in his splendour, and the mask of darkness fell from the awakened 
Earth" (2-4). Shelley's patterns of' light and darkness reflect a confusion 
about states of consciousness and modes of knowledge inherent in the 
narrator's account, who is so uncertain of the exact nature of his 
experience and identity that even spatially he is caught between "the 
Deep... at my feet" and "Heaven above my head" (27-8). " For Keats, a 
blurring of two apparent opposites at the extreme edges of "Hyperion"'s 
text sets a precedent for similarities between Saturn's "Will to Knowledge" 
and Apollo's "Will to Power"; in fact, Saturn's "Vill to Knowledge" could 
be the product of a corrupted "Will to Power". These power relations are 
worked out through a pattern of ascent and descent and, finally, merged in 
literal twilight when Hyperion battles to prevent his own fall from 
power and Apollo's deification: 
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Rajan's recent reading offers a less nihilistic deconstructive account of 
The Triunph of Life. Although she accepts the absolute loss and 
irrecoverability of the poem's original meaning, she does not surrender the 
text to the repetitive gloom of de, Man's assertion that "to read is to 
understand, to question, to know, to forget, to erase, to deface, to 
repeat" (aR, 122). Rajan chooses instead to view the effacement of one 
reading as the means to a recovery of another (a, 349). What emerges is 
an endless series of writings and i-eadings through which author and reader 
pdrticipate in a continual process of successive self-revision and self- 
fashioning. Shelley's posthumous influence rests with an infinite number of 
readers' re-constructions of his poetic identity, 
Keats's "margin-sand", like Shelley's shoreline, reveals "Hyperion"Is 
own autotelic structure, The once living, now deceased Keats, is engaged in 
writing--or "auto-graphing" --the nature of his new poetic character, which 
can only derive credibility from a future that is by no means assured. 13 
Only Keats's own autograph offers the chance to attain this credibility as, 
in Derrideau terms, he becomes the "bearer of the name" John Keats (EQO, 
44); a signature eternally returned to by readers of Keats and diversely 
interpreted--and endlessly constructed--by them through a succession of 
readings and re-readings, writings and re-writings, The credibility of 
Keats's poeticai character rests with readers' eternal affirmation of his 
aesthetic revolution through this act of countersigning-or re- 
constructing--the Keatsian signature. " To countersign requires a reader to 
stamp Keats' s autograph with their own personal seal and so ensure the 
continuation of the "name" of the deceased John Keats. Consequently, there 
are no limits on readers' reconstructions of the signature, for as Derrida 
writes, "[w1hat returns to the name never returns to the living" (EQU, 44). 
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And all along a dismal rack of clouds, 
Upon the boundaries of day and night, 
He stretch'd himself in grief and radiance faint. 
(1,302-4). 
"Hyperion" is preoccupied with a fiction-making process of self-creation 
and self-discovery, promising the birth of a new voice and identity through 
a revolutionary overthrow of Titan by Olympian, but the poem never fully 
realises this event. "Hyperion" does not subscribe to Oceanus's 
understanding of "progress", which professes to be "eternal law", 
preferring to explore self-creation as process rather than as a means to a 
particular universal stage; or as Saturn would have it, a specific state of 
being. "Hyperion'"s focus is on the process of a self writing itself a 
future fictional identity that has little guarantee of ever existing. 
Nietzsche, like Keats, places emphasis on this process of self- 
construction, rather than ascribing to the process a particular end or 
final state: 
IMIan is a bridge and not a goal; counting himself happy 
for his noontides and evenings, as a way to new dawns... 
(Z, 215). 
Generically, "Hyperion" may take the form of an eighteenth-century progress 
poem":: '-, but its Rietzschean understanding of Olympian dawn, as inevitable 
outcome rather than intended telos, belies its apparent Enlightenment 
origins, The Enlightenment myth of human progress is reversed through a 
negative interpretation of change. Consequently, Apollo's dawn is delayed 
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to avoid Hyperion's overshadowing, "like the bulk / Of Xemnon's image at the 
set of sun" (2,373-4). Titanic decline remains the centrepiece, of 
"Hyperion" against Olympian aspiration, teaching a "sorrow more beautiful 
than Beauty's self" (1,35), which forces a suspension in the narrative, 
Ambivalently Keats's Titans portray, on one hand, enormous tragic suffering 
and, on the other, explain their tragedy as a rational necessity. In spite 
of Keats's distrust of reason, his empathy with Titanic demise and 
"Hyperion"'s parallels with the progress poem form indicate his ambiguity 
toward Enlightenment ideals. 
A similar ambiguity is present in Shelley's treatment of Rousseau, which 
oscillates between rehabilitation and rejection of him as an Enlightenment 
writer. Even if Rousseau's rejection is the final outcome, his confessional 
account is central to The Triumph of Life and, like "Hyperion"'s Titans, 
cannot be easily displaced from the text, Shelley's ambivalent attitude to 
the Enlightenment is reflected by Rousseau's "last" look (546), indicating 
his separation from the "sad pageantry" (176), which still consists of 
"those spoilers spoiied, Voltaire... and Kant" (235-6). The Triunph of 
Life's interpenetrating patterns of light and dark indicate Shelley's pre- 
occupation with intellectual enlightennent, and ignorance. 17 This 
exploration of what it is to be enlightened or ignorant is played out in 
the numerous questions asked by the younger Rousseau and the dreaming 
narrator: 
Half to myself I said, "And what is this? 
Whose shape is that within the car? & why? "-- (176-8) 
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The narrator's questions are out short by Rousseau's interjection of 
"Life" (180) in response to them, Rousseau's "strange distortion,, (183) 
diagnoses in the narrator a "thirst of knowledge" (194> which once may have 
been like his own, but Rousseau having already "feared, loved, hated, 
suffered... and died" (200) has becone "weary" K-196) of seeking out 
knowledge. Rousseau's affliction extends beyond weariness to an incapacity 
to know, as he is unable to answer the narrator's question, "who art thou? " 
replying only that his present forn is a "disguise" and that there 
"was once Rousseau" (204). Rousseau's credibility as an enlightened guide 
is cast in a shadow of doubt before he has began to "relate / The progress 
of the pageant" (193. ). The narrator's constant questioning represents a 
human desire, which achieved its fullest expression in the Enlightenment, 
to wrest order, purpose and meaning from the indifferent, ceaseless, 
"mighty torrent" of life which randomly buffets an individual "through 
the sky [as] / One of the million leaves of summer's bier" (53; 50-1). "1 
Such a desire leads to the belief that beyond the chaos of existence there 
is a metaphysical realm that lends life a purpose or what Shelley 
understands, in terms reminiscent of AdonaLis, as a "native noon" for "the 
sacred few" (131; 128), Both Shelley's narrator and the young Rousseau 
believe that an absolute, unquestionable and transcendental meaning can be 
imposed upon life, and they strive to establish its ultimate significance. 
By implication, Rousseau belongs with those feigners of "the morn of truth" 
(214) and the supposedly enlightened company of Voltaire and Kant, who 
remaiiL chained to the car of Life. If Rousseau is enlightened, his insight 
is derived not from a system of metaphysics, but through his confessional 
response to the question, "I wl hence camest thou and whither goest thou? " 
(296), Central to Rousseau's own account of his life's quest for knowledge 
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is his encounter with the "a shape all light" in the "orient cavern" (344; 
352): 
".., (Wlhich with one hand did fling 
Dew on the earth, as if she were the Dawn 
Whose invisible rain forever seemed to sing 
"A silver music on the mossy lawn, 
And still before her on the dusky grass 
Iris her many coloured scarf had drawn. --" (352-6) 
Rousseau's "shape all light" is described as a product of "the bright 
omnipresence / Of morning" which "I blurned on the waters of the well" (343; 
346). Recalling a Wordsworthian regret for the passing of "a glory from the 
earth", indicated for him by "lwlaters on a starry night" and the 
sunshine's "glorious birth" (14-15; 18), Rousseau's vision becomes symbolic 
of those ideals he sought to extract from a chaotic universe. The sensual 
"shape all light" is a momentary coalescence of invisible vision, material 
insubstantiality and "many coloured" white brilliance occasioned by 
Rousseau's own fiction-making. She is born of a youthful Rousseau's "Vill 
to Knowledge" which insists that the transcendental "realm without a name" 
(396) can be revealed and expressed in words. 
The older Rousseau's confession suggests a scepticisn about the "shape 
all light" that was absent fron his original experience of her, recognising 
that to contemplate such ideal unity and beauty risks "the gazer's mind" 
being "strewn beneath / Her feet like embers" (386-7). Contemplation of an 
ideal metaphysical realm turns out not to be valuable in itself, but for 
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what is revealed about the human world of contingemý: ies and transience, 
Rousseau's "shape all light" does not enlighten him through her 
revelational brilliance, for she is "Eals Day upon -the threshold of the 
east" (389), but by a "darkness" which "reillunines even the least / Of 
heaven's living eyes" (391-2). If the "shape all light" reveals anything to 
Rousseau, it is that pursuing an ideal should lead tO an existential 
acceptance oi "this harsh world" (334). " After all, her "fair shape waned 
in the coming light" of "the new Vision" with "its cold bright car" of Life 
(412; 434) and, having drugged Rousseau with "Nepenthe" (299), she abandons 
him to "the sick day in which we wake to weep" (430). Rousseau's quest for 
enlightenment ends with the realisation that aspirations to ideals are only 
"forever sought" and "forever lost" (431). More importantly, Rousseau 
acknowledges the "shape all light" as an illuminating darkness, which 
teaches an acceptance of life's procession and a certain responsibility he 
must have for his words that "were seeds of misery" (279). Shelley's 
Rousseau, if he is to avoid condemnation, has to come to terms with "a 
world of agony" (295) in which his mind's lliires" will be extinguished in 
"the dust of death" (388). In the same way, Keats's Apollo must actively 
embrace suffering if he is ever to achieve deification through an act of 
self-creation: 
But that the creator may exist, that itself requires suffering 
and much transformation.., For the creator himself to be the 
child new-born he must also be willing to be the mother and 
endure the mother's pain. 
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Death is a necessary precondition to self -construction in "Hyperion", 
because it is precisely the negation of life and the onset of Titanic 
decline that will permit the "new born" voices of Apollo and Keats to 
speak. Paradoxically, Apollo must die into inmortality, as the once living 
Keats nust, surrender--through the act of writing--to the death-in-life of a 
suspended "Hyperion" text, if his imnartal voice as author is to reach the 
reader from beyond the grave. Zarathustra, prophet of' the noontide, acts as 
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a signpost to the becoming Overman [Ubermensckl and a constructed mask from 
behind which Nietzsche can teach his anti -metaphysical philosophy (even 
after the event of his own death). He performs a similar function to 
Apollo, who is prophet of a new dawn and of Keats's unique poetic identity 
and power soon to be born--or buried in the grave, 
Yet Keats was to discard the Olympian mask of "far-flown Apollo" (1, 
204) in "The Fall of Hyperion", and to experiment more directly with the 
processes of self-invention. The replacement of "far-flown Apollo" with a 
human poet-figure, and the rite of suffering undertaken by the poet in 
ascending the "immortal steps" ("The Fall, " 1,117), emphasise how crucial 
the dark wisdom of the Titans is to "The Fall of Hyperion", Keats's 
inclusion of a poet-figure makes "The Fall'"s action more directly relevant 
to the issue of self-creation. Nonetheless, the poem's events are further 
distanced, as is dramatic action in Shelley's The Triu=h of Life, by 
Keats's use of a Dantean dream framework as a narrative device. 20 In spite 
of the centrality of suffering to both these fragnents the anguish of their 
respective protagonists remains at an interpretative distance from the 
audience, Rousseau's visionary experience is told, retrospectively, within 
the narrator's dream and Moneta reveals her vision of' the fallen Titans to 
a dreaming poet. Readers must sharpen their critical faculties if they are 
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to appreciate and affirm the tragedy at the heart of The TriumDh o' Life 
and "The Fall of Hyperion". For Keats, a retrospective account of the clash 
between the Olympic and Titanic factions enables a shift of focus from the 
displacement of one culture, power, and identity by another--the subject of 
the first "Hyperion" fragment-to a greater emphasis on the affirmation of 
suffering. 
"To see as a God sees" ("The Fall" 1,304) is the aspiration of the 
poet-figure, who must forge his own unique literary identity by accepting 
both the fictionality of his own self-identity and the inevitability of 
mortal suffering and death, Once again poetic self-identity and self- 
knowledge is to be partly constructed and partly disclosed: a process 
worked out for the author through the actual writing of the text and for 
the reader through the construction--or reading--of that writing. The 
implicit relation between reading and writing in "Hyperion" presents the 
reader as a perpetual countersigner to the poetic fragment--when confronted 
with the absence of the deceased author who is indefinitely incapable of 
signing--a role more explicitly explored in "The Fall": 
'Whether the dream now purposed to rehearse 
Be poet's or fanatic's will be known 
When this warm scribe my hand is in the grave. 
("The Fall" 1,16-19). 
A reader's judgement will either confine "The Fall" to the mere 
ramblings of a dream-crazed fanatic or, alternatively, recognise it as a 
work by a "poet" who has felt the "high tragedy" of the Titans (1,277). To 
pronounce "The Fall", the work of a "poet" involves the reader, 
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imaginatively reanimating the author's hand of in the gravel, and 
countersigning this poetic legacy by tracilig "upon vellun or wild Indian 
leaf / The shadows of melodious utterance" (1,5-6). If readers fail to 
graLsp this duality of experience and consciousness, they can only condemn 
"The Fall" as the scribblings of a fanatic and dismiss poetic vision as 
mere idealised illusion. Readers must, as Shelley urges in The Iriu=h Qf 
Life, "from spectator turn / Actor or victin in this wretchedness" so that 
they actively engage with life and literature teaching the deceased 
author's text, in Rousseau's words, "what thou wouldst be taught" (305-7). 
1he necessity of first hand knowledge of the "harsh world", before T 
undertaking a process of self-revision, is emphasised by Shelley's apparent 
distinction between Classical "great bards of old" and recent poets of 
tragic feeling: 
"See the great bards of old who inly quelled 
The passions which they sung, as by their strain 
May well be known: their living melody 
Tenpers its own contagion to the vein 
"Of those who are infected with it--I 
Have suffered what I wrote, or viler pain! --" (274-9) 
These "great bards of old", who had previously attained sanctuary in the 
abode of the "sacred few", must be purged by being infected with human 
existence's "contagion" if their words are ever to be a balm to the world. 
Life cannot be substituted for a metaphysical realm and all poets, 
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including Rousseau, must suffer the "viler pain" of' human existence with 
the rest of the multitude. Only those classed as the "dreamer tribe" ("The 
Fall, " 198) by Keats's Moneta would forsake existence in pursuit of a 
transcendental ideal, vexing rather than comforting the world. 1" These 
"great bards of old", Rousseau, the dreaming narrator and The Triu=h of 
Lifals audience are compelled to embark upon a process of endless self- 
revision in light of their intense awareness of suffering. Shelley ensures 
this self-revision is viewed as a. vital present and future process, which 
is of equal importance to the living and those who have already gone to 
their graves: 
New figures on its false and fragile glass 
"As the old faded. "--"Figures ever new 
Rise on the bubble, paint them how you may; 
We have but thrown, as those before us threw... (247-50) 
What is tragically realised is that life and death are the two necessary 
conditions upon which any definition of self-identity depends, These 
emerging "InIew figures" constantly risk becoming "faded", bordering on the 
discovery of the falsity of their supposed truths and the fragility of 
their own fictionality. The validity of any one of these self -constructions 
will always remain in doubt and open to question, capable only of a 
momentary self -af f irmation which must be constantly revised and replaced by 
"I fI igures ever new" - 
Keats's revision of the "Hyperion" fragment--a text itself preoccupied 
with the revision of a literary and cultural tradition--establishes a 
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complex relation between the action of" writing and reading, Both Keats's 
"The Fall" and Shelley's Ihe Triumph Qf Ljje are revisionary poens. "The- 
Fall" is literally a re-reading and re-writing ot "Hyperion" and Ila 
Triumph of Life reviews AdQnais's rhetorical confidence in "the abode where 
the Eternal are" (495. ) and renders life an endless series of "Ifligures 
ever new" from which no metaphysical comfort can be extracted. The worth of 
these revisionary works rests with readers' individual interpretations, 
which are to a certain degree governed by the emphasis of these texts on 
the difficulty of knowing and interpreting, These fragments must be 
interpreted within their textual frameworks, but a reader loyal to their 
meaning would, finally, pass beyond their broken forms to an active life of 
living, knowing and suffering. This process involves the potential re- 
reading of the author's literary identity (or "name") and re-writing of the 
reader's self -identity--literature both reads and writes the author and 
reader as much as it is written or read by them. The double truth of "dying 
into life" is written on and read fron Moneta's face by the author and 
reader. The human poet-figure, like his forerunner Apollo, must prove his 
ability to interpret a lesson from a face that is "deathwards progressing / 
To no death" (1,261-2). 
Moneta's visage reveals an active embrace of suffering and so fully 
grasps the double truth of "dying into life", unifying the states of life 
and death, Moneta attains the death-in-life condition sought by the poet- 
figure (who, like Keats, desires to be immortalised and so speak from the 
grave), by Apollo (whose deification requires a dying out of mortal life 
into immortality), aLnd not least, the faithful countersigning reader (who 
wishes to reanimate the lifeless poet, Keats>. To grasp the essential 
double truth beyond and over the text of the "Hyperion" fragments is, as 
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Nietzsche writes of Zarathustra, "to have one foot bQIWMýL life,, (BR, 42) 
and to relish both great joy and suffering, existence and self- 
annihilation. New dawns of self-discovery and self-creation are only 
possible if death of a former self-identity is a relished prospect, or 
even a more literal death embraced. Saturn in the recast fragment accepts, 
rather than struggles, against his demise, affirming the "high tragedy" 
through a repetition of "moan" and the simple words: "'There shall be 
death'" (1,424). This tragic consciousness of duality is present in 
Shelley 's "icy cold" (77) anticipation of the car of Life's approach, 
driven endlessly on by the "Janus-visaged Shadow" whose all "four 
f aces... had their eyes banded" (99-100): 
So came a chariot on the silent storm 
Of its own rushing splendour, and a Shape 
So sate within as one whom years deform 
Beneath a dusky hood and double cape 
Crouching within the shadow of a tomb, 
And o'er what seemed the head a cloud like crape 
Was bent, a dun and faint etherial gloom 
Tempering the light... (86-93) 
Heralded by a "cold glare. ., intenser than the noon" (77) and 
borne "on 
the silent storm / Of its own splendour", Shelley's chariot recalls the 
"Shape all light[ 'sl" trampling of Rousseau's mind "thought by thought" 
(387) with its "light's severe excess" (424). "ý The "Shape" concealed 
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11 [ b) eneath a dusky- hood. .. crouchi lig wi thi i, the shadow of a tomb" is the 
inevitable dark otherside to Rousseau's idealised vision of the "shape all 
light" and a reminder that unity, fixed meaning. and transcendent ideals 
lead only to a realisation of reality's relentless indifference and random 
chaos. Such indifferent chaos is emphasised by the charioteer's "banded 
eyes" (104), whose blind insistence ensures submission to the car of Lifels 
darker revelation, and the "wonder-winged team[Is]" obscurity, whose 
"Shapes" are lost in apocalyptic and self-destructive "thick lightnings" 
(95-6). The chariot's "rushing splendour" points to, as the "shape all 
light" instructs Rousseau, the destruction of ideaLlised vision and an 
acceptance of suffering and self -annihilation which in itself provides an 
impetus for imaginative fiction-making; the "car's creative ray" (533) is 
its obliterating "cold glare". Light and darkness, creation and 
destruction, life and death, interpenetrate one another as the "shape ail 
light" fades into the shadowy unknown form of the "Shape". Neither vision, 
in The Triumph of Life, is iinal and the car of Life might at any moment 
dissolve into a new vision as the "Shape all light" is succeeded by the 
chariot. This implied succession of visions, or imaginative versions of 
reality, play out Rousseau's understanding of how "Efligures ever new / 
Rise on the bubble" and his later observation that "Imlask after mask fell 
from countenance / And form of all" (535-7). -ýý:; -ý: Consequently, Shelley's 
fragment gestures towards an unending process of self-invention and self- 
revision. 
The lesson in Moneta's face re-emphasises this "borderline" 
indistinction between life and death--in which there is "COnstant 
change... progressing to 'no death" (1,260- 1) --signpost ing the way towards 
the process of "becoming" without ever affirming its fruition, preferring 
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instead to defer the moment of consummation and its responsibility to the 
reader. "The Fall" enacts the same suspension of' process. Though the 
"Hyperion" fragments tare capable of pointing to the process of aesthetic 
self-recovery and hint at the double truths such a process requires, 
to 
neither fragment is able to "'fashion forth"' an Overman LUbernenschj from 
the figure of Apollo, Saturn, or the poet-i: igure. Instead, the poetic 
fragments disclose and suspend the autotelic process involved in the self 
forging its own fictional identity. The responsibility for aesthetic self- 
loss and recovery is, like the worth of Keats's and Shelley's poetic 
identities, decisively deferred to their readers who, having traced the 
"large foot-marks" of the Titans along the " margi n-sand" to the 
"borderline" of the fragments, must with Apollo make their choices about 
the nature of the aesthetic revolution they will countersign. 
Shelley's The Triumph of Lifa and Keats's "Hyperion" fragments enact a 
Keatsian "Vale of Soul-making" (a, 2,102)ýý`4, which invests individuals 
with a creative potentiality to attain their identities through self- 
invention, pre-figuring Nietzsche's belief that hunanity could "overcone" 
itself using self-creation: 
Could you conceive a god? - But may the will to truth mean 
this to you: that everything shall be transformed into the 
humanly-conceivable, the humanly-evident, the humanly-palpable! 
You should follow your senses to the end! Q, 110). 
Such an aesthetic act of self-creation requires an affirmation Of the 
whole of life, its Joys and sorrows: a view which finds ultimate expression 
in the Nietzschean "great Yes to life" and literature (EH, 42). After all, 
1) 1,65 
for Nietzsche, it is "LoInly as an aesthptic Lthatj human 
existence and the world [is] eternally justified" (BL 52). To go beyond 
reading of Titanic loss and Olympian aspiration, or Rousseau's 
disillusionment, or the prophecies of Zarathustra is, effectively, to live 
a life and constantly create an identity through "becoming". For this 
reason Apollo must "die into life,, and be willing to accept Titanic 
suffering by pursuing the "large foot-marks" ("Hyperion", 1,15); the poet- 
figure must, like Apollo, embrace life and death by ascending the stairs 
with "iced foot" ("The Fall", 1,132) and Rousseau must remain separate 
from and yet forever implicated in the "sad pageantry", Yet if the double 
truth contained in the self-identity crises of the "Hyperion" fragments, or 
Ihe TriulWh QI Life, is to be grasped the reader must follow these "same 
steps". This responsibility, attributed to the reader by Keats and Shelley, 
is echoed by Nietzsche's prescription for grasping the truth of 
Zarathustra: 
To understand anything at all of my Zarathustra one has to 
possess a qualification similar to that which I possess--to 
have one foot beyond life. (Ea, 42) 
Self-overcoming may involve the grasping of certain double truths, but 
ironically, although they seen to exist beyond or above literature, or even 
life, their value does not rest with unlocking the secret of transcendence 
for the "becoming" Overman ChermensQh ; rather, with an active engagement 
in, and affirmation of, human experience and existence. "To see as a god 
sees" , as Apollo, Saturn, the poet-figure and Rousseau know all too well, 
involves exercising the divine gift of self-creation and an affirmation of 
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hunan suffering and tragedy. Inevitably, the god-like aspiration of sell- 
overcoming serves only to remind individuals of their contingent, culpable, 
, so 
and mortal nature, for as Nietzsche urges, the Overman LU ernellsoll) must 
joyously embrace the tragic circumstances of our human condition, 
Signposts to the process of self-overcoming and self-creation are 
littered everywhere amongst the ruins of the fragments of Keats's 
"Hyperion" poem and Shelley's The TrJuMph of Life; waiting to be read in 
and written on the tragic faces of the Titans, or the death-in-life visage 
of the priestess Moneta, or even the hidden countenance of Mnemosyne and 
the "Shape" within the car of Life. The lessons written and read in these 
faces apparently promote an overcoming of life and literary text, through a 
recognition of the fictive nature of self-identity, and a seizing upon 
vital double truths about existence. 
Neither Keats's "Hyperion" fragments nor Shelley's The Triu=h of Life 
are prescriptive about the lessons that are written or read into them for-- 
like Zarathustra's instructions to his disci pl es--t heir ultimate authority 
and meaning rests not with Keats, Shelley, or Nietzsche, but with their 
readers' countersignatures. Keats, Shelley, and Nietzsche ensure, through a 
process of infinite deferral, that the responsibility of reconstructing 
their texts is firmly placed with the reader, Self-overcoming is not an 
ideal imposed upon the readers of Keats's "Hyperion" fragmentss or 
Shelley's The Triu=h oj Life, for them to admire, but an ideal that they 
must fashion into their own, "" Only then can a reader truly countersign an 
aesthetic revolution of self-revision, and proclaim a great Nietzschean 
"Yes to life" and literature, 
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